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What do we need a theory of concepts for?  Two answers to this ‘meta-level’ question 
about concepts figure prominently in the recent philosophical literature, namely, that 
concepts are needed primarily for the purposes of psychological explanation, and that 
concepts are needed primarily for the purposes of normative epistemology.  I argue that 
the psychological perspective leads to what I call ‘Judgment Pragmatism’, which is a 
version of conceptual/inferential role semantics according to which concepts are not 
constitutively tied to rationality and knowledge. 
I begin in Chapter 1 by distinguishing two uses of the term ‘concept’ found in the 
literature, and laying out some constraints on any adequate theory of concepts.  In 
Chapter 2, I articulate the two meta-level approaches under consideration, and explain 
how the work of Jerry Fodor and Christopher Peacocke is representative of the 
psychological and epistemological perspectives, respectively.  I also show that the meta-
level question is distinct from the object-level question of whether Fodor’s Informational 
Atomism or Peacocke’s ‘Concept Pragmatism’ is correct. 
In Chapter 3, I distinguish two versions of Concept Pragmatism: Judgment 
Pragmatism, which individuates concepts in terms of mere judgment, and Knowledge 
Pragmatism, which individuates some concepts in terms of knowledge.  I argue against 
Peacocke’s claim that the former leads to the latter, and show that the perspective of 
psychological explanation provides us with reasons to resist Knowledge Pragmatism.  I 
then consider, in Chapter 4, one of Peacocke’s arguments for Judgment Pragmatism, and 
articulate the Quinean Challenge it faces.  In Chapter 5, I argue that Quine’s arguments 
against the analytic/synthetic distinction are inadequate, and that Concept Pragmatism is 
not vulnerable to Fodor’s empirical case against the analytic. 
I then make the empirical case for Judgment Pragmatism, in Chapter 6, by 
defending the view that positing the analytic/synthetic distinction is a piece of 
explanatory psychology.  In Chapter 7, I consider the dialectical role of Frege cases, and 
argue that adopting the psychological perspective allows us to stake out a middle ground 
between Fodor’s ‘syntactic’ treatment and Peacocke’s claim that concepts are 
constitutively tied to reasons and rationality.  Chapter 8 offers some concluding thoughts.   
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 ii 
 
 
 
 
We are in the midst of a major interdisciplinary attempt to understand the mental process by which 
human behavior accommodates to the world’s demands—an attempt to understand human 
rationality, in short.  Concepts are the pivot that this project turns on since they are what mediate 
between the mind and the world.  Concepts connect with the world by representing it, and they 
connect with the mind by being the constituents of beliefs.  If you get it wrong about what 
concepts are, almost certainly you will get the rest wrong too. 
 
-Jerry Fodor  
   
 
Asking a psychologist, a philosopher, or a linguist what a concept is is much like asking a 
physicist what mass is.  An answer cannot be given in isolation.  Rather, the term plays a certain 
role in a larger world view that includes the nature of language, of meaning, and of mind.  Hence 
the notion of a concept cannot be explicated without at the same time sketching the background 
against which it is set; and the “correctness” of a particular notion of concept cannot be evaluated 
without at the same time evaluating the world view in which it plays a role. 
 
-Ray Jackendoff 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
CONCEPTS: A DISTINCTION AND SOME ASSUMPTIONS 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Unlike other species on the planet, human beings think about and understand the world 
by using an incredibly rich conceptual repertoire.  Of course we also represent things 
perceptually, and since we share some of our innate perceptual machinery with other 
species, presumably such perceptual representations are shared as well.1 There is, 
moreover, evidence that we share at least some of our conceptual capacities with other 
species (Munakata et al. 2001, Hauser 2000).  But the sheer number and diversity of 
concepts that humans exploit in thinking about the world is surely one feature of our 
minds that distinguishes it from the minds of other species.  We can think about quarks, 
quasars, infinity, life, democracy, and disease, which, prima facie, are not represented 
perceptually.  Thinking about these things requires concepts.2  
Given that concepts are central to all aspects of human cognition, it’s unsurprising 
that theorists approach the task of providing a theory of concepts from many 
perspectives.  Developmental psychologists, for instance, are interested in characterizing 
the innate representations that children bring to experience, as well as the learning 
mechanisms that are required in order for them to construct concepts from those innate 
                                                 
1
 For instance, there are homologies between the low-level visual systems of human and non-human 
primates (Tootell et al. 1996).  
2
 There is, of course, an empiricist tradition in philosophy and psychology according to which all of our 
concepts are constructed out of (and definable in terms of) perceptual primitives.  In my view, there are 
powerful empirical and philosophical arguments against such empiricism.  We’ll discuss this further in 
Chapter 2. 
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representations (e.g., Carey 1985, Keil 1989).  Others set aside issues of development and 
acquisition, and focus on characterizing the nature of the concepts that furnish the adult 
mind, which will be our concern.  A brief look at the philosophical and psychological 
literature reveals a range of theories both about the nature of concepts and how they get 
their content. 
There are so-called “classical” or “definitional” theories, according to which a 
concept specifies a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s falling 
under it.  The concept BROTHER3, on such a view, might specify that something falls 
under it just in case it’s a male sibling; and the concept BACHELOR might specify that 
something’s a bachelor just in case it’s an unmarried adult male.  Although such views 
have a long, venerable history, they’ve come under attack in recent years, and from many 
different quarters (see e.g., Wittgenstein 1953/1958, Quine 1953a, Putnam 1970, Fodor et 
al. 1980, Smith and Medin 1981, Armstrong et al. 1983).  
In light of the problems plaguing definitions, some theorists claim that a concept 
specifies necessary but not sufficient conditions for something’s falling under it 
(Jackendoff 1983, Pinker 1989).  For example, the concept RED might specify that 
something can’t satisfy it unless it’s colored; the concept KILLING might specify the 
condition ‘causing to die’; and the concept PERSUADE might specify the condition ‘cause 
to believe’.  Others claim, in a similar vein, that some of the arguments against 
definitions (e.g. Quine’s) are inconclusive, and that it is still possible to hold that our 
analytic intuitions are best explained by positing constitutive connections among 
concepts (Horwich 1992, Rey 1993a).  Other approaches depart from the classical 
                                                 
3
 I follow the convention of using words written in small capitals to refer to concepts.  When quoting, I 
change the author’s notation to fit mine.  
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tradition altogether, claiming that conceptual structure consists in probabilistically 
weighted lists of features (Rosch and Mervis 1975, Rosch 1978).  While still others claim 
that conceptual structure consists in relations to other concepts as specified by a mental 
theory of some kind (Murphy and Medin 1985). 
The nature of conceptual content is an issue that is addressed almost exclusively 
by philosophers, and as one might expect, this literature is no less diverse.  Some claim 
that concepts have the content they do in virtue of law-like connections they bear to the 
external (extra-conceptual) world (Dretske 1981, Fodor 1987, 1990).  Others claim that 
conceptual content is determined by conceptual/inferential role, or perhaps a mix of 
internal role and external environment, or truth-conditions (Field 1977, Loar 1981, 
Peacocke 1992a, Block 1986).  And still others claim that conceptual content is 
determined by certain information-carrying functions, which are the product of evolution 
by natural selection (Papineau 1987, Millikan 1984).  Each of these ambitious proposals 
has problems of its own, and in my view it’s fair to say that none of them qualifies as an 
adequate (counterexample-free) theory of what concepts are, or how they get their 
content.  
At this point, what’s important to notice about these theoretical disagreements is 
that they’re all, as it were, at the object level.  That is, they’re disagreements about what 
concepts are and how conceptual content is determined.  Let’s take a step back from these 
disagreements and consider what we might think of as a “meta-level” question about 
concepts, namely: What is a theory of concepts for?  As the epigraph from Jackendoff 
makes clear, theorists approach the task of providing a theory of concepts from what are 
often quite different perspectives, and thus invoke concepts for quite different purposes.  
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The question I want to consider is whether a theory of concepts is needed primarily for 
the purposes of psychological explanation or normative epistemology, two purposes for 
which concepts have been recruited that figure prominently in the recent philosophical 
literature on concepts.   
As Jackendoff points out, understanding the ‘background’ against which some 
theorist’s view of concepts is set is crucial for understanding the theory itself.  The reason 
for this is straightforward.  In the case at hand, a theorist who approaches the task of 
providing a theory of concepts from the perspective of normative epistemology will have 
an explanatory agenda that is quite different from the agenda of one who approaches the 
task from the perspective of psychological explanation.  These different explanatory 
agendas will, in turn, determine the shape of the respective object-level theories in quite 
distinctive ways.  
Of course, a theorist’s stance on the meta-level question—What is a theory of 
concepts for?—is often left largely implicit.  But, since one’s stance on the meta-level 
question affects the outcome of one’s theoretical investigations at the object level, it’s 
worth sharply distinguishing these different ways of answering it.  As it happens, two 
theorists whose work is at the forefront of the recent philosophical literature on concepts, 
Jerry Fodor and Christopher Peacocke, approach the task of providing a theory of 
concepts in just these different ways.  Fodor approaches the task from the perspective of 
psychological explanation, while Peacocke approaches the task largely from the 
perspective of normative epistemology.  Their work will thus provide an important focal 
point in our consideration of how one’s meta-level stance affects one’s object-level 
theory. 
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Speaking of the difference between these meta-level approaches, Fodor has 
recently said the following: 
It may be that one has eventually to choose between getting a theory of concepts 
that is epistemologically useful and getting one that’s useful for understanding 
how the mind works.  That would hardly be surprising; epistemology really is a 
normative discipline, and psychology really isn’t.  (2004b, p.106)  
If Fodor is right about this, then the meta-level question is very important indeed.  For the 
implication is that an ecumenical approach to the meta-level question is not an option.  In 
the remainder of this chapter, I spell out some necessary background.  In Chapter 2, I 
consider these different meta-level perspectives in greater detail.   
It’s worth emphasizing at the outset, however, that this dissertation is not merely 
(or even mostly) about methodological, or metaphilosophical questions about concepts.  
There will be some of that, of course.  But my main aim is to make clear what sorts of 
object-level claims about concepts can be defended by taking seriously the perspective of 
psychological explanation.  Although I won’t be arguing that the psychological 
perspective in fact has priority, I will argue that adopting the psychological perspective 
ultimately leads to a view that effectively splits the difference between the object-level 
theories of Fodor and Peacocke.  
 
A Distinction and Some Assumptions 
Throughout the dissertation I’ll be making some assumptions about concepts.  In what 
follows I make these clear, and note a distinction between two different uses of ‘concept’ 
that often get run together in the literature.  I’ll start with the latter.  
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In the psychological literature, concepts are often identified with mental 
representations, whereas in the philosophical literature they’re often taken to be abstract, 
“graspable” entities of some kind.  However, I take it to be untendentious in both 
philosophy and psychology that concepts are the constituents of thoughts, e.g. beliefs, 
desires, and the like.  The belief that it’s raining, for instance, has as an ingredient the 
concept RAINING.  If you don’t possess the concept you can’t entertain the belief.  While 
this should be uncontroversial, it doesn’t clarify matters much.  For there’s a notorious 
state/content ambiguity in propositional attitude terms.  For instance, one might take the 
sentence “John believes that it’s raining” to be about what John believes: he believes that 
it’s raining, and not that it’s snowing or hailing.  Alternatively, one might take the 
sentence “John believes that it’s raining” to be about the state that John is in: he believes, 
rather than hopes or fears that it’s raining.  Claiming that concepts are the constituents of 
thoughts is thus ambiguous between claiming that they’re the constituents of mental 
states and claiming that they’re the constituents of mental state contents. 
For those who identify concepts with mental representations, it’s natural to think 
of concepts as the constituents of mental states.  Fodor, for instance, says that he uses the 
term ‘thought’ to pick out mental representations, which on his view are what express the 
objects of the propositional attitudes (1998a, p. 25).  Since concepts are the constituents 
of thoughts, concepts are mental representations that express properties, the constituents 
of the objects of the propositional attitudes.  The concept CAT is thus a mental 
representation that expresses the property of being a cat.  And to believe that the cat is on 
the mat is to stand in a (computational) relation to a mental representation that expresses 
the cat’s being on the mat.    
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But it’s tendentious to claim that concepts are mental representations.  For some 
theorists claim that concepts are individuated differently than their corresponding mental 
representations.  Peacocke, for instance, claims that “[i]t is possible for one and the same 
concept to receive different mental representations in different individuals” (1992a, p.3 ).  
Georges Rey (1998d) agrees, pointing out that one person’s concept CITY might be 
associated with a mental representation corresponding to the predicate ‘is a city’, while 
another’s might be associated with a mental representation corresponding to the predicate 
‘is a metropolis’.  Rey adds, moreover, that concepts and mental representations come 
apart in the other direction as well: “one person might use an image of bustling 
boulevards to express CITY, another to express POLLUTION” (1998d, p. 507).  
There are, of course, those who don’t think that such arguments establish that 
concepts can’t be identified with mental representations (e.g., Laurence and Margolis 
1999).  We’ll consider these arguments further in Chapter 7.  At this point, however, I 
merely want to draw attention to the distinction between the claim that concepts are 
mental representations, and the claim that they’re the constituents of the contents of 
mental representations.  For it’s one thing to say that concepts are, as it were, the 
representational vehicles of thoughts (e.g., predicates in the language of thought) and it’s 
quite another to say that they’re what’s expressed by such vehicles.   
Luckily for us, most of the discussion in what follows will be sufficiently abstract 
so that this vexing ontological issue will not be particularly important.  When nothing of 
importance hangs on it, I’ll thus be quite loose with my use of ‘concept’.  When it 
matters, though, the discussion will keep careful track of the distinction.  (It will matter, 
for instance, when we discuss Frege cases in Chapter 7.)  
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Now, on to the assumptions that I’ll be making about concepts.  I take the 
following to be widely accepted among philosophers and psychologists4: 
 
(A) Concepts are representational, or intentional.  The concept DOG, for example, has 
the intentional property of being about dogs.  As Fodor says:  
[A]pplications of concepts are susceptible of ‘semantic evaluation’; claims, or 
thoughts, that a certain concept applies to a certain thing are always susceptible of 
evaluation in such semantical terms as satisfied/unsatisfied, true/false, 
correct/incorrect, and the like.  (1998, p. 24)5  
It’s important to notice that this assumption is compatible with the existence of empty, or 
vacuous concepts, i.e., concepts that have no referents.  The concept ELF, for example, is 
not robbed of its intentionality merely because there are no elves.  For there’s a sense in 
which it is still about elves, even though (strictly speaking, and somewhat paradoxically) 
there are no things that it is about.  In other words, a concept can be intentional without 
referring to anything in the world.  Or, to put the point slightly differently still, a concept 
can have an intentional content, even if the object specified in the content doesn’t exist.6  
 
(B) Concepts are individuated more finely than reference.  Two kinds of considerations 
have led philosophers to claim that reference isn’t all there is to concept individuation.  
The first comes from Gottlob Frege (1892), who famously points out that true identity-
                                                 
4
 The list is loosely drawn from Fodor (1998a, pp. 23-39) and Prinz (2002, pp. 3-23). 
5
 Jackendoff (2002) is one notable theorist who denies that concepts are intentional. 
6
 This raises a whole host of subtle and complex issues.  Some content externalists will deny that a concept 
can have content unless there exists a mind-independent object to which it refers.  To such philosophers, all 
I can say is that my intuition that we have genuine thoughts about non-existent entities is far from 
outweighed by the admittedly plausible arguments that motivate content externalism.  For a discussion of 
empty concepts in the context of content externalism, see Rey (forthcoming b, c).   
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statements can be informative.  Thus, someone who possesses the concept MORNING 
STAR and the concept EVENING STAR might be surprised to find out that the morning star 
is the evening star.  If possession of MORNING STAR and EVENING STAR consisted in 
knowing their satisfaction conditions, then this fact would be genuinely puzzling.  
Indeed, it would be inexplicable.  For MORNING STAR and EVENING STAR have the same 
satisfaction conditions.  
A second, related fact that Frege draws our attention to is that in certain contexts 
coreferential expressions can’t be substituted for one another salva veritate.  
Propositional attitude ascriptions are the paradigm.  The sentence “John believes that the 
morning star is beautiful” may be true, while the sentence “John believes that the evening 
star is beautiful” is false, even though “the morning star” and “the evening star” are 
coreferential.  But if reference were all there is to the individuation of MORNING STAR 
and EVENING STAR, then we apparently couldn’t account for such facts.  
Frege’s famous solution to these puzzles is to introduce the notion of sense, which 
is, in effect, an aspect or layer of meaning that goes beyond mere reference.  There’s a 
sense in which “the morning star” and “the evening star” have the same meaning, since 
they have the same referent.  But there’s another sense in which they differ in meaning, 
since they differ in what Frege calls “cognitive significance”.  The claim that “the 
morning star” and “the evening star” have different senses is meant to capture this latter 
sense of meaning.   
Positing senses is thus meant to do explanatory work.  That one can grasp the 
sense of “the morning star” without grasping the sense of “the evening star” explains why 
“the morning star is the evening star” can be informative.  It also explains certain sorts of 
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normative facts, e.g., why one can rationally believe that the morning star is beautiful 
while failing to believe that the evening star is.  Moreover, it’s a difference in sense that 
explains why coreferential terms can’t be substituted for one another in opaque contexts 
salva veritate. (On Frege’s view, the referents of “the morning star” and “the evening 
star” shift in such contexts.  Rather than taking their standard referent, Venus, they refer 
to the sense of “the morning star” and the sense of “the evening star”.)   
While Fregean senses can do explanatory work, it’s not always clear what 
Fregeans mean by “sense”.  What are senses?   We’ll address this question in Chapter 7.  
At the moment, though, it’s worth noting that one need not posit Fregean senses in order 
to claim that concepts are individuated more finely than reference.  For while it’s clear 
that a concept must have some property that individuates it more finely than reference, 
this property needn’t be a Frege sense.  Indeed, as we’ll see in Chapter 7, satisfying this 
requirement does not even entail that this property be a semantic property. 
Putnam (1975a) famously draws our attention to examples that illustrate what is 
essentially the same point as Frege’s examples, but from the opposite direction.  Putnam 
imagines a place called “Twin-Earth”, which is identical to Earth, except that the watery 
stuff on Twin-Earth has a different chemical composition than the watery stuff on Earth.  
On Twin Earth, the liquid that fills the rivers and flows from taps is XYZ, not H2O.  On 
Earth, my concept WATER refers to H2O even if I don’t know anything about hydrogen or 
oxygen, whereas my doppelganger’s concept WATER (on Earth, we might refer to it as 
‘TWATER’) refers to XYZ even if he doesn’t know anything about X, Y, or Z.  Despite 
this difference in reference, there’s still a sense in which our WATER concepts have the 
same content.  For they’re both concepts of the clear, colorless, liquid that fills the rivers 
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and comes out of the taps (they have the same ‘narrow content’).  Thus, whereas Frege’s 
examples putatively show that identity of reference need not imply identity of (narrow) 
conceptual content, Putnam’s examples illustrate that identity of (narrow) conceptual 
content need not imply identity of reference (wide content).  Both show that concepts 
must be more finely individuated than reference.  
 
(C) Concepts are shareable.  Whatever else concepts turn out to be, they must be the kind 
of thing that different people (and different time-slices of the same person) can share.  
Fodor puts the point very nicely; I quote at length: 
It seems pretty clear that all sorts of concepts (for example, DOG, FATHER, 
TRIANGLE, HOUSE, TREE, AND, RED, and, surely, lots of others) are ones that all 
sorts of people, under all sorts of circumstances, have had and continue to have.  
A theory of concepts should set the conditions for concept possession in such a 
way as not to violate this intuition.  Barring very pressing considerations to the 
contrary, it should turn out that people who live in very different cultures and/or 
at very different times (me and Aristotle, for example) both have the concept 
FOOD; and that people who are possessed of very different amounts of 
mathematical sophistication (me and Einstein, for example) both have the concept 
TRIANGLE; and the people who have had very different kinds of learning 
experiences (me and Helen Keller, for example) both have the concept TREE; and 
that people with very different amounts of knowledge (me and a four-year old, for 
example) both have the concept HOUSE.  Accordingly, if a theory or an 
experimental procedure distinguishes between my concept DOG and Aristotle’s, or 
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between my concept TRIANGLE and Einstein’s, or between my concept TREE and 
Helen Keller’s, etc. that is a very strong prima facie reason to doubt that the 
theory has got it right about concept individuation or that the experimental 
procedure is really a measure of concept possession.  (1998a, p. 29)   
The motivation behind this ‘Shareability Constraint’ (as I’ll call it) has to do with the 
very thing that motivates at least Fodor’s interest in a theory of concepts in the first place, 
namely, intentional explanation.  What’s important about such explanations is that they 
aim for generality.  For just like any other respectable science, intentional psychology 
aims to provide law-like generalizations, in this case about the causal relations both 
among various mental states and between mental states and behavior.  But in order for 
different instances of a given relation between mental states to be subsumed under the 
same intentional generalization, it must be the case that the states have the same content.  
And, to a first approximation anyway, intentional contents are shareable only if concepts 
are shareable.7  
For example, two people share the belief that there’s water in the cup only if they 
share the concept WATER.  If they don’t literally share the concept WATER, then they 
don’t literally share the belief that there’s water in the cup.  But if they don’t share that 
belief—or any other water-beliefs for that matter—then their water-directed behavior 
can’t be subsumed under the same intentional generalizations.  Giving up on the 
Shareability Constraint thus apparently requires giving up on intentional explanations, 
which is why theories that are incompatible with it ought to be abandoned. 
 
                                                 
7
 In Chapter 7 we’ll discuss the relation between the Shareability Constraint and intentional explanations in 
a bit more detail, and consider a possible exception to this claim.   
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(D) Concepts are Compositional.  One of the most incredible features of the human mind 
is its capacity to entertain endlessly many thoughts.  There simply seems to be no upper 
bound to the number of beliefs we can entertain, desires we can form, and sentences we 
can understand. Consider the last of these.  Despite the fact that almost any sentence we 
read or hear uttered is entirely novel, we understand its meaning almost instantaneously.  
Of course, we’re finite beings with finite memories.  So there are certainly grammatical 
sentences whose mere length precludes us from understanding them.  But the 
counterfactuals are important here: we would understand such sentences if our memories 
and other cognitive capacities weren’t limited in the way that they are.   
The same goes for thought.  We can that think that the dog is on the mat; that the 
dog, which chased the cat, is on the mat; that the dog, which chased the cat, which chased 
the rat, is on the mat; and so on.  Again, there are of course thoughts whose contents are 
so long and complicated that our finite cognitive capacities preclude us from entertaining 
them.  But abstracting away from such ‘performance limitations’, it seems that a theory 
of our grammatical and conceptual competence must account for the so-called 
‘productivity’ of language and thought. 
 A second, less striking but still important feature of thought is that it appears to be 
systematic, in the following sense: a mind that is capable of entertaining a certain 
thought, P, is also capable of entertaining logical permutations of P.  For example, minds 
that can entertain the thought that the book is to the left of the cup can also entertain the 
thought that the cup is to the left of the book.  Although it seems to be conceptually 
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possible that there could be minds that didn’t exhibit such systematicity, as a matter of 
empirical fact it seems that all minds do.8   
The productivity and systematicity of thought cry out for explanation, and it 
appears that the only available explanation is that thoughts and concepts are 
compositional.  Roughly, this means that the content of complex concepts is determined 
by the content of their constituents, and how those constituents are put together.  Given a 
finite base of primitive concepts, our capacity to entertain endlessly many thoughts can 
be explained by positing a finite number of rules for combining concepts, which can be 
applied endlessly many times in the course of constructing a complex thought (or 
concept).   
Similarly, compositionality explains systematicity because the stock of primitive 
concepts and rules for combining them are such that if a mind can entertain a certain 
thought P, then it can entertain thoughts that are logical permutations of P.  The reason 
that a mind that can entertain the thought that the book is to the left of the cup can also 
entertain the thought that the cup is to the left of the book, is that these thoughts are built 
up out of the same constituents, using the same rules of combination.  Since 
compositionality apparently provides the only hope of explaining the productivity and 
systematicity of thought, any theory that is incompatible with it ought to be rejected. 
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 In putting it this way, I side with Fodor (1987), Fodor and Lepore (1992), and Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) 
in regarding the systematicity/productivity of thought as an empirical fact, and not an a priori, conceptual 
truth about thought itself, as in Peacocke (1992a), who reads Evan’s (1982) ‘Generality Constraint’ in this 
fashion.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THE META-LEVEL QUESTION: PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION, 
NORMATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY, AND CONCEPTS  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 1 I laid out what I take to be constraints on any adequate theory of concepts.  
In this chapter, I consider in more detail the meta-level question broached at the 
beginning of Chapter 1, namely, whether concepts are needed primarily for the purposes 
of psychological explanation or normative epistemology.  My aim is to outline each 
meta-level position, articulate the background motivation for each, and discuss the issue 
of which has priority.  Along the way we’ll also consider the object-level theories of 
Fodor and Peacocke, and see that the meta-level and object-level questions about 
concepts need to be sharply distinguished.  
 
Concepts and Psychological Explanation  
Perhaps more than any other philosopher of mind, Fodor has vigorously defended 
intentional explanations of human behavior, and it’s important to understand his theory of 
concepts in this context.  Whereas behaviorists and eliminativists argue that the 
intentional states invoked by folk-psychological explanations of human behavior will not 
be part of a serious scientific psychology, Fodor defends the view that they’ll in fact be 
an indispensable part of such a psychology.  The kind of intentional psychology Fodor 
envisions and defends thus vindicates (at least to some extent) our pre-theoretic beliefs 
about how humans get around in and manipulate their environments.  On this view, a 
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scientific psychology that aims to articulate generalizations concerning human behavior 
will postulate mental entities that common sense takes to exist.  
What are the commitments of folk psychology, and how are they (or will they be) 
related to those of a scientific psychology?  Both questions are controversial.  At a 
minimum, folk psychology is committed to two kinds of mental state: belief-like states, 
which represent the environment as being a certain way and guide one’s behavior, and 
desire-like states, which represent one’s goals and motivate behavior.  Moreover, I take it 
that common sense has it that such states are causally efficacious.  The practical 
syllogism captures some of these relations: if an agent desires x, and believes that 
performing action y would achieve x, then (ceteris paribus) the agent will form an 
intention to y and engage in y-directed behavior.  We appear to exploit our knowledge of 
(something like) the practical syllogism in explaining peoples’ actions.  For instance, we 
explain Mary’s walking to the music store in terms of her desire to buy her favorite 
band’s new CD and her belief that she can purchase the CD at the store.  It’s also part of 
our common-sense psychology that states of the environment causally interact with 
mental states: Mary’s belief that the CD is on the store’s shelf is explained by her seeing 
the full-page advertisement in today’s paper.  Such explanations presuppose that mental 
states causally produce behavior, as well as stand in causal relations both with each other 
and the environment.  
Must a scientific psychology respect our folk-classifications of mental states, and 
our common-sense beliefs about how they’re causally related to each other, in order to 
count as a vindication of folk psychology?  Rather than taking a stand at the outset on 
exactly how this question will be answered, Fodor reasonably says: 
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[T]he generalizations that are recognized by the vindicating theory mustn’t be 
crazy from the point of view of common sense … After all, common-sense 
psychology won’t be vindicated unless it turns out to be at least approximately 
true.  (1987, p.15, original emphasis)  
Of course this doesn’t mean that common sense, belief-desire explanations are in any 
way sacrosanct.  For surely some of our common-sense beliefs will have to be given up 
in light of the empirical findings of a scientific psychology.  As Fodor says, “a lot of what 
common sense believes about the attitudes must surely be false (a lot of what common 
sense believes about anything must surely be false)” (1987, p. 15).  Perhaps even the 
folk-notions of ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ won’t survive.1  In any case, psychology has arguably 
already ousted some common-sense beliefs, for example that much of what’s in the mind 
is learned through experience, or that much of what’s in the mind is accessible to 
introspection.  Nevertheless, in order to count as a vindication of folk psychology, an 
intentional psychology must share many of the commitments of the folk.  It mustn’t be 
“crazy” from the folk-perspective. 
Perhaps the most important of these commitments is that folk psychology 
postulates states that have the property of being intentional.  In other words, whatever 
other properties the entities that a scientific psychology quantifies over have, in order to 
count as a vindication of folk psychology they must have intentional ones.  Beliefs are 
                                                 
1
 With respect to the issue of whether the attitudes themselves will be vindicated by a mature psychological 
theory, Fodor makes clear that he is a ‘conservative’ realist about such folk-notions: “I … want to 
distinguish between two versions of intentional realism, one of which is merely conservative, and the other 
of which is die-hard.  The merely conservative view is that the best hope for psychology is the exploitation 
of intentional categories, just as Granny has always said.  The die-hard line, by contrast, is that the 
intentional categories that we want for science ought to include belief, desire, and the other taxa of 
commonsense propositional attitudinizing. …  A conservative intentional realist who is not a diehard can 
contemplate with equanimity the abandonment of belief/desire psychology strictly socalled, so long as the 
apparatus of intentional explanation is left intact” (1990, p. 175, original emphasis).   
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true or false, and desires have satisfaction conditions, and such semantic evaluability is 
one of the essential components of successful folk-psychological explanations.  Mary 
believes that the CD is in the store, and desires (that she own) a copy.  These states have 
content (specified by the ‘that-clauses’), and it’s because they have the content that they 
do that they can be invoked in a successful causal explanation of Mary’s going to the 
music store.  The kind of scientific psychology Fodor and many others envision is thus a 
thoroughly intentional one.  Its generalizations will quantify over mental states and their 
contents.  
It bears emphasis that a defense of the intentional idiom in psychology does not 
necessarily depend upon the success of the practical syllogism.  It’s true that Fodor 
himself often relies on cases involving practical reason and rationality, and rightly 
emphasizes the remarkable predictive power of folk psychology.  For instance, if 
someone utters ‘I’ll be at the airport at 3pm on Tuesday’, then we take it that he intends 
to be there at that time.  If he doesn’t turn up, then, as Fodor says, “it’s less likely that the 
[folk-psychological] theory has failed than that something went wrong with the airline” 
(1987, p. 3).  This sort of predictive success certainly needs to be accounted for, and I 
agree with Fodor that the best of way of doing so is to accept that there are states with 
intentional content.  But I would like to call attention to the fact that there are intentional 
psychological generalizations that have nothing particularly to do with the practical 
syllogism.   
In psychophysics, for instance, there are generalizations that relate the intensity of 
physical stimuli to sensory magnitudes, or “just-noticeable differences”.  In a typical 
experiment, subjects are asked to estimate the perceived magnitude of a stimulus (e.g., 
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the brightness of a light source, or the loudness of a beep) with respect to a reference 
stimulus, the latter of which is assigned an arbitrary number.  For example, if the subject 
perceives a light to be twice as bright (or a beep twice as loud) as the reference stimulus, 
then the subject assigns it a number twice that of the reference stimulus.  Stevens (1957) 
formulated the so-called ‘Psychophysical Law’ as an exponential relationship between 
the stimulus and the perceived magnitude: 
Ψ = KSn   
where Ψ is the perceived magnitude, K is a constant, S is the physical magnitude, and n is 
a modality-dependent exponent.  What’s important to note here is that such 
psychophysical generalizations apparently quantify over mental states with intentional 
content.  For such laws claim that states that represent a stimulus as having a certain 
brightness, or a certain loudness, are nomologically related to stimuli with certain 
physical properties.  The laws thus pick out the mental states by reference to their 
contents.  
 Standard cognitive illusions provide another nice example.  Consider, for 
instance, the famous moon illusion (Ross and Plug 2002).  It’s apparently a psychological 
law that when we see the moon near the horizon, it appears much larger than it does when 
we see it in the zenith.  Of course the moon itself doesn’t get bigger, nor does it cover 
areas of different size on our retinas depending on its position in the sky.  The apparent 
difference in size is an illusion, and like the Müller-Lyer and other illusions, the moon 
illusion is quite striking in that it is (to use Pylyshyn’s nice phrase) cognitively 
impenetrable:  knowing that moon isn’t larger on the horizon doesn’t change the fact that 
our experience represents it as such, just as knowledge that the lines in the Müller-Lyer 
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illusion are the same length doesn’t affect our representing one line as longer than the 
other.  Again, the important point is that the generalizations here quantify over mental 
states and their intentional contents.  
It is, of course, an empirical question as to exactly which generalizations are such 
that their explanatory power depends upon exploiting the intentional idiom.  I cite the 
cases of psychophysics and cognitive illusions because they’re particularly vivid and 
plausible examples.  For it’s not at all clear how one could state psychophysical 
generalizations, or laws about illusions, without mentioning mental states and their 
contents.  But other examples could be given, for instance from theories of vision (Marr 
1982, Biederman 1995) or language (Fodor 1975, Fodor, Bever, and Garrett 1974, 
Jackendoff 1992), which arguably quantify over states with content.  There are of course 
lively debates about whether such theories in fact quantify over states with content, and if 
they do, what kind of content it is.2 The important point here is that while intentionality 
may be necessary for the scientific vindication of the practical syllogism, it’s arguably 
necessary for other psychological generalizations too.  
 Now, there are philosophers who deny that there are any psychological 
generalizations, and, a fortiori, that there are psychological generalizations that quantify 
over mental states and their contents.  For example, eliminativists claim that folk 
psychology, with its ontology of propositional attitudes, is explanatorily bankrupt and 
                                                 
2
 In the case of vision, for instance, some theorists argue that Marr’s (1982) theory requires wide content 
(Burge 1986), others argue that what’s needed is narrow content (Segal 1989), while still others argue that 
content plays no individuative role in the theory at all (Egan 1995).  In the case of language, the disputes 
are not so easily characterized.  For instance, in motivating his ‘internalist’ approach to language, Chomsky 
(2000) sometimes seems to suggest that he takes theories in linguistics—e.g., phonology and semantics—to 
invoke some notion of ‘narrow’ content.  But sometimes Chomsky appears to deny that linguistic theories 
invoke representations at all.  Jackendoff’s (1992) discussions have a similar flavor, in that he stresses the 
need for mental representations in linguistic theories, but at the same time denies that the representations 
have intentional content (see especially chapters 2 and 8).  See Rey (2003a, 2003b) and Chomsky (2003) 
for an interesting exchange on this issue.   
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false, and will eventually be replaced with a more scientifically respectable and non-
intentional neuroscience (Churchland 1981).  Presumably they would say the same for 
intentional, non-folk-psychological generalizations.  Near the beginning of Concepts: 
Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, Fodor says that “there isn’t any reason in the 
world to take [eliminativism] seriously and, in what follows, I don’t” (1998a, p.7).3  
Although, pace Fodor, I think there are reasons to take the eliminativist challenge 
seriously, in what follows I follow his lead and ignore it.4  
 There are also non-eliminativists who deny the existence of psychological laws.  
For instance, in his monumental essay “Mental Events,” Donald Davidson claims that 
there can be no psychological or psychophysical laws “because of the disparate 
commitments of the mental and physical schemes” (1970/2002, p. 123).  Roughly, the 
idea is that psychology (or our “mental scheme”) is inherently normative, since principles 
of charity and norms of rationality are constitutive of intentional ascription, whereas 
physical states and events—i.e., events picked out with the predicates of physical 
science—do not have this normative character.  These “disparate commitments” of the 
mental and physical schemes, Davidson argues, rule out the existence of strict 
psychological laws.   
Davidson’s argument has generated an enormous literature, and a full-fledged 
discussion of it would take us too far afield.  I merely want to draw attention to a key 
premise of his overall argument for Anomalous Monism, namely, his “Principle of the 
                                                 
3
 Elsewhere, Fodor says: “That people (and, surely, other higher organisms) act out of their beliefs and 
desires, and that, in the course of deciding how to act, they often do a lot of thinking and planning, strikes 
me as maybe empirical in principle but surely not negotiable in practice” (1994, pp.3-4).  This seems right.  
But it’s easy to imagine sensible eliminativists—i.e., eliminativists who don’t think we’ll eventually be 
communicating and explaining each others’ actions in neurospeak—who wouldn’t deny the practical non-
negotiability of folk-psychology.  They would simply deny that it’s being practical is a matter of its being 
true.  Theories can be practically useful, even though they’re strictly speaking false.  
4
 For detailed rebuttals of eliminativists’ arguments, see Horgan and Woodward (1985) and Rey (1997).  
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Nomological Character of Causality,” according to which “events related as cause and 
effect must fall under strict deterministic laws” (1970/2002, p.116).  Not only is this an 
unargued premise, but it’s far from plausible.  Perhaps the causal relations between the 
fundamental entities of physics are subsumed under strict laws (but see Cartwright 1983), 
but there is no reason to take this as a model for causal relations generally.  For it’s 
plausible that there are genuine causal relations between entities and properties that occur 
at higher levels of organization in nature—i.e., those studied by the so-called “special 
sciences” such as geology, meteorology, biology, and psychology.  And Davidson’s 
argument, if correct, would establish in a purely a priori fashion that any non-
microphysical events that stand in causal relations must be identical to microphysical 
events.  Perhaps such a strong form of physicalism is ultimately correct.  But most 
philosophers who are physicalists would deny it.  And in any case, it’s surely dubious 
that it can be established by Davidson’s Principle of the Nomological Character of 
Causality alone.  
I mention this because, as a number of philosophers have argued, causal 
explanation in science is plausibly a matter of subsuming events under laws, even if the 
relevant laws are not strict.  This is particularly plausible in the case of causal relations 
between events that occur at higher levels of organization, which one would expect to be 
subsumed under ceteris paribus laws.  For the special sciences are concerned with 
incredibly complex systems to which exceptionless generalizations are unlikely to apply.  
For instance, the biological laws governing gene frequencies in populations are subject to 
exceptions given migration, recombination, genetic drift, and mutation (Sober 2000a).  
One would expect generalizations in psychology to have exceptions as well.  
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Generalizations in linguistics, for instance, are subject to apparent exceptions given 
speakers’ finite capacities.  This is why linguists (in the Chomskyan tradition, anyway) 
regard their theories as claims about speaker’s underlying grammatical competence, 
which abstract away from the relevant performance limitations, such as memory, 
saturation effects, mortality, etc. (Larson and Segal 1995, Pietroski and Rey 1995).   
Or, consider again the generalization captured by the practical syllogism: “If an 
agent desires x, and believes that performing action y will achieve x, then the agent will 
form an intention to y and engage in y-directed behavior”.  Clearly such a generalization 
needs a ceteris paribus clause, since there are circumstances that could interfere with the 
agent’s forming the intention; he might get distracted, hit over the head with a bat, or 
struck by lightning.  Of course, spelling out the nature of such ceteris paribus laws in any 
detail would require much more discussion (see, e.g., Fodor 1991a, and Pietroski and Rey 
1995).  In what follows I simply assume that genuinely causal relations between events 
can be subsumed under the ceteris paribus laws of the special sciences. 
 To sum up the discussion so far: On the sort of view under consideration, and 
which I endorse, folk psychology will (more or less) be vindicated by a mature, scientific 
psychology, which aims to articulate generalizations concerning human behavior that will 
quantify over belief (-like) states and desire (-like) states.  Psychological laws are 
thoroughly intentional, in that they describe causal relations among mental states that are 
specified using intentional vocabulary (i.e., the laws quantify over mental states and their 
contents).  Moreover, psychological generalizations are ceteris paribus, and this needn’t 
threaten the status of intentional states as causally efficacious.  
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According to Fodor, some or other version of the Representational Theory of 
Mind (RTM) offers the best hope of carrying out this project.  The key claim of RTM is 
that mental states have both representational and causal properties.  The former are 
sensitive to, or carry information about, states of the environment, while the latter are 
supposed to be the properties in virtue of which mental states enter into mental processes, 
and thus eventuate in behavior.  Both properties are essential.  For instance, my belief 
that Washington D.C. is the capital of the U.S. is really about Washington D.C., and 
some state of my visual system is really about an edge.  Moreover, such mental states 
clearly causally interact with each other, and at least sometimes eventuate in behavior.  
Mental states with both kinds of properties are typically called ‘mental representations’, 
and the key claim of RTM is that it’s only by postulating mental representations that a 
scientific psychology will be able to articulate generalizations concerning human 
behavior (Fodor 1975, 1987, Jackendoff 1992). 
There are, to be sure, different versions of RTM, and the theory, as Fodor says, is 
“really a loose confederation of theses” (1998a, p. 6).  The following five theses are 
central to Fodor’s version of RTM: 
(1) Psychological explanation is typically nomic and is intentional through and 
through.    
(2) Mental representations are the primitive bearers of intentional content.  
(3) Thinking is computation.  
(4) Meaning is information (more or less).   
(5) Whatever distinguishes coextensive concepts is ‘in the head’.                 
(1998a, pp. 7-15) 
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For Fodor, interest in a theory of concepts arises in the context of RTM, for the latter 
provides the best hope for providing a theory of mental states, and “the natural home of a 
theory of concepts is a part of a theory of mental states” (1998a, p.6).  I endorse this 
view, and in what follows I will not question the truth of (1), (2), (3), or (5).5 However, 
one my central claims, which will emerge in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, is that taking concepts 
to be needed primarily for the purposes of psychological explanation provides a powerful 
reason for rejecting thesis (4).   
At this point, though, we need to consider the following question: Why think that 
concepts are an indispensable piece of RTM?  To begin, consider the following 
remarkable fact about the human mind: it’s sensitive to, and capable of having thoughts 
about, indefinitely many properties: being a tiny folded piece of paper, an object that 
weighs more than one pound, an oval-shaped canteen, a beautiful artwork, an odd 
number, a muon, a supernova, and so on, indefinitely.  Although this might seem rather 
mundane, it it’s in fact astonishing.  For in virtue of what fact about us, or the 
organization of our nervous system, do we exhibit this remarkable kind of sensitivity?  
Certainly nothing else in the known universe is so organized.  
One suggestion is that, to a first approximation anyway, it’s because we have 
concepts.  It’s because we have the concepts TINY FOLDED PIECE OF PAPER, OBJECT 
THAT WEIGHS MORE THAN ONE POUND, ODDLY-SHAPED CANTEEN, BEAUTIFUL 
ARTWORK, QUARK, and SUPERNOVA, that we’re able to think about tiny folded pieces of 
paper, objects that weigh more than one pound, oddly-shaped canteens, beautiful 
artworks, quarks, and supernovas.  Fodor (1986) argues in particular that what’s 
characteristic about organisms with minds like ours is not just that they’re sensitive to 
                                                 
5
 In Chapter 6, though, we’ll consider a reason why some theorists are skeptical of (2). 
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indefinitely many properties, but that they’re sensitive to indefinitely many non-nomic 
properties, i.e. properties that don’t figure in any laws of nature.  To use Fodor’s 
example, consider the property of being a crumpled shirt.  There isn’t a law of nature that 
relates being a crumpled shirt to any other property, including any of the properties 
instantiated by our minds or our nervous systems.  Now, it’s true that since laws govern 
all objects, laws govern crumpled shirts.  But crumpled shirts aren’t subsumed under any 
laws in virtue of being crumpled shirts.  They’re subsumed under laws in virtue of 
instantiating nomic properties, e.g. being a particular mass measure.  This is important 
because despite the fact that being a crumpled shirt does not figure in any laws of nature, 
we’re nevertheless capable of responding selectively to it.  Indeed, as we noted above, we 
respond selectively to all manner of such properties—being an oddly-shaped canteen, 
being a beautiful painting, etc.  And Fodor (1986) suggests that this fact is, in part, what 
motivates RTM’s need for concepts.   
Consider the following everyday sort of scenario: I turn my head in the direction 
of a crumpled shirt, notice it, and say ‘there’s the crumpled shirt’.  What explains my 
behavior, i.e. my uttering the words ‘there’s a crumpled shirt’?  Well, one explanation is 
that I noticed that the object is a crumpled shirt and (for whatever reason) wanted to draw 
attention to it.  This would be a case, then, in which my behavior is explained by my 
being sensitive to a non-nomic property.  But since being a crumpled shirt is non-nomic, 
there’s no law that relates it to the property of my saying ‘that’s a crumpled shirt’, or to 
my noticing that it’s a crumpled shirt.  How, then, are we to make sense of explanations 
of human behavior that invoke such non-nomic properties?  For isn’t it true that good 
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explanations involve subsuming events under law-like generalizations, i.e. 
generalizations that describe relations among nomic properties? 
The key, here, is that such non-nomic properties of objects are nevertheless 
properties that we can represent objects as having.  Although the property of being a 
crumpled shirt does not itself enter into any law-like relations, it’s nonetheless a property 
of the object that we can represent it as having, and such mental representations are (or 
have) nomic properties.  There is, for example, presumably a nomic relation between my 
representing something as a crumpled shirt and my coming to say ‘that’s a crumpled 
shirt’.  (The generalization here will clearly be complex.  For such a nomic relation will 
only hold via some other mental states, e.g., noticing that it’s a crumpled shirt, wanting to 
remark on it, and so forth.) 
Of course, our being sensitive to a non-nomic property such as being a crumpled 
shirt is clearly dependent on the shirt’s instantiating some properties that are nomic.  For 
we couldn’t represent objects as having non-nomic properties unless they also 
instantiated properties that are detectable by transducers, the systems at the periphery of 
the nervous system that have evolved to respond selectively to certain nomic properties in 
the world, e.g., light waves, sounds waves, chemicals, motion, pressure, electrical fields, 
magnetic fields, and temperature (Churchland and Sejnowski 1992, p. 142).  Examples of 
such transducer systems include the rods and cones in our retinas, the hair cells in our 
cochlea, the taste buds on our tongues, and the stretch receptors in our muscles.  The 
point is that when I turn toward the shirt, certain of its nomic properties enter into law-
like relations with certain of my retinal states, which is necessary for my eventually 
coming to represent the object as a crumpled shirt.   
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Now, the precise way in which such processes work—i.e., how we (or our 
nervous systems) make so-called ‘perceptual inferences’—is no doubt incredibly 
complicated.6 The important point, as far as Fodor is concerned, is my representing 
something as a crumpled shirt is a nomic property, even though being a crumpled shirt is 
not.  This sequence of events is represented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. RTM explains how nonnomic properties of the object of perception can figure in determining the 
behavioral consequences of perceptual encounters: they occur as properties that the distal object both has 
and is represented as having.  Thus S has psychophysical (hence nomic) properties p1 … pn as well as 
(nonnomic) property O.  In virtue of psychophysical law, causal interaction between S and organism A 
eventuates in (nonbehavioral) psychological states s1 … sm. In effect, states s1 … sm carry the information 
that p1 … pn, and this information serves as the ‘premise’ of a perceptual inference of which the 
‘conclusion’ is an attribution of O to S.  Drawing this inference leads to behavioral consequences as 
illustrated.  Roughly, horizontal connections indicated by dashed lines are nomologically necessary; those 
indicated by dotted lines are inferential (Fodor 1986, p. 15, original emphasis).  
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 Speaking of such inferences, Fodor says: “That, I suppose, is the problem of perception insofar as the 
problem of perception is a problem in psychology.  For though the information provided by causal 
interaction between the environment and the organism is information about physical properties in the first 
instance, in the last instance it may (of course) be information about any property the organism can 
perceive the environment to have.  To a first approximation, the outputs of sensory mechanisms are 
appropriately viewed as physical descriptions, but perceptual judgments need not be articulated in the 
vocabulary of such descriptions.  Typically they are not: A paradigm perceptual judgment is, ‘There’s a 
robin on the lawn’ or ‘I see by the clock that it’s time for tea’” (1975, p. 47, original emphasis).   
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Now, I don’t want to place too much weight on the suggestion that it’s our 
sensitivity to non-nomic properties that demands the postulation of concepts.  For it’s not 
entirely clear that the nomic/non-nomic distinction is what matters here.  After all, 
couldn’t one construct a machine that responded selectively to patches of green, and that 
had a timer on it so that it registered when the date reached January 1, 2006? 7 If so, then 
the machine would be responding selectively to a grue-like property, the property of 
being green and detected before January 1, 2006 or otherwise blue, which is famously 
non-nomic (Goodman 1956).  The machine’s capacity to respond selectively to such a 
non-nomic property would plausibly not justify our attributing the concept GRUE to it.  
 But if it’s not our sensitivity to non-nomic properties, then what does justify the 
need for concepts?  Suppose there’s a range of properties that are transducer-detectable, 
and the outputs of transducer systems provide the ‘data’ upon which perceptual 
inferences are made.  Perhaps the need for concepts can thus be put by saying that certain 
organisms respond selectively to properties that are non-transducible, properties like 
being a crumpled shirt or being a beautiful artwork.  Fodor doesn’t like this proposal: 
[T]he only difference between a transducer and anything else that responds 
selectively to proximal stimulation is that transducers are devices whose outputs, 
taken under their computationally relevant descriptions, are lawfully related to 
corresponding properties of their inputs; in short, the point about transducers is 
that they respond selectively only to nomic properties.  If there were a way of 
defining “transducer” independently of notions like nomicness, I would jump at it.  
But I don’t know of any, and there’s independent reason to suppose that 
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 Georges Rey raised this possibility in conversation.  
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nomicness is the more fundamental notion: unlike transduction, nomicness is a 
concept that we need outside the information sciences.  (1986, pp. 15-16)  
That the distinction between law-like and accidental properties is needed throughout the 
sciences is, all else being equal, a reason for preferring it to the distinction between 
transducer-detectable and non-transducer detectable properties.  But it doesn’t seem that 
all else is equal.  For as the possibility of a grue-detector machine illustrates, it’s not clear 
that transducers do respond only to nomic properties.  This suggests that our capacity for 
responding to properties that are non-transducer detectable may be what matters after all.   
 This becomes particularly plausible when one considers the fact that we’re 
sensitive to indefinitely many non-local, non-physical properties (Rey 1997).  For 
instance, we can detect such non-local properties as being the footprint of a triceratops 
and being a consequence of the big bang, and such non-physical properties as being a 
sentence and being a noun phrase.  Why think that this capacity is underwritten by our 
having the concepts TRICERATOPS FOOTPRINT, CONSEQUENCE OF THE BIG BANG, 
SENTENCE, and NOUN PHRASE?  Consider the non-local property of being a triceratops 
footprint.  When a paleontologist looks at a footprint, his transducer systems are sensitive 
only to the local properties of the footprint, e.g. the properties that determine its size and 
shape.  Nevertheless, the paleontologist can come to represent it as a triceratops 
footprint.  How?  Well, presumably the paleontologist is smart: he knows a range of facts 
about the distinguishing characteristics of triceratops footprints, fossilization, etc., and is 
able to exploit this information in making a complicated inference that begins with the 
output of his transducer systems and ends with his thinking ‘there’s a triceratops 
footprint’.  
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 Indeed, such non-demonstrative inferences provide the basis for a powerful 
argument for the existence of an internal representational system in which such 
inferences are carried out: 
Perception must involve hypothesis formation and confirmation because the 
organism must somehow manage to infer the appropriate task-relevant description 
of the environment from its physical description together with whatever 
background information about the structure of the environment it has available. …  
If one accepts … [this] kind of approach to perception … then one is committed 
to the view that perceptual processes involve computing a series of redescriptions 
of impinging environmental stimuli.  But this is to acknowledge that perception 
presupposes a representational system; indeed, a representational system rich 
enough to distinguish between the members of sets of properties all of which are 
exhibited by the same event.  (Fodor, 1975, pp. 50-51, original emphasis)   
There’s thus a real sense in which the paleontologist goes ‘beyond the data’ in 
representing something as a triceratops footprint.  For it’s clear that TRICERATOPS 
FOOTPRINT is not merely the concept of something that has certain transducer-detectable 
properties.  That is, for something to fall under TRICERATOPS FOOTPRINT it’s not enough 
for it to have, as it were, all of the appearance properties of a triceratops footprint.8  
Rather, for something to be a triceratops footprint it must be fossilized in a particular 
geological layer, bear a causal relationship to the foot of an organism with a very 
particular evolutionary history, and so forth. This is why determining whether something 
                                                 
8
 In a way, this illustrates what is perhaps the main problem with the logical empiricists’ attempt to 
“reduce” the content of all non-sensory concepts to that of sensory ones (i.e. concepts whose content is 
fixed by transducer systems).  For if our concepts go beyond the evidential data delivered by our sensory 
systems, it’s hard to see how their content could be reduced to sensory content.  We touch on some other 
problems with verificationism below.   
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is indeed a triceratops footprint involves making complicated inferences that only experts 
are in a position to make—they’re the only people with the appropriate background 
knowledge.  
The present point is simply that paleontologists couldn’t make such inferences 
unless they were manipulating representations involving, e.g. the physics of dating 
techniques, the geology of certain layers of rock, the evolutionary history of triceratops, 
etc., in quite complex and subtle ways.  In general, the “smarter” an organism is, the 
more complicated the mechanisms that mediate the input/output relations will be, which 
in turn increases the need for positing concepts.9 Thus, from both Fodor’s perspective and 
mine, what underlies our capacity to think thoughts about indefinitely many properties is 
that we have the corresponding concepts.  Moreover, if our minds realize a set of 
principles for combining mental states and their constituent concepts, then we can explain 
why thought is both productive and systematic.  In short, since concepts are the 
constituents of mental states, providing a theory of concepts is of a piece with providing a 
theory of such states and the psychological explanations that invoke them.  For concepts 
are the constituents of the very things—mental states—that intentional psychology 
quantifies over when it provides generalizations concerning human thought and behavior.   
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The available evidence suggests that what we normally think of as quite simple (or “not so smart”) 
organisms in fact have quite complicated systems of internal representations (Gallistel 1990, Carruthers 
2004).  It’s worth noting, moreover, that while the need for concepts rests in part on the need for 
understanding the possibility of non-demonstrative inference, this is not to claim that there’s an adequate 
theory of the mechanisms that mediate such inferences.  See Fodor (1983, 2000a) for pessimistic arguments 
about the prospect of our ever understanding such processes, and Carruthers (2003) for an optimistic 
rejoinder. 
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The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction 
At this point I’d like to briefly discuss a very sticky issue, namely the distinction between 
personal and subpersonal explanations.  My own suspicion is that quite a few of the ‘Big 
Picture’ disagreements among philosophers of mind are ultimately due to their having 
different attitudes about the importance of this distinction.  But let me simply say a few 
words about the distinction, why it might seem to matters for our purposes, and how I 
plan to essentially bypass it in what follows.  
 The issue arises for us because each of the two meta-level perspectives we’re 
considering—concepts as needed for psychological explanation, and concepts as needed 
for normative epistemology—is often accompanied by a corresponding stance on the 
personal/subpersonal distinction.  Those who view the task of providing a theory of 
concepts from the perspective of psychological explanation will most likely deny that the 
personal/subpersonal distinction matters very much, whereas this is not so for those who 
view the task from the perspective of normative epistemology.  The latter approach is 
part of a tradition in the philosophy of mind that takes intentional notions in general to be 
inextricably tied up with normative aspects of reason and rationality, and thus, as we’ll 
see, places heavy emphasis on the role of concepts in reason and rationality.  This is 
where the personal/subpersonal distinction comes in.  For it’s often stressed that reasons 
and rationality are “personal-level” notions: reasons are had by people, and it’s people 
who act for reasons.  The rationalizing explanations of folk psychology are thus personal-
level explanations, since they render people’s actions intelligible by citing the their 
beliefs and desires.   
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 It’s worth noting that a theorist who takes this view is not thereby committed to 
any particular claims about the metaphysical status of persons.  One might take the 
“personal-level” to be like other “macro-levels” in the sciences, to be understood on a par 
with the chemical, geological, and biological levels.  On such a view, persons and their 
properties reside at higher-levels of organization in nature, in the same way that hearts 
and their properties do, as entities that are fully “composed” by microphysical entities 
and properties that are fully “realized” by microphysical properties.10 Or one might take 
the view that persons are metaphysically fundamental, primitive entities of some kind.  
On this sort of view, persons and their properties are not understood as macro-objects and 
macro-properties, and intentional psychology is not viewed as just one among many of 
the special sciences.11 Either of these views is open to those who take intentional 
properties to be inextricably tied up with reasons and rationality, and the latter to be 
notions understood at the personal-level.  
The important point here is that if one combines this sort of view with the view 
that concepts are constructs needed for rationalizing explanations, then it’s a short step to 
the claim that concepts have their home in person-level explanations.  In A Study of 
Concepts we thus find Peacocke making the following claim: 
All the specific possession conditions [for concepts] I gave … were in fact at the 
personal level, and so are all those to follow. … Indeed, this must be so, because 
all possession conditions speak in one way or another of a speaker’s reasons for 
forming beliefs (positive or negative).  The statement that someone forms a belief 
                                                 
10
 This is a physicalist version of the view, anyway.  Jaegwon Kim (1993) appears to hold a view of this 
kind, as he stresses both the importance of reason and rationality in understanding the propositional 
attitudes, and the fact that mental states and properties (and presumably the particulars that have them, 
namely people) are fully physically composed. 
11
 Paul Pietroski (2000b) defends this view. 
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for a particular reason is at the personal level, not the subpersonal.  (1992a, p.55, 
my emphasis) 
Why restrict an account of what it is to possess a certain concept to the goings-on at the 
personal-level?  It’s true that people have beliefs and desires, and that people act for 
reasons, but couldn’t it be that an account of what it is to possess certain concepts will 
nevertheless appeal to goings-on at the subpersonal level?  Peacocke rejects this, 
apparently because he takes the very concept CONCEPT to be constitutively tied to what 
people do: 
[W]hatever is involved in the individuation of a concept needs to be at the surface 
of our psychology, on pain of otherwise leaving the subject-matter of concepts 
behind.  The notion of a concept has its home within the domain of reason-based 
explanation of thought and action.  Nothing not having to do with reason-based 
explanation should be included in an account of what individuates a particular 
concept.  (1996/1999, p.348, my emphasis)12 
Now, I don’t know whether Peacocke takes it be analytic that CONCEPT is tied to the 
personal-level, or whether he takes it to be a theoretical, constitutive claim about 
concepts themselves.  
Either way, it’s clear that Peacocke views a theory of concepts as in some sense 
insulated from the empirical findings of psychology, which will presumably appeal to 
events at the subpersonal level in its explanations.  Indeed, Peacocke even goes so far as 
to say that “for any particular concept, the task for the psychologist is not fully 
formulated until the philosopher has supplied an adequate possession condition for it” 
                                                 
12
 In a recent article on the topic, Peacocke says: “The notion of a concept that is individuated by its 
possession condition at the level of constitutive role in rational explanation is at a level of generality that is 
above that of subpersonal explanation” (2005, p. 168).   
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(1992a, p. 190).  For a theorist who views the task of providing a theory of concepts from 
the perspective of psychological explanation, such claims will appear grossly misguided.  
It’s not that such a theorist must deny that there’s a personal/subpersonal distinction.  For 
there surely is such a distinction to be drawn: roughly, it’s the distinction between a 
person and person’s parts, e.g., a person’s nervous system (Dennett 1969).  What such a 
theorist will claim, rather, is that while the distinction may be real and important, it does 
not pose any substantive constraints on a theory of concepts.   
For instance, the distinction is clearly very important when it comes to assessing 
legal and moral responsibility.  For people are held responsible their actions, not their 
nervous systems, and this is true even though certain nervous disorders might exculpate 
the accused.  The issues here—concerning freedom, autonomy, people’s self-
conceptions, etc.—are important, subtle, and complex.13  But that the 
personal/subpersonal distinction is relevant for these purposes does not imply that it’s 
relevant for all purposes.  In particular, it doesn’t imply that the distinction is relevant for 
the purposes of psychological explanation.  And if concepts are viewed as constructs 
needed primarily for the purposes of psychological explanation, then the 
personal/subpersonal distinction will not be seen as relevant for the purposes of a 
providing a theory of concepts either.   
Why isn’t the personal/subpersonal distinction relevant for the purposes of 
psychological explanation?  As we’ve seen, the primary aim of an explanatory 
psychology is to articulate generalizations concerning human behavior, where the latter is 
construed broadly to include reasoning, remembering, seeing, attending, acting, 
comprehending a sentence, and so on.  If one endorses RTM, then these generalizations 
                                                 
13
 See, e.g., Dennett (1984).  
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will be spelled out in terms of various computational relations that hold among the 
representations involved in such mental processes.  What’s important to notice here is 
that while some of these processes will indeed be happily characterized at the personal-
level, others will not.  
Consider vision, for instance.  It’s true that people see objects.  But it’s also true 
that the early visual system performs a whole range of computations that underwrite this 
personal-level capacity.  On Marr’s (1982) theory, the visual system constructs ‘raw 
primal sketches’ (2–D representations) from retinal images, ‘primal sketches’ (richer 2-D 
representations) from ‘raw primal sketches’, ‘2 ½-D sketches’ from ‘raw primal 
sketches’, and so on and so forth.  These computations are clearly carried out in people.  
But are they also carried out by people?  Most people of course don’t know anything 
about Laplacian operators or zero-crossings in second derivatives, which (according to 
Marr) are used in carrying out the computations that allow for, say, the detection of light 
intensity changes across time.  It would thus at least seem odd to say that people are 
carrying out these computations.  But of course it’s people who see objects, and it’s clear 
that they couldn’t do so unless their visual systems were carrying out some such 
computations.14  Similar points could be made about speech perception (e.g., 
representations of speech signals specify formant relations that are clearly at the 
subpersonal level), language comprehension, and memory.  
                                                 
14
 Similarly, if Milner and Goodales’s (1995) “two systems” hypothesis is correct, then the perceptual states 
that guide my actions when I simply grasp a cup are non-conscious and unavailable for personal-level 
explanations.  Nevertheless grasping cups is surely something that people do.  Thanks to Peter Carruthers 
for the example.   
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What this suggests is that the personal/subpersonal distinction is not particularly 
relevant for the purposes of psychological explanation.  Fodor makes this point very 
clearly and vividly: 
[T]he ordinary distinction between what the organism does, knows, thinks, and 
dreams, and what happens to and in its nervous system, does not seem to be 
frightfully important.  The natural kinds, for purposes of theory construction, 
appear to include some things that the organism does, some things that happen in 
the nervous system of the organism, and some things that happen in its 
environment. … [T]he states of the organism postulated in theories of cognition 
would not count as states of the organism for purposes of, say, a theory of legal or 
moral responsibility.  But so what?  What matters is that they should count as 
states of the organism for some useful purpose.  In particular, what matters is that 
they should count as states of the organism for purposes of constructing 
psychological theories that are true.  (1975, p. 52, original emphasis) 
From this perspective, there is thus no reason for a theory of concepts to be confined to 
the personal-level.  Of course some concepts do indeed have possession conditions that 
are formulated in personal terms.  Recognitional concepts, which are individuated in 
terms of recognitional judgments, are presumably good candidates.  For people make 
judgments.  But the possession conditions for other concepts—e.g. those invoked in 
theories of vision, speech perception, and language comprehension—will presumably 
involve subpersonal events and states.  Thus, while one may need to posit such concepts 
in order to characterize certain psychological generalizations, their possession conditions 
will generally not be spelled out (at least entirely) at the personal-level.  Therefore, until 
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Peacocke provides a good reason for thinking that in order for something to be a concept 
it must be individuated at the personal-level, it seems reasonable on explanatory grounds 
to allow for the possibility of concepts with subpersonal possession conditions.  In my 
view, the personal/subpersonal distinction is thus irrelevant for the purposes of providing 
a theory of concepts.   
Now, I take it that it’s an empirical issue whether or not the concepts that figure in 
personal-level psychological explanations belong to the same natural kind as concepts 
that figure in subpersonal psychological explanations.  If it turns out that they play 
similar roles in psychological explanations, and figure in similar kinds of psychological 
laws, then that would provide the basis for an argument that they’re of the same natural 
kind.  If not, then there’s an argument to the contrary.  Either way, I think it’s a mistake 
to place the a priori constraint on a theory of concepts that it be articulated at the 
personal-level.   
Although I agree with Fodor that we ought to downplay the importance of the 
personal/subpersonal distinction for a theory of concepts, I don’t think I’m begging any 
questions against Peacocke in doing so.  For the conflict between their respective meta-
level approaches can be adequately characterized without presupposing that some 
concepts do in fact have subpersonal possession conditions.  Indeed, the discussions that 
follow will focus on concepts that are putatively individuated in terms of beliefs and 
judgments that are happily characterized at the personal-level.  My arguments will thus 
not presuppose anything with respect to the personal/subpersonal distinction that 
Peacocke would find objectionable.   
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Concepts, Normativity, and Normative Epistemology 
In my view, there’s nothing essentially normative about concepts and concept possession.  
I take it as given that there’s a range of descriptive facts about the human mind, and that 
it’s the job of an intentional psychology to articulate generalizations that concern them.  
Since concepts are the constituents of these mental states, a theory of concepts simply 
falls into place as one (particularly crucial) component of a descriptive intentional 
psychology.  
Now, one might object to this on the grounds that any theory of concepts and 
content must account for certain normative facts about the mind.  After all, humans are 
fallible and sometimes make mistakes, and to make a mistake it to make an error, and 
making errors is something we shouldn’t do.  Suppose I apply SQUIRREL when I hear the 
sound of rustling leaves under the park bench.  I know there are lots of squirrels in the 
park, and on numerous occasions I’ve heard the same sound from under the bench and 
later seen that it was a squirrel.  So I infer that it’s a squirrel that’s making the sound.  But 
I’m wrong.  It turns out to be a chipmunk.  This is a case of representational error.  
Note that my erroneous judgment here isn’t necessarily irrational, for I had (what 
I took to be a) good reason to apply SQUIRREL.  Compare this with a case in which I’m 
face-to-face with a chipmunk in broad daylight, and have no reason to think that there are 
any squirrels-made-to-look-like-chipmunks in the area, or that I’ve been given a drug that 
makes squirrels look like chipmunks, etc.  In this case, it would presumably be irrational 
for me to apply SQUIRREL.  But it’s plausible that I didn’t violate any norms of rationality 
by applying SQUIRREL when I heard the rustling under the bench.  Thus, if the possibility 
of representational error shows that concept-application has an essentially normative 
 41 
component, then it’s a weaker sort of normativity than that which is tied up with 
rationality.   
But in fact, there’s good reason to deny the antecedent of that conditional.  For 
misrepresentation can plausibly be understood in the same way that we understand 
deviations from ceteris paribus laws in science generally (Pietroski and Rey 1995).  As 
we saw earlier, in order to hit upon explanatorily interesting generalizations governing a 
given system, one must abstract away from certain of its features.  For instance, although 
some samples gas will not obey Boyle’s Ideal Gas Law (PV=nRT), it’s understood that 
there are other factors responsible for this, factors that are ignored for the purposes of 
stating the generalization (e.g., electrical attraction between the gas molecules).  The 
suggestion would be that the same goes for the factors responsible for representational 
error.  They’re simply factors that one abstracts away from for the purposes of stating 
certain explanatory psychological generalizations.  On this model, my possession of the 
concept SQUIRREL doesn’t imply that I ought to apply it to squirrels in any interestingly 
normative sense, any more than it’s true that the temperature of a certain sample of gas 
ought to obey the Ideal Gas Law in any interestingly normative sense.  The mere 
possibility of error thus need not imply that concept possession is essentially normative.  
I admit that there’s room to quibble here.  One might claim that there’s still a 
sense in which a theory of concepts and content is a normative enterprise, even if 
representational error can be understood in the way we understand deviations from 
ceteris paribus laws.  For the possibility of error alone, one might claim, shows that 
concepts and content are normative notions.  For naturalists, the hope is that even if this 
is this case, we will ultimately be able to provide a purely descriptive (i.e. reductive) 
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account of both representation and misrepresentation, and thus account for any 
normativity they may involve.15 
For some theorists, however, the normative component to concepts goes much 
deeper than this.  John McDowell is one such theorist, who claims that in order to “make 
sense of the idea of a mental state’s or episode’s being directed towards the world … we 
need to put the state or episode in a normative context” (1994, xi).  What it is it to ‘put a 
state in a normative context’?  To use McDowell’s phrase, it’s to place the state in the 
“space of reasons,” which is a personal-level domain that (on his view) includes the 
properties of minds, meaning, rationality, and justification.  According to McDowell, all 
of these have essential normative properties, which are “different in kind” (1994, xv) 
from the properties that characterize what McDowell calls the “realm of law,” the domain 
that’s happily described in impersonal, causal-nomological terms.  For McDowell, this 
means that the normativity involved in concept possession is sui generis: “we must 
sharply distinguish natural-scientific intelligibility from the kind of intelligibility 
something acquires when we situate it in the logical space of reasons” (1994, xix).   
Again, the hope of many contemporary philosophers is that we will eventually 
understand, or make intelligible, how the goings-on in the space of reasons can be (re-) 
described as (or explained in terms of) goings-on in the realm of law.  Hence the so-
called “naturalization” projects in philosophy of mind and epistemology (and ethics), 
                                                 
15
 Fodor’s (1987, 1990) ‘asymmetric dependency’ account is an attempt to do just this.  It’s constructed so 
as to guarantee that in cases of misrepresentation concepts don’t end up with disjunctive contents, e.g., that 
my concept SQUIRREL means squirrel, and not squirrel or chipmunk or ….  Roughly, Fodor’s idea is that 
my misapplication of SQUIRREL to chipmunks (or any other non-squirrel) depends upon my correct 
application of SQUIRREL to squirrels, but not vice versa.  The claim, in short, is that the mechanisms in 
virtue of which non-squirrels cause tokenings of SQUIRREL are asymmetrically dependent on the 
mechanisms in virtue of which squirrels cause tokenings of SQUIRREL.  There’s been plenty of discussion in 
the literature of the so-called ‘disjunction problem’, as well as Fodor’s solution to it.  See, for example, the 
papers collected in Loewer and Rey (1991). 
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projects that McDowell collectively calls “bald naturalism”.  For various reasons 
McDowell rejects such bald naturalism.  On his view, a purely descriptive psychology is 
thus not even in the offing.   
Now, one might think that a rejection of bald naturalism would bring along with it 
a kind of Platonism about the space of reasons.  As McDowell says: 
Setting our faces against bald naturalism … [i]t can seem that we must be 
picturing the space of reasons as an autonomous structure—autonomous in that it 
is constituted independently of anything specifically human, since what is 
specifically human is surely natural, and we are refusing to naturalize the 
requirements of reason.  (1994, p. 78)   
It is indeed very difficult to see how such a “rampant platonism” (1994, p. 78) about the 
space of reasons could be avoided once bald naturalism is rejected.  For surely a 
minimum commitment of a bald naturalist16 about some domain in the space of reasons is 
that the entities and properties of that domain are supervenient on the entities and 
properties of a domain that’s in the realm of law, and are thus ultimately subject to (re-) 
description in causal-nomological terms.17 To deny that the goings-on in the space of 
reasons supervene on the goings-on in the realm of law would thus seem to be 
                                                 
16
 Or, a “hairy realist”, as Fodor prefers to think of himself (1998e, p. 5).   
17
 For physicalists, the supervenience base will be constructed from the entities and properties of 
fundamental microphysics.  I should note that there is a growing trend away from the thought that 
supervenience is the key to understanding how higher-level domains are related to microphysics.  A 
supervenience thesis, it is suggested, is best seen as a statement of the problem that naturalists face, not a 
solution to it; see, e.g., Horgan (1993) and Kim (1998).   
Speaking of McDowell’s proposed division between the “space of reasons” and the “realm of law”, Fodor 
rightly remarks: “Though I do agree that the problems about the mind and world are a lot harder than 
reductionists have sometimes supposed, I also think that an adequate and complete empirical psychology 
would, ipso facto, tell the whole, literal truth about the essence of the mental.  Science discovers essences, 
as Kripke once remarked.  So, if it’s literally true that rationality, intentionality, normativity, and the like 
belong to the mind essentially, then they must all be phenomena within the natural realm that scientists 
explore” (1998e, p. 5).   
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tantamount to claiming that the space of reasons is an “autonomous structure,” floating 
free from the rest of the natural world.   
Nevertheless, one of McDowell’s (1994) goals is to show that rejecting bald 
naturalism need not lead to rampant Platonism.  I agree with Fodor (1998e), Pietroski 
(1996), and Wright (2002) that McDowell’s defense of a proposed middle ground 
between bald naturalism and rampant Platonism is deeply unsatisfying.  But there’s no 
need to consider his proposal here.  For our purposes, the important point to note is that 
McDowell sees a theory of concepts as an essentially normative enterprise that has its 
home in the space of reasons, where this is conceived of as being incompatible with its 
being part of a descriptive, explanatory psychology. 
But philosophers who suspect that concepts and concept possession have a 
normative dimension to them need not adopt McDowell’s irreducible “space of reasons”.  
For example, rather than seeing a theory of a concepts merely as a fundamental 
component of an intentional psychology, Peacocke takes a theory of concepts to be 
inextricably tied up with normative epistemology, while at the same time allowing that 
the theory be naturalistically kosher.  In a series of densely-argued books—A Study of 
Concepts, Being Known, and most recently, The Realm of Reason—Peacocke has 
proposed one of the leading philosophical theories of concepts, and articulated its relation 
to questions about how we ought to conceive of reasons and truth-conditions 
(/epistemology and metaphysics) in various domains, as well as the nature of reason-
giving relations in general.   
Throughout his work, Peacocke implicitly adopts the following meta-level view: 
providing a theory of concepts is of a piece with answering very general normative, 
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epistemological questions about reasons and rationality.  What sorts of questions?  Here 
are some examples: 
(1) In virtue of what are some reasons for judging a content good, and others bad? 
(2) In virtue of what are there a priori ways of coming to know certain contents?  
(3) How does perceptual experience rationalize, or entitle one to make, perceptual 
judgments?  
(4) Why, in certain circumstances, do some perceptual judgments count as 
knowledge, and others not?  
On Peacocke’s view, concepts are constitutively tied to a whole host of related normative 
notions—e.g., reasons, rationality, entitlement, and knowledge—and he claims that 
recognizing the ways in which they are so tied will illuminate interesting concept-based 
answer to normative epistemological questions such as (1)-(4).  It’s worth briefly 
mentioning the sorts of answers Peacocke gives to these questions, so as to get a feel for 
the way in which he takes a theory of concepts to be related to normative epistemology.    
With regard to question (1), for instance, Peacocke claims the following: 
Certain circumstances in which a thinker may find himself can give him good 
reasons for taking particular attitudes to thoughts built up from given constituent 
concepts.  In some cases the status of the reasons as good reasons is dependent 
upon the identity of one of the constituents of the complete content in question.  
When it is, we can count the triple of circumstance, attitude, and thought as 
among the normative liaisons of the constituent in question.  (1992a, p. 126) 
For instance, your seeing a certain individual as a bald man may give you a good reason 
for judging that man is bald, but not a good reason for judging that that spy is bald 
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(Peacocke 1992a, p. 126).  That your experience gives you a good reason for judging the 
one content but not the other, Peacocke claims, is constitutively tied to identity of the 
concepts involved.   
Peacocke gives a similar answer to (3).  Only certain experiences will rationalize, 
or entitle one to judge a given content, and Peacocke claims that this too is a matter of the 
identity of the concepts involved:  
[I]t seems obvious that the identity of an observational concept is relevant to the 
issue of why it is that a thinker’s perceptual experience entitles her to make a 
perceptual, empirical judgement.  (2000c, p. 257, my emphasis)  
Peacocke’s answer to question (2) falls out of his thoroughgoing, yet ‘moderate’ 
rationalist epistemology, which he calls ‘Moderate Rationalism’: 
[F]or any a priori way of coming to know a given content, there is a substantive 
explanation of why it is a way of coming to know that has a priori status, an 
explanation which involves the nature of the concepts in the given content.  
(2000c, p. 260)  
A priori knowledge is thus explained, not by appeal to a special faculty of ‘rational 
insight’ or ‘rational intuition’, which many have found mysterious and naturalistically 
inexplicable, but rather in terms of the possession conditions of the relevant concepts.   
Finally, Peacocke’s answer to (4) is given in his so-called ‘Linking Thesis’: 
[T]here is a class of concepts each member of which can be individuated, partly 
or wholly, in terms of the conditions for a thinker’s knowing certain contents 
containing those concepts.  (1999, p. 13) 
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Peacocke’s motivation for the Linking Thesis has a number of sources, not least of which 
is that he thinks that a theory of concepts ought to provide the resources for meeting what 
he calls the ‘integration challenge’, the challenge of providing a metaphysics and an 
epistemology that are simultaneously sustainable.  We’ll explore the motivations for the 
Linking Thesis further in Chapter 3.  
Of course, whether other theorists look favorably on Peacocke’s approach to these 
questions will depend on whether they too view concepts as constructs needed primarily 
for the purposes of normative epistemology.  In our discussion of the 
personal/subpersonal distinction, we noted one of the constraints that come along with 
this meta-level view: 
The notion of a concept has its home within the domain of reason-based 
explanation of thought and action.  Nothing not having to do with reason-based 
explanation should be included in an account of what individuates a particular 
concept.  (Peacocke 1996/1999, p. 348)  
But as I suggested, theorists who approach concepts from the perspective of 
psychological explanation will fail to see the reason for placing such strictures on a 
theory of concepts.  In any case, they certainly need not find it (for example) as obvious 
as Peacocke does that the identity of certain concepts are, as a constitutive matter, 
relevant to normative questions about entitlement, or questions about how to integrate our 
metaphysics and epistemology for some domain.  Indeed, in Chapter 3, I argue that 
adopting the psychological perspective provides us with a reason to resist Peacocke’s 
claims here.  
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At this point, the important thing to note is that Peacocke’s theory of concepts, at 
the object-level, is apparently determined by his stance with respect the meta-level 
question.  For it’s only because Peacocke takes the task of providing a theory of concepts 
to be of a piece with the task of providing a theory of normative epistemology that he’s 
led to his particular claims about the possession conditions for certain concepts, and how 
concepts are constitutively linked to rationality, entitlement, and knowledge.  His claims 
about the nature of concepts are thus driven by his stance on the meta-level question.  
However, a theme that will emerge in Chapter 3, and recur throughout the rest of the 
dissertation, is that one can draw upon a theory of concepts in answering such normative 
questions without taking concepts themselves to be constitutively tied to normative 
reasons, rationality, knowledge, etc. 
 
Putting Peacocke’s Meta-Level Approach in Context: Verificationism and its Failure 
Peacocke is not the first philosopher to claim that a theory of concepts is inextricably 
connected to epistemology.  In fact, Peacocke’s approach is continuous with much of 
what goes under the heading of the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy, and it’s important to 
see it in this light.  Initially, the linguistic turn consisted in the idea that in order to give a 
philosophical account of thought, we should first give a philosophical account of 
language.  Under the assumption that the structure of natural language mirrors the 
structure of thought, the hope was thus that one can give an account of the latter by giving 
an account of the former (Dummett 1993).  Indeed, perhaps, as Dummett claims, what’s 
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characteristic about analytic philosophy is its claim that this is the only way to give such 
an account.18  
As Williamson (2004) points out, in recent years the philosophy of mind has 
displaced the philosophy of language at the center of much of the debate.  Williamson 
says: 
[T]he notion of a mental representation is central to the new philosophy of mind.  
A concept is a mental representation in this sense, whether or not it corresponds to 
an expression in a language of thought.  One might therefore classify both thought 
and language together under the more general category of representation, and 
argue that the linguistic turn was just the first phase of the representational turn, 
on which the goal of philosophy is the analysis (in a generous sense) of 
representation.  (2004, p. 108, original emphasis) 
Both Peacocke and Fodor would count as philosophers of the ‘representational turn’.  But 
what distinguishes Peacocke is his connection, presumably through his teacher Michael 
Dummett, to the verificationist tradition associated with the positivists, which arose out 
of the linguistic turn (or, in Williamson’s terms, the first phase of the representational 
turn).  For along with the shift of focus from thought to language came a corresponding 
shift from theories of justification to theories of meaning.  Descartes’ preoccupation with 
justifying the whole of science was thus replaced with the positivists’ interest in 
                                                 
18
 The way Dummett tells analytic philosophy’s story, it might seem that philosophers who take thought to 
be explanatorily prior to language (e.g., Evans, Fodor, and Peacocke), don’t count as analytic philosophers.  
Indeed, Dummett suggests just this, at least about Evans (1993, p. 4).  But he also goes on to say that one 
needn’t subscribe to the particular claims of those who founded the analytic tradition in order to be a 
member of the ‘analytic school’.  It seems to me, though, that if what matters for membership in the school 
is “adopting a certain philosophical style” and “appealing to certain writers rather than to certain others” 
then this would also determine who counts as an analytic philosopher.  After all, why should non-analytic 
philosophers be allowed in the analytic school?  I don’t suppose that anything substantive hangs on the 
terminology, though.   
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providing an account of the semantics of scientific claims.  The hope, of course, was that 
a theory of meaning could provide the means with which to explain how scientific claims 
are justified.  Peacocke approaches the task of providing a theory of concepts with a 
similar hope.  
Verificationism is one way of providing a theory of meaning that can do such 
epistemological work.  On this view, the meaning of a statement is identical with its 
confirming/disconfirming conditions, and thus knowing the meaning of a statement just is 
knowing what it would take to verify that the statement is true, i.e. to be justified in 
believing it.  For instance, a verificationist might define claims about something’s being 
an acid or a base in terms of its turning litmus paper pink or blue.  At the level of 
concepts, the claim would be that the concept ACID is constitutively tied to turning litmus 
paper pink, and the concept BASE is tied to turning litmus paper blue.  The motivation 
behind such claims was clearly epistemological, for the verificationists hoped to provide 
a theory of meaning according to which knowing the meaning of a concept is tantamount 
to knowing what it would take to be justified in applying it to something.  To possess 
ACID, on this view, is to know when one is justified in believing that something’s an acid.  
There’s thus no real gap between specifying the meaning of a concept and saying what it 
would take to be justified in applying it.19  
                                                 
19
 Another motivation of the positivists was to demarcate science from pseudo-science.  Statements that are 
consistent with all possible evidence—i.e., statements that have no confirming/disconfirming conditions—
are rendered meaningless and thus unscientific.  The positivists had in much such statements as 
Heidegger’s “Das nich nichts” and Bradley’s “The Absolute enters into, but is itself incapable of, evolution 
and progress” (Ayer 1952).  But the claims of contemporary metaphysicians about the nature of universals, 
tropes, states of affairs, and so on, would arguably also be ruled out.  As some metaphysicians themselves 
admit, if two systems are equal with respect to the standard theoretical virtues (simplicity, explanatory 
power, etc.), then there’s simply no way of deciding which system more accurately describes the world.  
David Armstrong, for instance, takes it to be a live possibility that a theory of universals and some form of 
trope theory are mere “alternative languages” (1989, p.139).  See Oliver (1996) for discussion. 
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Fodor is thus correct when he says that “the idea that semantics might underwrite 
justification, thereby doing for us what God wasn’t able to do for Descartes, is most of 
what is called philosophy’s ‘linguistic turn’ (2001b, p. 4).  But it’s important to see that 
verificationism is one particularly extreme way of carrying out this turn, and thus getting 
a theory of concepts to do epistemological work.  It’s thus worth briefly rehearsing some 
of the well-known difficulties facing verificationism.  Since Peacocke’s theory of 
concepts attempts to do much of the same work while avoiding the difficulties, it’ll be 
useful to have these difficulties in mind when we consider his view in more detail.   
For starters, and as some positivists were well aware, it turns out to be incredibly 
difficult to formulate a non-vacuous version of the verifiability theory of meaning 
(Hempel 1965).  Moreover, the possibility of verification-transcendent truth is a 
notorious difficulty for verificationists.  For it arguably leads to anti-realism, e.g. about 
the past (Peacocke 1999).  More importantly, and perhaps more intuitively, we seem to 
understand the meaning of certain concepts well before we’ve worked out what would 
count as evidence for believing that they apply.  String theory provides a particularly 
vivid contemporary example of this.  Would a verificationist really be prepared to claim 
that string theorists do not understand what they’re claiming about the world merely 
because they haven’t yet figured out the conditions under which the theory would be 
empirically confirmed or disconfirmed?  Of course, if verificationists are prepared to say 
that what matters for meaning is not what’s presently verifiable but what’s verifiable in 
principle (as Ayer (1952) does), then there’s no problem here.  For according to current 
estimates, an accelerator the size of the entire universe would allow us to literally see 
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individual strings (early estimates had it that an accelerator the mere size of the galaxy 
would do!) (Greene 2000, p. 215).  
But it’s important to see that the point isn’t whether it’s logical, practical, or 
nomological possibility that’s relevant to determining the meaning of ‘string’.  Rather, 
the point is that string theorists make these and other calculations concerning how truths 
about strings could be confirmed or disconfirmed well after they formulate their claims 
about strings.  Contra Quine, then, it’s implausible that the “associations between 
observable events and theoretical vocabulary” are the means by which “we learn the 
theoretical vocabulary in the first place” (1974, p.38).  For theorists must surely acquire 
the theoretical concepts in order to work out their relation to observable events.  It thus 
can’t be that the content of the concept STRING, for instance, consists in its verification 
conditions, since theorists exploit the very concept STRING in determining what those 
conditions are.  One simple way of putting this point is that it often takes quite a bit of 
ingenuity (and not mere conceptual competence) to come up with experiments that 
confirm or disconfirm theoretical claims.  Indeed, it’s often only the very best of 
scientists that are able to construct the elaborate experimental designs that will do the 
trick, which is why they’re the ones who win prestigious prizes.   
Note, too, that verification conditions often change as a theory progresses.  For 
instance, some string theorists claim that strings might be under much less tension than 
the standard theory supposes, which would make them substantially larger.  For some this 
is an exciting possibility, since if it’s true it means that string theory may be confirmed or 
disconfirmed by the next generation of particle accelerators (Greene, 2000, p.398n8).  
This would be a case, then, in which physicists’ beliefs about the conditions under which 
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string theory can be tested would change as their beliefs about strings change.  Surely any 
theory must allow for such changes without thereby demanding a change in the content of 
STRING.  Imagine a string theorist who rejects this possibility, claiming that what he 
means by ‘string’ is tied to the observations one would make in a universe-sized particle 
accelerator!  Perhaps this is far-fetched, but there is a real problem for verificationism 
here, which concerns which conditions are to be held constitutive of meaning and which 
aren’t.  
As Quine (1953a) famously points out, and philosophers of science since Duhem 
have emphasized, hypotheses simply can’t be tested in isolation.  Doing the experiments 
to test for strings, for example, presupposes a large body of hypotheses about the world—
from all of the relatively ‘low-level’ claims about the inner workings of a particle 
accelerator, to the ‘high-level’ theoretical claims about the strings themselves.  Indeed, 
when one thinks of actual cases of confirmation in science in this way, Quine’s 
“confirmation holism”—embodied in his famous claim that “statements about the 
external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as corporate 
body” (1953a, p. 41)—is very hard to resist.20 And it suggests that verificationists do not 
have a principled way of deciding which conditions are supposed to be constitutive of a 
given concept and which aren’t.  For given confirmation holism, it might seem arbitrary 
to take a particular condition as constitutive of any given hypothesis (or concept).   
Now, some philosophers argue that one can endorse what’s right in Quine’s 
confirmation holism while at the same time holding out for some kinds of local 
confirmation, which Quine and others wrongly take such holism to rule out.  One might 
                                                 
20
 In Chapter 5, we’ll see that confirmation holism itself should be kept distinct from this claim, at least 
with the ‘only’ included.   
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agree that not all concepts are constituted by their confirmation conditions, but argue that 
this needn’t imply that no concepts are so constituted.  After all, it’s prima facie plausible 
that some concepts are tied to their confirmation conditions.  Dispositional concepts such 
as FRAGILE, FLEXIBLE, SOLUBLE, POISONOUS (etc.) are good candidates.  For possessing 
a dispositional concept plausibly requires knowing under what conditions a disposition 
will manifest itself.  Possessing FRAGILE, for instance, arguably implies knowing that 
objects that fall under it will (ceteris paribus) break if dropped, and possessing SOLUBLE 
arguable implies knowing that things that fall under it will (ceteris paribus) dissolve in 
water.  
Even so, the Quinean will insist that it’s not entirely clear how we’re supposed to 
decide a priori which conditions are constitutive of a given concept and which aren’t.  
Perhaps it’s analytic that fragile objects tend to break when dropped, and that soluble 
substances tend to dissolve in water (Mumford 1998).  But this requires an 
analytic/synthetic distinction, which is a cost that many Quineans will not be willing to 
incur.  They will insist, rather, that the ways in which we confirm or disconfirm 
hypotheses always depend upon our empirical theory of the world.  As Fodor and Lepore 
put it, “it is a posteriori (rather than a priori) what confirms what” (1992, p. 39).  On this 
view, empirical beliefs such as those concerning the size of strings, or about how objects 
with certain molecular and crystalline structures will behave under certain circumstances, 
will determine the relevant confirmation conditions, and these can’t be known a priori.21 
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 Even if confirmation conditions depend upon our empirical beliefs of the world, this doesn’t entail that 
they’re thereby only contingently related to the property in question.  On ‘dispositionalist’ or ‘causal’ 
theories of properties, for example, the causal powers a property bestows on a particular are essential to the 
identity of the property (Shoemaker 2003, Swoyer 1982, Ellis 2001).  On such views, the causal powers 
that individuate being a string would include those a string has in virtue of being a certain length, or being 
under a certain amount of pressure.  The causal powers that individuate being a string must be discovered, 
but they are nonetheless powers that strings have in all possible worlds. 
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Of course, someone who insists on at least some concepts being constituted by 
their confirmation conditions may deny Fodor and Lepore’s claim that “it is a posteriori 
what confirms what”.  Where one comes down on this issue will depend on where one 
thinks the burden lies with respect to the analytic/synthetic distinction, confirmation 
holism, and constitutive conceptual connections.  In Chapters 5 and 6, I argue not only 
that conformational holism is perfectly compatible with an analytic/synthetic distinction, 
but also that our best empirical theory of the world may in fact require such a distinction. 
It’s worth mentioning one last, related objection to verificationism, namely, that 
when coupled with confirmation holism, verificationism leads to semantic holism.  The 
idea is that if the content of a concept is identified with its confirming/disconfirming 
conditions, and no concept has confirming/disconfirming conditions of its own, then the 
content of a concept must be identified with the confirming/disconfirming conditions of 
our entire theory, or belief system.  In other words, verificationism leads to the claim that 
the content of a concept is not something one can specify independently of all of the 
relations it bears to other concepts.  In my view, the price of semantic holism is very high 
indeed, for it appears to be incompatible with the existence of genuine disagreements 
among people, genuine changes of mind within a person, scientific realism, and the 
reality of intentional laws (Fodor and Lepore 1992).  I thus take it that semantic holism is 
not a genuine option.  If confirmation holism is independently plausible, this counts as 
yet another reason to deny a verificationist account of meaning. 
It bears emphasis that a rejection of verificationism is not tantamount to giving up 
on the hope that a theory of concepts might underwrite a theory of justification.  We’ve 
already seen that Peacocke takes the task of providing a theory of concepts to be of a 
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piece with providing a theory of normative epistemology.  But, while Peacocke’s theory 
of concepts does have a verificationist element to it—in that he argues it rules out certain 
concepts as spurious, or beyond the limits of intelligibility (1992a, ch.8)—he argues that 
it carries no commitment to a thoroughgoing verificationism, e.g. like that found in the 
work of Dummett (1978).  For one needn’t claim that the meaning of a concept is 
identical with its confirming/disconfirming conditions in order to claim that a theory of 
concepts can do work in normative epistemology.  It’s sufficient to formulate one’s 
theory of concepts so that it explains the normative and epistemic properties of certain 
judgments, e.g., why certain judgments are rational, warranted, or count as knowledge 
under certain conditions.  As we saw above, Peacocke goes even further, claiming, for 
example, that what counts as a good reason for a judgment depends upon the identity 
conditions of the concepts that are the constituents of the judgment’s content.  
Why not leave questions about rationality, knowledge, entitlement, etc. to the 
epistemologists?  For Peacocke, the very notion of a concept can’t be separated from 
these normative notions.  As he has recently put it: 
My own view is that there is a large circle of interrelated notions, including 
entitlement, knowledge, and even intentional content itself, each of whose 
elucidations ultimately involves the others.  (Peacocke 2004a, p. 11) 
If this is right, then what motivates a theory of concepts can’t be separated from 
epistemological questions about knowledge and entitlement.  As we’ll see in Chapter 3, 
not only are there reasons to resist this claim, but it’s doubtful that Peacocke himself 
needs to endorse it in order to carry out his epistemological project. 
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The Two Meta-Level Perspectives and the Issue of Priority  
 
Consider the following question: Which is explanatorily prior, concept possession, or 
concept individuation?  For Peacocke, a theory of concepts just is a theory of concept 
possession, and thus there is nothing more to the identity conditions for a concept than an 
account of what it is to possess the concept.  Fodor, on the other hand, claims that an 
explanation of concept possession is ultimately parasitic on an explanation of concept 
individuation: “First you say what it is for something to be the concept X … and then 
having the concept X is just having whatever the concept X turns out to be” (1998a, p. 2, 
original emphasis). 
Why does this question of priority matter?  According to Fodor, it matters because 
the claim that concept possession is prior to concept individuation “frequently manifests a 
preference for an ontology of mental dispositions rather than an ontology of mental 
particulars” (1998a, pp. 3-4), which he apparently takes to be incompatible with the claim 
that concepts have causal powers.22 But, as Peacocke (2000a) rightly points out, 
accepting the priority of concept possession is fully compatible with “the thesis that 
concepts considered as particulars are have causes and effects and cannot be reduced to 
anything dispositional” (p. 328).  For if the priority claim is taken as a claim about types 
(as in Peacocke 1992a), then it is fully consistent with the claim that the particular tokens 
are casually efficacious. 
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 Fodor’s first ‘non-negotiable’ condition on a theory of concepts is that “concepts are mental particulars; 
specifically, they satisfy whatever ontological conditions have to be met by things that function as mental 
causes and effects” (1998a, p. 23).  And he says elsewhere: “[I]f concept possession is a dispositional state, 
the causation of behavior by thoughts isn’t ‘event causation’; it’s not to be construed on the analogy of 
billiard balls colliding.  Rather, thought causes behavior in the way that fragility might cause the glass to 
break” (2004a, pp. 29-30).  Unfortunately Fodor does not make clear precisely what this way is, or why he 
thinks it’s problematic.  Needless to say, the issue of the causal efficacy of dispositions is controversial.  
See, e.g., Mumford (1998) and Rives (2005). 
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Even so, the priority issue is relevant to our concerns for the simple reason that 
starting with the question of what it is to possess a concept leads very quickly into 
epistemological considerations.  For by having concepts we have all sorts of epistemic 
capacities.  Having concepts allows us to devise plans, draw inferences, make judgments, 
and so on.  If we take concept possession to be explanatorily prior to concept 
individuation, then we might be led to think that some of these epistemic capacities are 
constitutive of concept possession.  And if there’s nothing more to the individuation of a 
concept than an account of what it is to possess it, then such capacities will be concept-
constitutive. 
However, according to Fodor, the only capacity that’s constitutive of having a 
concept is the capacity to think thoughts with it.  Of course, the capacity to think thoughts 
about what falls under a given concept brings along with it a whole host of other 
epistemic capacities.  A thinker who didn’t possess DOG, for instance, couldn’t plan to 
take his dog for a walk, judge that the barking next door is coming from a dog, infer that 
since John owns a dog John owns an animal, and so on.  But it’s a mistake, on Fodor’s 
view, to take these or any other epistemic capacities to be constitutive of concept 
possession.  Although Fodor doesn’t talk in terms of possession conditions, we might 
characterize his position as follows: the only possession condition on a given concept is 
having the corresponding mental representation, which bears the appropriate content-
determining relation to the relevant property.   
Since Fodor starts with the question of what it is to be a concept, and he takes 
concepts to be mental representations, he seems to identify the task of providing a theory 
of concepts with the task of providing a theory of mental representation.  For those who 
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think that a theory of concepts is needed primarily for the purposes of psychological 
explanation, this identification might be seen as a virtue.  As we saw above, 
psychological explanations require laws that quantify over mental representations, and 
concepts seem to be the simplest mental units that have both causal and representational 
properties.  Since psychology needs both a theory of mental representation and a theory 
of concepts, identifying these tasks would be economical.   
As we noted in Chapter 1, there may be good reasons, which are independent of 
our meta-level question, to deny that concepts are identical with mental representations.  
In Chapter 7, I consider Fodor’s positive reasons for insisting on the identification, and 
argue that there are good reasons to resist it.  At this point, though, what’s important to 
notice is that Fodor’s taking the task of providing a theory of concepts to be identical 
with the task of providing a theory of mental representation stands in stark contrast to 
Peacocke, who views the task of providing a theory of concepts as much wider than this. 
Now, one of my aims is to show that the meta-level issue of whether concepts are 
needed primarily for the purposes of normative epistemology or explanatory psychology 
ought to be sharply distinguished from the question of whether Peacocke’s or Fodor’s 
particular object-level theory is correct.  Embedding a theory of concepts in a theory of 
psychological explanation needn’t lead to Fodor’s object-level theory, and embedding a 
theory of concepts in a normative epistemology needn’t lead to Peacocke’s object-level 
theory.  The position I ultimately argue for is that Fodor’s meta-level approach ought to 
lead us to a version of the object-level theory Peacocke endorses. 
But before we consider the object-level dispute further, I need to consider the 
issue of whether one meta-level perspective ought to have priority over the other.  One 
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might reasonably worry whether it’s even possible to argue for a particular answer to the 
meta-level question.  For is it really possible to argue, for instance, that when theorizing 
about concepts, the perspective of psychological explanation ought to have priority over 
the normative, epistemological perspective?  Can’t a theorist interested in concepts 
approach the issue from whatever perspective they see fit?  Indeed, isn’t it plausible that 
for any given area of inquiry, there will be a number of distinct approaches to the 
phenomena in question, each of which is perfectly legitimate?  Consider, for instance, 
bats, which can be studied from any number of different perspectives: ecology, 
population genetics, molecular genetics, physiology, evolutionary theory, or some 
combination thereof.  Would it even make sense for someone to claim that one of these 
perspectives has priority over any of the others?  Surely the mere fact that there are 
interesting questions to ask about bats from a variety of perspectives itself legitimizes the 
practice of approaching them from those perspectives, without giving priority to any one 
of them. 
 Why can’t the same be said for concepts?  Part of what makes bats different from 
concepts in this regard is that, in the case of bats, I take it that there is no serious question 
as to what is being studied from these different perspectives.  Unlike ‘bat’, ‘concept’ is a 
term of art, whose meaning, as Jackendoff says, will be determined by its “role in a larger 
world view that includes the nature of language, of meaning, and of mind” (1989/1999, p. 
305).  If one approaches concepts from the psychological perspective then one may end 
up with a theory of what concepts are that is different from the theory of one who 
approaches concepts from the perspective of normative epistemology.  This is clearly not 
the case with theorizing about bats from different perspectives.  For instance, an 
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ecologist’s and a molecular geneticist’s theories about a particular species of bat will 
differ only to the extent that they are making different kinds of claims about bats.  Both 
theories can be true since, again, there is no serious question as to what bats are.  Unlike 
in the case of bats, what one takes concepts to be may be determined by the perspective 
one approaches the issue from. 
 How might one argue that the psychological perspective has priority over the 
epistemological one?  One might start by pointing out that concepts are the constituents 
of thoughts, and that any theorist who begins from a perspective that assumes otherwise 
is ipso facto not theorizing about concepts.  I take it that all relevant parties can agree 
with this.  Those who approach concepts from the perspective of psychological 
explanation will obviously agree, since they take a theory of concepts to have its proper 
home in an explanatory theory of the mind, and according to the best such theory (i.e., 
RTM) thoughts have concepts as constituents.  Those who approach concepts from the 
perspective of epistemology should also agree.  For they’re interested in questions 
concerning rationality, entitlement, knowledge, and justification, all of which are 
properties of thoughts.  Peacocke, for instance, is interested in explaining the normative 
properties of particular kinds of thoughts (i.e. judgments) in terms of the nature of their 
constituent concepts.  In order for the nature of concepts to explain the normative features 
of such thoughts, it’s plausible that concepts must be their constituents.   
Suppose, then, that all parties must begin with the claim that concepts are the 
constituents of thoughts firmly in place.  From here, one might think that it’s a short step 
to the claim that the psychological perspective has priority over the epistemological one.  
For thoughts themselves, one might think, are logically prior to whatever normative, 
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epistemological properties thoughts have.  For instance, one might think that there 
couldn’t be knowledge, justified belief, or rational judgment unless there were thoughts, 
in the same way, perhaps, that there couldn’t be good or right actions unless there were 
actions.23 If the psychological perspective has priority with respect to thoughts, then the 
fact that explanatory psychology has priority when it comes to concepts might be 
parasitic on the fact that it has priority when it comes to thoughts, since concepts are the 
constituents of thoughts.  And one might argue that explanatory psychology does have 
priority with respect to thought, since we don’t posit thoughts for the purposes of doing 
epistemology.  Rather, one might argue, we posit thoughts (and their contents) because 
they’re necessary to explain generalizations concerning human behavior.  
Consider, in this regard, an eliminativist or a behaviorist who challenges the 
existence of thoughts and their constituent concepts.  One might claim that even those 
who take a theory of concepts to be needed primarily for normative epistemology will 
have to defend concepts on explanatory, psychological grounds.  For suppose they say to 
the eliminativist/behaviorist: “But if there weren’t concepts, then we couldn’t understand 
how justification is possible, why some judgments and not others are rational in certain 
circumstances, or how a priori knowledge is possible!”  The eliminativist/behaviorist will 
clearly not be moved by this.  For if there are no thoughts, then there can’t be justified 
beliefs, rational judgments, or a priori knowledge.  One might argue, then, that defending 
the existence of the former by insisting on the existence of the latter won’t work.   
                                                 
23
 Louise Antony says: “no device can be said to have epistemic access to any aspect of its environment 
unless it is a device that represents its environment.  (Of course there may be other conditions necessary for 
epistemic access—but this much at least is necessary.)” (1995, p. 74, original emphasis).  Similarly, one 
might think, one can’t know something about the environment, rationally judge something about the 
environment, or be entitled to form a belief about the environment, unless one can think about the 
environment.   
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Although I’m sympathetic with this line of reasoning, I don’t think it’s sufficient 
to show that the psychological perspective has priority over the normative, 
epistemological perspective.  The reason is that one can’t non-question-beggingly claim 
that thoughts are logically and explanatorily prior to the normative features of thought.  
For it’s part of the very normative, epistemological perspective in question that thoughts 
themselves are constitutively connected to reasons and rationality.  Thus, while a theorist 
who approaches concepts from the perspective of explanatory psychology may think that 
thought is explanatorily prior to rational, or entitled thought, the theorist who approaches 
concepts from the perspective of normative epistemology will not.  Since the above 
argument turns on this premise, it’s thus apparently question-begging. 
The flip side of this, of course, is that philosophers can’t argue for the priority of 
the normative, epistemological perspective by assuming that rational, entitled thought is 
logically or explanatorily prior to thought.  In what follows I simply assume for the nonce 
that concepts have their proper home in an explanatory psychology.  I hope the reader 
does not find this disconcerting.  My aim is to argue that adopting this perspective can 
shed interesting light on some recent philosophical disputes over concepts.  In particular, 
I’ll be arguing that adopting the psychological perspective allows us to steer a middle 
course between the object-level theories of Peacocke and Fodor.  In order to show this, I 
don’t also need to take on a large-scale defense of the psychological perspective itself.  
Let me conclude this chapter, then, by saying a bit more about the differences between 
the object-level theories of Fodor and Peacocke. 
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Distinguishing the Object-Level Theories 
For the better part of twenty years now, Fodor has been engaged in a sustained attack on 
what’s known as conceptual, or inferential role semantics.  The idea behind this sort of 
view, which has its roots in Wittgenstein’s claim that the “meaning of a word is its use in 
a language” (1953/1958, §43), is that the identity of a concept is determined by its role in 
a thinker’s cognitive life, e.g. in thought and inference.  The view is perhaps most 
plausible in the case of logical concepts.  If you possess the logical concept AND, for 
instance, then it’s prima facie plausible that from the conjunctive thought JOHN RAN AND 
MARY SWAM, you must be willing to infer both the thought MARY SWAM and the thought 
JOHN RAN.  If you’re unwilling to draw these inferences—i.e., if you’re unwilling to infer 
both P and Q from thoughts of the form ‘P and Q’—then presumably you lack the 
concept AND.   
Many philosophers have thought that something like this ought to work for non-
logical concepts too.  A thought containing the concept BROTHER, for example, plausibly 
has certain of its entailments in virtue of its containing BROTHER.  The thought JOHN HAS 
A BROTHER entails the thought JOHN HAS A MALE SIBLING, and that it does so is 
plausibly a matter of its containing the concept BROTHER.  Similarly, the thought JOHN 
KILLED HIS BROTHER entails the thought JOHN’S BROTHER DIED, and it’s plausible that it 
does so in virtue of its containing the concept KILL.  To possess these concepts is thus 
partly a matter of being able to draw certain inferences.  
Fodor loathes conceptual/inferential role semantics, and has pushed the following 
line of reasoning very hard:  If conceptual/inferential semantics is true, then, for any 
given concept, either all of the inferences and judgments that it figures in are concept-
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constitutive, or only some of them are.  The former option is semantic holism, which (as 
we’ve seen) faces many problems, most notably that it’s incompatible with the 
Shareability Constraint.  As Fodor recently put it, “since practically everybody has some 
eccentric beliefs about practically everything, holism has it that nobody shares any 
concepts with anybody else” (2004, p. 35).  Since the viability of intentional psychology 
depends upon people at least sometimes sharing concepts with each other (as the 
Shareability Constraint requires), and the viability of intentional psychology is not in 
dispute here, semantic holism faces a serious problem.24 
 Presumably, then, conceptual/inferential role theorists ought to claim that only 
some inferences and judgments are concept-constitutive.  But if they go this route, then 
they owe some account of what distinguishes those inferences and judgments that are 
constitutive from those that aren’t.  And Fodor argues that the only way to provide such 
an account is to endorse an analytic/synthetic distinction, and claim, in effect, that the 
concept-constitutive inferences and judgments are the analytic ones.  But, the argument 
continues, there are good philosophical and empirical arguments for the claim that there 
is no principled analytic/synthetic distinction.  Thus, Fodor claims, the 
conceptual/inferential role theorist in fact has no way of distinguishing the constitutive 
from non-constitutive roles. 
I argue in Chapter 5 that this line of reasoning fails.  But Fodor suggests that in 
light of it conceptual/inferential role semantics ought to be abandoned, and along with it 
the view that lexical concepts are structurally complex.  In its place, Fodor proposes what 
                                                 
24
 I’m assuming here that holistic accounts that give up on a notion of ‘content identity’, and invoke instead 
some notion of ‘content similarity’, don’t work.  I won’t discuss this issue, since it’s orthogonal to our 
primary concerns.  See Block (1986), Harman (1999), Fodor (1998a), and Fodor and Lepore (1992) for 
discussion. 
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he calls ‘Informational Atomism’, according to which lexical concepts are unstructured 
atoms, which have their content in virtue of law-like relations that hold between them and 
the properties they express.  On this view, the concept BROTHER means brother in virtue 
of a law-like relation that holds between instances of being a brother and BROTHER, and 
not in virtue of the conceptual/inferential relations BROTHER bears to other concepts, e.g. 
MALE.  Similarly, KILL means kill in virtue of a nomic relation it bears to being a killing, 
and not in virtue of its relation to CAUSE TO DIE.25   
Now, although Informational Atomism has it that none of the epistemic properties 
of a concept are constitutive, it does allow epistemic properties a role in fixing content.  
And rightly so, for it’s plausible that a concept’s epistemic properties are what sustain the 
laws in virtue of which it has its content.  Consider, for instance, the law in virtue of 
which the concept DESK has being a desk as its content.  This law can be mediated by a 
variety of DESK’s epistemic properties.  Perceptual mechanisms are the paradigm: put a 
thinker in a well-lit room full of desks, then the thinker will recognize that the objects are 
desks, and a tokening of DESK will ensue.  The mechanisms that underwrite a thinker’s 
ability to recognize desks might involve prototype or stereotype-like representations, 
                                                 
25
 Now, exactly what this law-like relation comes to is far from clear.  As we noted in our brief discussion 
of representational error, Fodor himself has argued that it’s an asymmetric dependence relation (Fodor 
1987, 1990).  Given the numerous objections to his account found in the literature (see, for example, the 
papers in Loewer and Rey (1991)), however, Fodor rightly wishes to distance the plausibility of intentional 
psychology per se from the plausibility of the asymmetric dependence account: “I don’t want anybody to 
think that if [asymmetric dependence] is wrong, then the practical syllogism goes too.  That said, I think 
[asymmetric dependence] does what it promised to do: it suggests that there is no principled reason why 
you can’t embed a theory of misrepresentation in an informational semantics.  I think this claim is 
interesting (if true) because so many non-naturalists in semantics have denied it” (2004b, p.110).  For 
Fodor, then, what the asymmetric dependence account shows is that there is no in principle barrier to 
constructing a theory that accounts for the normative properties of concepts and content in purely non-
normative, descriptive vocabulary.  Fodor makes clear, however, that whatever the nature of the actual 
content-making relation, it will not treat as constitutive any of a concept’s epistemic properties.   
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images of exemplars, or other epistemic properties that psychologists have shown we 
exploit in a variety of categorization tasks.   
According to Informational Atomism, such properties and mechanisms sustain the 
laws in virtue of which concepts have their content, even though they are not constitutive 
of the concepts themselves.  Rather, possessing DESK is a matter of possessing a mental 
representation that stands in the appropriate nomic relation to desks, however the relation 
is mediated.  Perceptions of desks that lead to tokenings of DESK are the paradigm, but 
the law could also be sustained by hand-held devices that light up when and only when a 
desk is present, or by anything else could sustain a reliable connection between desks and 
DESK.  To paraphrase Fodor (1998a, p. 76), it’s that a thinker’s mental representations 
contrive to resonate to being a desk, not how they contrive to resonate to being a desk, 
that is constitutive of the concept DESK.  
However, conceptual/inferential role semanticists, such as Peacocke, take the 
epistemic properties of some concepts to be constitutive.  The concept RED, for instance, 
is reliably connected to the property of being red via perceptual mechanisms.  Thinkers 
experiencing objects as red is what typically mediates the connection between RED and 
being red, for experiencing something as red tends to lead to tokenings of RED, e.g. 
judgments that that’s red.  This epistemic property of RED, on such views, is concept-
constitutive.  Similarly, Peacocke draws our attention to cases in which experiences make 
available certain perceptual-demonstrative concepts, like THAT DESK, and argues that the 
fact that experiences mediate the connection between the concepts and their referents is 
constitutive of the concepts. 
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Fodor has recently dubbed conceptual/inferential role approaches to concepts 
‘Concept Pragmatism’, and his alternative approach ‘Concept Cartesianism’ (2003, 
2004a).  On his view, Concept Pragmatism is not only where “cognitive science went 
wrong” (as the subtitle of his (1998a) proclaims), but also the whole of 20th century 
philosophy of mind (2004a)!  Fodor says: 
[T]he characteristic doctrine of 20th century philosophy of mind/language [is] that 
concept possession is some sort of dispositional, epistemic condition.  Maybe it’s 
some sort of ‘knowing that’; or maybe it’s some sort of ‘knowing how’; or maybe 
it’s a bit of both.  In any case, ‘knowing’, ‘believing’ and the like must come into 
the story somewhere, and what you have to know in order to have a concept ipso 
facto constitutes the concept’s content.  (2004a, p. 29, original emphasis) 
On Fodor’s alternative Cartesian account, “it’s not what you know (-how or –that) that 
determines what concepts you have; it’s what you are able to think about” (2004a, p. 31, 
original emphasis).  In order to possess TREE, for instance, you don’t have to know that 
trees are plants, or that they typically have leaves; you don’t even have to know how to 
recognize good instances of trees when you see them.  To possess TREE, on this view, is 
simply to have a bit of mental apparatus in your head that ‘resonates’ with trees—a 
mental representation that enables you to think about trees.  According to the Cartesian, 
concept possession is thus an intentional state, but it’s not in any way an epistemic one.  
It bears emphasis that the object-level dispute between Cartesians and Pragmatists 
crosscuts the dispute between those who think that concepts are needed primarily for the 
purpose of psychological explanation and those who think they’re needed primarily for 
normative epistemology.  The meta-level question is thus distinct from the question of 
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whether Informational Atomism or conceptual/inferential role theories are correct.  
Indeed, I argue in later chapters that approaching the task of providing a theory of 
concepts from the perspective of psychological explanation provides us with good reason 
to reject Informational Atomism and adopt instead some kind of Concept Pragmatism.  
However, as we’ll see in the next chapter, adopting the psychological perspective 
provides us with reasons to reject Peacocke’s version of Pragmatism, according to which 
there are constitutive connections between concepts, and rationality and knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PEACOCKE’S KNOWLEDGE PRAGMATISM: FOUNDATIONALIST 
MOTIVATIONS AND REASONS FOR RESISTANCE 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows.  I begin by saying a bit about the foundationalist 
motivations that motivate Peacocke’s Pragmatism, as well as the kind of theoretical work 
that his kind of Pragmatism can do.  Then, I explore Peacocke’s argument that concepts 
individuated in terms of judgment can also be individuated in terms of knowledge.  This 
argument is particularly important for Peacocke, since it’s meant to establish a 
constitutive connection between concepts, on the one hand, and normative notions such 
as rationality and knowledge, on the other.  I argue that it fails, and that theorists who 
approach the task of providing a theory of concepts from the perspective of psychological 
explanation should not endorse it.  But, on behalf of Peacocke, I also suggest that my 
arguments are not necessarily devastating to his epistemological aims.  
 One of the important morals that will emerge in this chapter is that ‘Concept 
Pragmatism’ is an umbrella term that fails to distinguish two distinct doctrines.  
According to Peacocke’s Pragmatism, concepts are constitutively tied to rationality and 
knowledge, with all of their normative dimensions.  I call this view ‘Knowledge 
Pragmatism’.  But there is a weaker kind of Pragmatism, which Fodor’s term ‘Concept 
Pragmatism’ fails to distinguish from Peacocke’s, according to which concepts are 
constitutively tied to judgment, but lack any constitutive connections to rationality and 
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knowledge.  I call this weaker view ‘Judgment Pragmatism’.  Although Peacocke’s meta-
level approach leads him to adopt the stronger kind of Pragmatism, I suggest that 
Judgment Pragmatism will suffice even for those who think a theory of concepts ought to 
do epistemological work.  I argue, moreover, that there are good reasons for theorists 
who approach concepts from the perspective of psychological explanation to resist 
Knowledge Pragmatism.  
 
Foundationalist Motivations and Epistemically Individuated Concepts 
As we saw in Chapter 2, Peacocke has recruited his theory of concepts to do heavy 
philosophical work.  It’s meant to provide the foundation for a thoroughgoing, yet 
‘moderate’ rationalist epistemology, which explains a priori knowledge by appeal to the 
possession conditions of the relevant concepts (Peacocke 1998a, 1998b, 2000c, 2004a).  
Moreover, it’s meant to deliver the means with which to solve a perennial philosophical 
problem, namely, the problem of providing a metaphysics and an epistemology that are 
simultaneously sustainable.  Peacocke (1999, 2000b) argues that, at least for a range of 
domains, his theory of concepts provides the key with which to meet such integration 
challenges.1 
                                                 
1
 This project is carried out most fully in his recent book Being Known, where he considers the integration 
challenge for a range of domains.  Different kinds of solution are offered for each.  For example, in the case 
of the past Peacocke maintains a robust realism, which requires revisions to our theory about the way we 
come to know past-tense truths (e.g., it requires externalism about memory).  He goes the other way around 
with necessity, however.  Many philosophers want to be realists about necessity, but the most developed 
account of modal truths is found in Lewis (1986), who takes other possible worlds to be on a par with the 
actual world.  Arguably, this makes knowledge of modal truths difficult to come by.  In the case of 
necessity, Peacocke thus reins in the metaphysics in order to bring it in line with an appropriate 
epistemology.  Still other solutions are available, as in the case of reconciling an externalist metaphysics of 
intentional content with our knowledge of our own mental states.  As we’ll see, I’m focusing on what 
Peacocke claims is a condition for solving them at all, namely, that the concepts in question are 
epistemically individuated.   
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These projects are tremendously interesting, and deserve the careful attention of 
philosophers.  But for our purposes, the important thing to note is that they apparently 
rely upon Peacocke’s Pragmatism, his view that there’s a tight connection between 
epistemology and a theory of concepts.  This connection is put forward in Peacocke’s so-
called “Linking Thesis”: 
[T]here is a class of concepts each member of which can be individuated, partly 
or wholly, in terms of the conditions for a thinker’s knowing certain contents 
containing those concepts; and … every concept is either such a concept, or is 
individuated ultimately in part by its relations to such concepts.  (1999, p. 13) 
I’ll follow Peacocke in calling such concepts “epistemically individuated”.  While several 
approaches individuate concepts in terms of judgment, the Linking Thesis is unique in 
that it goes further and individuates concepts in terms of knowledge.2  In fact, Peacocke 
argues that any concept that can be individuated in terms of judgment is also an 
epistemically individuated concept.  We’ll go into his reasons for claiming this in the 
next section.  But first, we should consider the foundationalist motivations underlying the 
Linking Thesis, an example of the kind of concept that Peacocke claims is epistemically 
individuated, and Peacocke’s reason for saying that any non-epistemically individuated 
concept will ultimately be individuated by its relations to epistemically individuated ones. 
In order to understand the motivation behind the Linking Thesis, we must first see 
that even fans of epistemically individuated concepts must admit that not all concepts are 
epistemically individuated.  Here, one must only consider the incredibly intricate 
inferences that physicists must make to arrive at truths in physics, e.g., truths about 
                                                 
2
 Peacocke has hinted at this conception in earlier writings (1992a, pp. 157-158; 1992b, pp. 807-811), but 
as far I know it doesn’t get a full treatment until Peacocke (1999, chapter 2).    
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quarks.  The ways in which physicists come to know things about quarks are clearly not 
individuative of the concept QUARK.3  For physicists must first learn, and then exploit the 
concept QUARK in order to work out the conditions under which claims about quarks can 
be confirmed or disconfirmed.  Theoretical concepts in the physical sciences are thus 
clear examples of non-epistemically individuated concepts.  Since scientists arrive at 
knowledge involving such concepts by making abductive inferences, the concepts in 
question are clearly not individuated in terms of knowledge.  Indeed, in general, concepts 
that figure in contents that are inferentially known will not be epistemically individuated.  
There is, however, a famous argument in epistemology according to which 
inferential knowledge is possible only if there’s some non-inferential knowledge.  What I 
have in mind, of course, is the traditional ‘Regress Argument’ for epistemological 
foundationalism.  This argument is important for our purposes because it is, in large part, 
what motivates Peacocke’s claim that some concepts are epistemically individuated.  
Anthony Quinton provides an exceptionally clear statement of the Regress Argument: 
If any beliefs are to be justified at all … there must be some terminal beliefs that 
do not owe their … credibility to others.  For a belief to be justified it is not 
enough for it to be accepted, let alone merely entertained: there must also be good 
reason for accepting it.  Furthermore, for an inferential belief to be justified the 
beliefs that support it must be justified themselves.  There must, therefore, be a 
kind of belief that does not owe its justification to the support provided by the 
others.  Unless this were so no belief would be justified at all, for to justify any 
                                                 
3
 In this respect, the concept QUARK is no different from STRING, our example from Chapter 2.  I use QUARK 
here for the simple reason that the existence of quarks (as far as I know) is not in dispute, and this is 
obviously not the case with strings. 
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belief would require the antecedent justification of an infinite series of beliefs.  
(1973, p. 119) 
Knowledge is thus threatened with a vicious regress.  While many of our beliefs are 
clearly justified by inference, the Regress Argument suggests that at some point this kind 
of inferential justification must come to an end.  Otherwise, each justified belief would 
require an infinite series of beliefs, which is prima facie absurd.4 
The Regress Argument has been tremendously important in shaping both 
historical and contemporary debates in epistemology.  As Laurence BonJour says: 
[T]he [epistemic regress] problem … is perhaps the most crucial in the entire 
theory of knowledge.  The stand which a philosopher takes here will decisively 
shape the whole structure of his epistemological account.  (1985, p. 18) 
The foundationalist’s way out of the regress, of course, is to claim that there are some 
beliefs that are non-inferentially known, and that all inferential knowledge ultimately 
depends for its justification upon these non-inferentially justified beliefs.  Not 
surprisingly, much of the resistance to foundationalism comes in the form of skepticism 
about the possibility of spelling out how a claim can be non-inferentially known. 
For Peacocke, this is where epistemically individuated concepts come in.  For he 
claims that the Regress Argument provides a kind of transcendental rationale for thinking 
that some concepts must be epistemically individuated.  Peacocke argues, in Kantian 
fashion, that the existence of such concepts is a condition on the very possibility of our 
having knowledge at all.  While he focuses on abductive inference, the point is perfectly 
general: 
                                                 
4
 This is not to say that some philosophers haven’t embraced the regress.  Peter Klein (1998), for instance, 
defends a kind of ‘Infinitism’, according to which justification can actually result from an infinite regress.  
For detailed arguments against Klein’s position, see Gillett (2003), and Klein (2003) for a reply.    
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[I]f knowledge is to be possible at all, not everything can be known by inference 
to the best explanation.  An inference to the best explanation can yield knowledge 
only if the propositions to be explained in the explanation are themselves already 
known.  If they are not already known, the explanatory hypothesis in question, 
however impressive, cannot by that means acquire the status of knowledge.  It 
follows that if knowledge is to be attainable in some cases by inference to the best 
explanation, there must be some knowledge which is not so attained. … It is 
knowledge of contents containing epistemically individuated concepts which 
ultimately makes possible knowledge attained by inference to the best 
explanation.  (1999, pp. 15-16)   
More recently, Peacocke has framed the argument in terms of ‘entitlement’: 
There is an abstract, structural argument that if rational, entitled thought is to be 
possible at all some concepts must be such that one is default-entitled to presume 
that one is in the circumstances in which they are individuated. … Now could it 
always be that inference, or some other entitled transition, has to made before we 
are entitled to apply a concept?  It seems that this could not be so if entitled 
application is ever to get started.  (2004a, p. 72)   
Finally, to round off our sample of foundationalist quotes, here’s one that makes clear 
that Peacocke takes the existence of non-inferential, a priori knowledge to be a condition 
on the very existence of empirical science:  
[I]t seem to me incoherent to suppose that the empirical ways of knowing 
employed in reaching empirical theories, including our theory of the layout of the 
observable world around us, could exhaust the ways of coming to know 
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propositions.  Any case of knowledge of an empirical theory exists only because 
some a priori entitlements also exist.  Empirical knowledge is not merely 
inextricably entwined with the a priori.  A better metaphor would be that the a 
priori provides the girders without which empirical entitlement would collapse 
(2004a, p. 194).  
We can now see that the Regress Argument is used as a kind of ‘Ur-argument’, in both 
the theory of knowledge and the theory of concepts.  For one’s stance on the Regress 
Argument shapes not only the structure of one’s epistemology, as BonJour says, but it 
can also shape one’s views on the nature of concepts.  For Peacocke uses the Regress 
Argument to motivate his claim that a theory of concepts must take at least some 
concepts to be epistemically individuated.  
Indeed, it’s striking to note how the traditional foundationalist claims about 
knowledge are mirrored, at the conceptual level, in Peacocke’s Linking Thesis.  Consider 
the following characterization of foundationalism, provided by BonJour: 
[E]pistemological foundationalism…is the twofold thesis: (a) that some empirical 
beliefs possess a measure of epistemic justification which is somehow immediate 
or intrinsic to them, at least in the sense of not being dependent, inferentially or 
otherwise, on the epistemic justification of empirical beliefs; and (b) that it is 
these “basic beliefs”, as they are sometimes called, which are the ultimate source 
of justification for all of empirical knowledge.  All other empirical beliefs, on this 
view, derive whatever justification they possess from standing in appropriate 
inferential or evidential relations to the members of this epistemically privileged 
class.  (1985, p. 17, original emphasis) 
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These two claims present the foundationalist with two challenges.  First, one needs to 
show how such immediate, intrinsic justification is possible.  As BonJour says, “a basic 
empirical belief is in effect an epistemological unmoved mover”; and he asks, “How can 
a contingent, empirical belief impart epistemic “motion” to other empirical beliefs unless 
it is itself in “motion”?  (Or, even more paradoxically, how can such a belief 
epistemically “move” itself?)” (1985, p. 30).  Second, one needs to show how it is that all 
other beliefs are ultimately justified by their relations to non-inferentially justified 
beliefs. 
Peacocke’s Linking Thesis apparently offers an answer to both of these 
challenges.  If the first part of the Linking Thesis is true, then we have an explanation, at 
the level of concepts, for how the justification of a belief could possibly be intrinsic to it.  
For if the content of the belief has epistemically individuated concepts as constituents, 
then, assuming certain conditions are met (see below), the belief is thereby justified.  
Moreover, the Linking Thesis, if true, explains why all of our inferential beliefs 
ultimately depend for their justification upon non-inferential beliefs.  For the second part 
of the Thesis claims that non-epistemically individuated concepts, which are the 
constituents of the contents of inferentially held beliefs, are individuated ultimately by 
their relations to epistemically individuated concepts.  Abstract, theoretical concepts—
such as QUARK—are thus presumably individuated ultimately by their relations to 
epistemically individuated ones.  This provides the foundationalist with an answer to the 
question of how the justification of our theoretical beliefs, which are based on non-
demonstrative forms of inference, depends upon the justification of our basic, non-
inferential beliefs.  As Peacocke admits at one point, “this is actually a form of a classical 
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rationalist principle, to the effect that all a posteriori reason-giving relations rest 
ultimately on a priori reason-giving relations” (2000a, p. 334).  Since epistemically 
individuated concepts are the ingredients of non-inferentially known contents, they’re 
thus supposed to be what make knowledge by inference possible. 
Now, one obvious way for an opponent of epistemically individuated concepts to 
proceed would be to argue against the foundationalist motivation for them, and instead 
defend an alternative, coherentist picture of knowledge and justification.  For if it could 
be shown that ‘a posteriori reason-giving’ does not need to be grounded in ‘a priori 
reason giving’, then we wouldn’t need epistemically individuated concepts to underwrite 
all of our knowledge by inference.  I note this merely in passing, for a full-scale defense 
of a general theory in epistemology, foundationalist or coherentist, is (fortunately) well 
beyond the scope of this dissertation.  I’m highlighting Peacocke’s foundationalism for 
two reasons: (1) I think Peacocke’s Pragmatism can be better understood in the context of 
a foundationalist theory of knowledge; and (2) while foundationalist claims are scattered 
throughout Peacocke’s corpus, he rarely makes explicit how foundationalism motivates 
his theory of concepts.   
What kind of concept is epistemically individuated?  Recognitional concepts are 
the paradigm.  If RED is recognitional, then, in optimal conditions, thinkers who possess 
RED will judge that an object is red when they’re perceiving it as red, and taking their 
experience at “face value”.5  When does an experience of an object count as an 
experience of the object as red?  Peacocke says that it’s when the experience “presents its 
object in a red′ region of the subject’s visual field,” where “red′ is fixed as that property 
                                                 
5
 To say that a thinker is taking an experience at face value means, roughly, that she isn’t worried about 
skeptical counterpossibilities, whether the lighting is good, etc.  For more on this, see Peacocke (1999, pp. 
51-55). 
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characteristically instantiated in regions of the visual field in which red objects are 
properly perceived” (1992a, p. 7).  Given this characterization, one can experience an 
object as red without possessing the concept RED.  For to experience an object as red is to 
enjoy an experience that presents the object in a red′ region of the visual field, and being 
red′ is a sensational property.  This comports with our everyday talk, for in ordinary 
English we say things like the following: “The object looks red to him, but of course he 
would never say (or think) that it looks red, since he doesn’t have the concept RED; he’s 
only two-years old, etc.”  But, thinkers who do possess RED, according to Peacocke, must 
be willing to judge that an object is red when they experience it as red and they’re taking 
their experience at face value.  
An important thing to notice about such judgments is that they’re in accordance 
with the norms of rationality.  For it’s surely rational to judge that something’s red if you 
see it as red, and are taking your experience at face value.  Moreover, it’s prima facie 
plausible that it’s irrational to be unwilling to judge that something’s red in such 
circumstances.  For this reason, Peacocke calls the judgments that figure in the 
possession conditions for epistemically individuated concepts “rationally non-
discretionary”.  On his view, if thinkers possess RED, then they’re not rationally permitted 
to withhold the judgment, say, that’s red, when they’re experiencing an object as red, and 
the relevant conditions are optimal.  To say that RED is epistemically individuated is to 
say that the fact that such rationally non-discretionary judgments count as knowledge in 
appropriate circumstances is (at least partly) individuative of the concept RED.  
Why should we believe that such judgments count as knowledge?  Because, 
Peacocke says, “there is … a general connection between the conceptual, the epistemic, 
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and the metaphysical” (Peacocke 1999, p. 39).  In this case, there’s a close relation 
between the way the property of being red is individuated, and the way the concept RED 
is individuated: “The relations to shades which contribute to the individuation of the 
colour are precisely those to which one who grasps the colour concept must be sensitive 
when making perceptually based judgments involving the concept” (2000c, p. 268).  This 
provides the basis for Peacocke’s concept-based explanation of our putative a priori 
knowledge of color-incompatibilities.  Perhaps more interestingly, Peacocke argues that 
our concept METAPHYSICAL NECESSITY involves tacit knowledge of the conditions under 
which putative possible-world descriptions represent genuine possibilities, so that the 
possession conditions for the concept are tied to the very conditions that make something 
possible (1999, chapter 4).  Again, my aim isn’t to evaluate the details of Peacocke’s 
account of particular cases, but to draw attention to the fact that it’s his Knowledge 
Pragmatism that’s carrying most of the philosophical load here.  For both Peacocke’s 
account of a priori knowledge and his solutions to various integration challenges depend 
upon the relevant concepts being epistemically individuated.  
 
From Judgment Pragmatism to Knowledge Pragmatism? 
It should be clear by now that Peacocke’s theory of concepts is both imbedded in and 
motivated by a larger project, which, at the most general level, is that of constructing a 
theory of what both the world and our minds must be like, such that the latter can know 
about the former.  One such condition, as we saw, is imposed by the Regress Argument: 
we clearly have some inferential knowledge; but our having some non-inferential 
knowledge is a condition on the very possibility of our having inferential knowledge; so 
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we must have some non-inferential knowledge.  For a theorist who accepts the conclusion 
of the Regress Argument, like Peacocke, a natural question to ask is: What must our 
minds be like in order for such non-inferential knowledge to be possible?  According to 
Peacocke, an adequate answer to this question requires the postulation of epistemically 
individuated concepts.   
Now, I suspect that a foundationalist epistemologist, who hasn’t much thought 
about the nature of concepts, will find Peacocke’s claims plausible.  But consider the 
reverse possibility, namely, a theorist who has thought about the nature of concepts, but 
hasn’t thought much (or at all) about the nature and structure of human knowledge.  
Consider, in particular, a theorist who approaches concepts from the perspective of 
psychological explanation, and agrees with Peacocke that concepts are individuated by 
their roles in judgment.  Are there any good reasons for such a Judgment Pragmatist, who 
approaches concepts from the perspective of psychological explanation, to make the 
further claim that some concepts are individuated in terms of knowledge? 
Peacocke thinks there is, for as I mentioned above he argues that any concept that 
can be individuated in terms of judgment is also an epistemically individuated concept.  
It’s worth going through Peacocke’s argument for this claim, in part because it will serve 
to highlight what Peacocke takes to be the essential connections between concepts, on the 
one hand, and rationality and knowledge on the other.  I argue that Peacocke’s defense of 
the claim that Judgment Pragmatism leads to Knowledge Pragmatism fails.  But after 
spelling out his argument, and noting the problems with each of its steps, I suggest that 
this is far from devastating to Peacocke’s aims.  For he does not in fact need concepts to 
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be epistemically individuated in order to carry out his project.  Concepts individuated in 
terms of judgment will suffice.   
Peacocke’s argument consists of the following four steps: 
(1) Take a target concept which is individuated in terms of its role in outright 
judgement.  Then consider the judgements mentioned in the concept’s possession 
condition, as judgements a thinker must be willing to make in specified 
circumstances.  These judgements must be ones which are rationally required of 
the thinker, in those circumstances, if she makes any judgements on the matter at 
all.  They must be rationally non-discretionary judgments.  
(2) Rationally non-discretionary judgments aim at knowledge. 
(3) So, if the suitably attained presuppositions of the thinker when making a 
rationally non-discretionary judgment are fulfilled, and any beliefs on which she 
is relying in making it are knowledge, and any faculties on which she is relying 
are operating properly, the rationally non-discretionary judgments will be 
knowledge. 
(4) Hence the target concept could be individuated in part in the following way: as 
that concept which, when certain judgments involving it are made by specified 
methods, and the properly made presuppositions are fulfilled, and any beliefs on 
which the thinker is relying are knowledge, and any faculties on which she is 
relying are operating properly, then the judgements so reached involving the 
concept are knowledge.  (1999, pp. 17-18) 
At first glance, the argument appears straightforward.  For the idea behind it is apparently 
simple: a Judgment Pragmatist ought to accept the existence of epistemically 
 83 
individuated concepts since the judgments that figure in the possession conditions for 
concepts, in the right circumstances, will also count as knowledge.  The concepts 
individuated in terms of judgment, the thought continues, could thus just as well be 
individuated in terms of knowledge.  As Peacocke puts it:  
The point is not that the formulation of the possession condition in terms of 
judgements is in some way incorrect.  It is not.  The point is rather that the 
formulation in terms of knowledge is equally correct.  (1999, p. 28)  
But I wonder whether this deceptively simple argument is actually flawed.  In fact, I 
think the argument is faulty at every step.  Let’s start with premise (1).  
The claim in (1), so far as I can see, is that if it’s true that a thinker must judge 
that such and such in certain specified circumstances in order to possess a given concept, 
then the judgment must be rationally non-discretionary for the thinker in those 
circumstances.  Consider RED, again.  If, in order to possess RED, thinkers must be 
willing to judge, say, that’s red, when they’re having an experience of an object as red 
and taking their experience at face value, then the judgment that that’s red must be 
rationally non-discretionary.  What’s the argument for (1)?  Somewhat unhelpfully, 
Peacocke says that the claim in (1) is “part of what is involved in the idea of a possession 
condition” (1999, p. 18), at least by a Judgment Pragmatist’s lights.  Perhaps this explains 
why his first argument for (1) seems to be little more than a restatement of it: 
If, in given circumstances, a content is one on which a rational thinker can 
intelligibly withhold judgement, consistently with her possession of the concepts 
involved, then judging that content in those circumstances cannot be part of the 
possession condition for any of the concepts composing the content.  (1999, p. 18)  
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One question that immediately arises is the following: which judgments are the ones that 
a thinker must be willing to make, consistent with possessing the concept in question?  I 
take this to be a question that all Pragmatists must ultimately address, for it underlies 
much of the Cartesian’s skepticism about the plausibility of Pragmatism.  But since this 
question applies to both Judgment and Knowledge Pragmatism, we’ll put it to one side 
for now.  We’ll consider it in more detail in later chapters.  
At this point, I’d like to draw attention to a rather different concern with 
Peacocke’s claim here.  Note, first, that the skeptic will deny it.  For if, as the skeptic 
claims, we are not rationally justified in judging that anything is red, it can’t be that we 
are justified in believing that some particular object is red, in certain circumstances, in 
virtue of the possession conditions for the concept RED.  Now, one might think that 
Peacocke intends his claim here to refute the skeptic.6 The idea would be that given the 
nature of the concept RED, having experiences of objects as red entails that the concept 
applies.  It thus becomes a sort of conceptual necessity that red objects exist.  But this 
won’t do.  For there’s no good reason, as far as I can tell, for the skeptic to deny that we 
think thoughts about redness.  That is, the skeptic needn’t deny that we have the concept 
RED.  Rather, what the skeptic denies is that (we’re rationally justified in believing that) 
the concept applies to anything in the world.  This requires denying that possession of the 
concept RED is constitutively tied to making certain rationally non-discretionary 
judgments, as Peacocke claims.  So in tying the possession of RED to such judgments, 
Peacocke is setting his face against skepticism. 
                                                 
6
 The skeptic does not figure in Being Known.  In fact, near the beginning of the book Peacocke says that 
he “will not be tackling scepticism head-on in this work” (1999, p. 11).  Regardless of Peacocke’s 
intentions, however, it does seem that his claims here are in tension with skepticism.   
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On its own, this is more of an observation than a criticism.  But notice that 
Peacocke isn’t merely committed to denying skepticism.  His claim here is stronger than 
that, as it’s stated in terms of the intelligibility of making or withholding certain 
judgments.  Even if we’re convinced that skepticism is false, the counterpossibilities that 
the skeptic makes so vivid are surely intelligible.  Indeed, they couldn’t be so vivid if 
they weren’t intelligible.  So long as we find it intelligible for the skeptic to deny certain 
judgments, while still possessing the relevant concepts, then such judgments can’t be 
rationally non-discretionary, and the above claim is false.   
It seems to me that the skeptic is intelligible.  For the skeptic essentially makes 
two claims: (a) there are certain counterpossibilities (of the evil-demon or brain-in-a-vat 
variety, say) such that if they obtain, then we have no knowledge; and (b) we’re not in an 
epistemic position to rule out such counterpossibilities.  Is there anything in either (a) or 
(b) such that the skeptic becomes unintelligible, or irrational, in endorsing them?  I 
submit that there isn’t.  Given this point, the skeptic will claim to have undermined the 
rationality of the judgments that Peacocke takes to be rationally non-discretionary.  Like 
Peacocke, I’m not a skeptic.  But I do think that, insofar as the argument for (1) requires a 
denial of the very intelligibility of skepticism, it is implausible.7 
                                                 
7
 In his more recent work, The Realm of Reason, Peacocke admits that his entire project in Being Known 
would collapse without an answer to skepticism, and for this reason attempts to take on the skeptic.  He 
offers what is essentially a Russellian response, arguing that good explanations are “complexity reducing” 
and that skeptical hypotheses do not reduce complexity but increase it (2004a, Chapter 3).  He adds to this a 
Darwinian claim about what justifies us in believing in the accuracy of our perceptual systems, and even 
goes so far as to say that it “is a relatively a priori truth” that since subjects rely substantially on their 
perceptual systems in the formation of belief there will be selection for roughly accurate perceptual 
systems” (2004a, p. 88, my emphasis).  But surely it is a substantive, empirical claim that selection is 
responsible for the existence of any trait.  The contingency of the properties of evolved systems thus makes 
it very unlikely that we can discover a priori how they came to have those properties.  Indeed, there are 
lively debates in both biology and psychology about the extent to which selection is responsible for 
evolutionary change.  See, for example, Fodor (2000a), Gould (1997), Gould and Lewontin (1978), and 
Lewontin (1990) for skepticism about the power of natural selection, and Maynard Smith (1978), Barkow, 
Cosmides, and Tooby (1992), Dennett (1995), and Pinker (1997) for more ‘pro-selectionist’ views. 
 86 
 Peacocke’s second argument for (1) makes explicit use of what he calls “the 
unexceptionable assumption that a thinker can do what rationality permits” (1999, p. 19).  
Peacocke says: 
Spelled out more fully, the case for (1) would run as follows.  If rationality 
permits a thinker to withhold judgement on a content containing a given concept, 
in specified circumstances, while continuing to possess that concept, then it is 
possible for a thinker to withhold such judgement while possessing the concept.  
It follows that willingness to make such a judgement cannot be part of the 
possession condition for the concept in question.  The judgement cannot, in the 
specified circumstances, be rationally non-discretionary.  By contraposition, any 
outright judgements mentioned in the possession condition for a concept must, in 
the circumstances mentioned in the possession condition, be rationally non-
discretionary.  (1999, p. 19) 
Notice that the point about skepticism applies here as well.  For if the skeptic is right, and 
rationality permits someone to withhold the relevant judgment, then this passage could 
actually be taken as an argument against premise (1).  
But setting skepticism aside, I wonder whether Peacocke’s ‘unexceptionable’ 
claim that thinkers can do what rationality permits is really so unexceptionable.  As 
Peacocke notes, the “case for premise (1) connects something normative—the rationally 
non-discretionary—with a descriptive condition which states what it is for a thinker to 
possess a given concept (1999, p. 18).  But as the extensive psychological literature on 
human rationality suggests, the connection between normative rationality and descriptive 
psychological claims about how people actually reason is not that tight.  For instance, 
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there’s an extensive literature concerning people’s performance on various versions of 
the so-called ‘Wason selection task’, which suggests that our reasoning about 
conditionals is far from optimal.  There’s also ample evidence that we’re poor reasoners 
when it comes to evaluating probabilities: people fail to take into account relevant base 
rates, even when they’re readily available; and, given the same background information, 
people will take certain conjunctive statements (“John is a dentist and a political 
activist”) to be more probable than one of their conjuncts (“John is a dentist”), which of 
course the laws of probability don’t allow.  Results like these have led psychologists 
Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross to claim that humans depart “from normative standards of 
inference”, and are subject to “profound systematic, and fundamental errors in judgments 
and inferences” (1980, p. 6).8  
Now, perhaps one could argue that such conclusions do not necessarily rule out 
Peacocke’s ‘unexceptionable’ claim, since people can come to see the ways in which they 
reason badly, and make the appropriate corrections.  The idea would be that even if 
rationality requires that we make certain judgments and not others, the fact that people 
often do not make the judgments that rationality requires, does not by itself show that 
people can’t make such judgments.  For people can acquire good reasoning skills, and 
hone the ones they already possess, and thus get better at bringing their actual judgments 
in line with the judgments that rationality permits, or requires.  
Although this reply is prima facie plausible, it seems to me that there could be 
cases in which people simply can’t make the appropriate corrections.  I don’t have in 
                                                 
8
 For a review of this kind of literature, in addition to Nisbett and Ross (1980), see Goldman (1986, 
chapters 13-16), and Tversky and Kahneman (1983).  For interesting discussions of how this literature 
bears on the philosophical literature on rationality, see Stich (1990), Stein (1996), and Botterill and 
Carruthers (1999).  
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mind here the possibility of people who are constitutionally bad at reasoning, but rather 
cases in which people, for whatever reason, can’t bring themselves to make certain 
judgments in accordance with what rationality permits, or requires.  Suppose John is a 
gambler, who often makes inferences and judgments that don’t comport with what 
rationality permits.  For John frequently commits the gambler’s fallacy: he often infers 
that the likelihood of rolling a two in a game of craps increases as the number of past 
rolls that don’t come up two increases; or, he sticks to his number in a game of roulette, 
judging that the odds of hitting the number increase as the number of spins in which the 
number fails to win increases.  As Stich and Nisbett point out, it’s plausible that in games 
of chance, John is in fact the norm; that is, it’s plausible that people frequently follow a 
principle according to which the probability of some outcome occurring after n + 1 
consecutive instances of non-occurrence is greater than the probability of its occurrence 
after n consecutive instances of non-occurrence (1980, p. 192).  This is probably true of 
even some highly reflective people.  Indeed, Stich and Nisbett draw our attention to a 19th 
century logic text in which the gambler’s fallacy is actually endorsed as good reasoning!9  
There’s no doubt that after having the fallacy pointed out to them, some of these 
people will correct their reasoning, and thus bring their judgments in line with the 
judgments rationality permits.  Perhaps most will.  But what are we to make of 
incorrigible gamblers who simply refuse to give up the fallacy?  As Stich and Nisbett 
point out, there’s reason to think that, at least for some people, the principles that are 
guiding their inferences and judgments are in reflective equilibrium for them.  Perhaps 
                                                 
9
 The text reads: “Thus, in throwing dice, we cannot be sure that any face or combination of faces will 
appear; but if, in very many throws, some particular face has not appeared, the chances of its coming up are 
stronger and stronger, until they approach very near to certainty. It must come; and as each throw is made 
and it fails to appear, the certainty of its coming draws nearer and nearer” (Quoted in Stich and Nisbett 
(1980), p. 193).   
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after having the faulty principles that are guiding their inferences and judgments 
articulated clearly for them, and after having time to reflect on them and the inferences 
and judgments themselves, they will continue to believe that there’s nothing wrong with 
either.  Pointing out the fallacy, for such people, will thus not bring their judgments in 
line with what rationality permits.  If such people are even a possibility, then Peacocke’s 
‘unexceptionable’ claim is thrown into doubt.  
Or, consider a different example.  After teaching the traditional arguments for and 
against the existence of God, and having discussions with students about the role of faith 
in religious belief, it’s clear to me that some students, for whatever reason, are simply 
more open to doubt than others.  It’s true that most believers appear to have no problem 
arriving at the following judgment: “God might not exist, but, all things considered, I 
believe that He does”.  But some of my students seem to believe so strongly that even 
contemplating the possibility that God does not exist is not really an option for them.  It 
seems that they’re simply incapable of genuine doubt.  But surely rationality at least 
permits thinkers to doubt whether God exists; indeed, rationality arguably requires it.  If 
such doubt is not open to some people, as the anecdotal evidence from my classes 
suggest, then Peacocke’s ‘unexceptionable’ principle is again off the mark.  
 But let’s put these worries about (1) to one side for now, and consider the next 
step in Peacocke’s argument.  Premise (2) says that rationally non-discretionary 
judgments aim at knowledge.  Peacocke begins his defense of (2) by pointing out that all 
judgments, both rationally discretionary and rationally non-discretionary, aim at truth.  
As he recently put it, “it is a constitutive aim of judgement that one tries to judge that p 
only if it is true that p” (2004a, p. 13).  I take the claim here to be that the very nature of 
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judging (or believing) is such that one can’t judge (or believe) that p unless one is at least 
attempting to judge only what’s true.  Peacocke doesn’t tell us whether he thinks aiming 
at the truth is part of the very concept JUDGMENT, or whether he thinks it’s merely 
constitutive of judgment that it aim at the truth.  But regardless of whether it’s meant as a 
bit of conceptual analysis, or a theoretical, constitutive truth about judgment itself, the 
claim is clearly meant to rule out what we might call “random” or “epistemically 
irresponsible” judgments—e.g., judging that the number of stars is odd.  If it’s actually 
possible to get yourself to assent to the proposition that the number of stars is odd, 
Peacocke’s claim would rule that out as counting as a genuine judgment.  For assuming 
that you have no good reason to believe that the number of stars is odd (you haven’t 
talked to God, or an alien superscientist), you can’t be aiming at the truth by assenting to 
the proposition.  
 Before going any further into Peacocke’s argument for (2), I should express my 
reservations about Peacocke’s claim that it’s constitutive of judgment that it aim at the 
truth.  It is true that, in general, people form beliefs and make judgments in the context of 
a background desire to get things right.  For nobody goes around with a background 
desire to have false beliefs, and for good reason: it would be incredibly imprudent to do 
so.  But it’s not clear that this observation is enough to ground Peacocke’s constitutive 
claim about judgment.  For imagine someone who, for whatever reason, deliberately aims 
to have false beliefs, not in general, but about something specific.  For instance, suppose 
John, our gambler, doesn’t want to have true beliefs about the principles that guide his 
judgments in the casino.  Why not?  Well, he might believe that if he comes to believe the 
truth about the gambler’s fallacy, he won’t get as much pleasure out of going to the 
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casino.  Perhaps his desire to have a certain amount of pleasure at the casino is stronger 
than his desire not to throw away his money.  And he suspects that if he comes to believe 
the truth about the gambler’s fallacy he’ll gamble away less money, but at the expense of 
the pleasure he’d otherwise have.  The point is that while John may have merely 
pragmatic reasons for not wanting to believe the truth, it would seem odd to deny that he 
literally judges that that the likelihood of rolling a two in a game of craps increases as the 
number of past rolls that don’t come up two increases, or that the chances of hitting a 
number on the roulette wheel increases as the number of spins in which the number fails 
to win increases.   
Or consider Pascal’s Wager.  Pascal claims that there are insufficient evidential 
reasons for belief in God, but nonetheless thinks that one ought to believe for prudential 
reasons.  Truth is clearly not the aim of Pascal’s judgment here.  For his judgment is 
aimed, not at truth, but at satisfying his desire not to burn for eternity!  Is Peacocke 
prepared to claim that Pascal didn’t really come to believe that God exists because his 
reasons for belief were merely prudential, and not evidential?  If Peacocke’s claim is 
intended as a bit of conceptual analysis, then it seems off the mark.  For I suspect that 
many people would have no problem with the intelligibility of the following sentence: 
Pascal believes that God exists, but also believes that there is insufficient 
evidence for God’s existence. 
Of course, people might think that Pascal is being epistemically irresponsible, and 
perhaps, following Clifford (1877/1999), even doing something that’s morally wrong.  
However, it’s doubtful that they’ll think there’s something conceptually confused, or 
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unintelligible about the sentence.10 And if Peacocke doesn’t intend the claim as an 
analysis, then what’s the argument for the theoretical claim that it’s constitutive of 
judgment that it aim at truth?  Peacocke doesn’t offer one, and as we’ve just seen the 
claim is prima facie implausible in any case.11  
Putting this worry about the constitutive aim of judgment to one side, why think 
that rationally non-discretionary judgments aim at knowledge?  Peacocke points to the 
simple fact that rationally non-discretionary judgments will be revised in light of 
evidence that suggests they’re not knowledge.  To use Peacocke’s example, suppose you 
see a coin and judge that’s a coin.  Suppose, moreover, that given the circumstances, the 
judgment is rationally non-discretionary for you.  Now suppose you’re told that there are 
many coin holograms in area.  What’s the rational thing to do?  Of course the rational 
thing to do is to think twice about your judgment, and consider whether what you’re 
experiencing is really a coin, or merely a coin hologram.  It is, to use Peacocke’s 
terminology, no longer rational for you to take your experience at face value: 
The rationality of taking perceptual experience at face value is undermined if the 
thinker comes to accept that something in these same circumstances, something at 
which she is not in fact looking, is not a coin even though it would produce the 
same subjective type of perceptual experience.  (1999, p. 21)  
                                                 
10
 There’s an issue here about whether it’s psychologically possible for Pascal to put himself in a position to 
believe that God exists, given that he also believes he lacks evidential reasons to believe that God exists.  
This is what makes this case slightly different from the case of John.  For in John’s case, he deliberately 
avoids putting himself in a position to gather evidence about whether his beliefs about gambling are true.  
But note that this is an issue about nomological possibility, not conceptual possibility.  Some people might 
think that given empirical facts about human psychology, Pascal can’t put himself in a position to 
genuinely believe that God exists.  But this judgment plausibly does not reflect the nature of the concept 
JUDGMENT, or BELIEF, but rather reflects people’s empirical beliefs about judgments and beliefs.  If this is 
right, then the intelligibility claim above still stands.  
11
 See Papineau (1999) for a rich discussion of the normativity of judgment, and for an argument that all 
such normativity in fact belongs outside of a theory of conceptual thought.   
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The presence of coin holograms in the vicinity thus undermines the judgment’s counting 
as knowledge.  And Peacocke is apparently suggesting that since it’s rational for you to 
reassess the judgment given the information that it’s not knowledge, this shows that 
rationally non-discretionary judgments aim at knowledge.  
 If this is right, and rationally non-discretionary judgments aim at knowledge, then 
how does (3) follow?  That is, how does it follow that when the presuppositions of a 
judgment are fulfilled, the relevant faculties and mechanisms are working properly, and 
the beliefs relied upon in making the judgment are knowledge, that the judgment will not 
just aim at, but be knowledge?  Peacocke’s claim is apparently that such a judgment 
couldn’t fail to be knowledge: “if [the presuppositions, etc.] could all be fulfilled and yet 
the judgement still not be knowledge, then the judgement would not after all be rationally 
non-discretionary” (1999, p. 22).  So it looks as if the relevant difference between such a 
judgment that is knowledge and a judgment that isn’t, is that the former is rationally non-
discretionary and the latter isn’t.  Being rationally non-discretionary is thus quite an 
important property, for a judgment that figures in the possession conditions for a concept 
counts as knowledge only if it’s rationally non-discretionary.   
But now recall what it takes for a judgment to have the property of being 
rationally non-discretionary: it must be a judgment that rationality requires a thinker to 
make in certain circumstances, namely the ones mentioned in the possession conditions 
for the concept in question.  So, on Peacocke’s view, there’s apparently no real gap 
between the circumstances in which it’s rational to make a judgment, given the 
possession conditions for the concept, and the circumstances in which a judgment will 
count as knowledge.  Since a judgment can’t be knowledge unless it’s true, this 
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connection between rationality and knowledge implies a corresponding connection 
between rationality and truth.  As Peacocke has recently put it: 
Suppose that the possession conditions for concepts composing a given 
conceptual content p are such that they jointly imply that in given circumstances a 
thinker will be willing to judge outright that p.  …  If the judgement could be false 
in these circumstances, then it could not rationally be required of thinkers that 
they be willing to make the judgement in these circumstances, and a formulation 
of the possession conditions for [a] concept that says they should be so willing 
would be incorrect.  (2004b, p. 88) 
We can thus see that Peacocke’s view is that there are very tight, constitutive connections 
between truth, rationality, knowledge, and concepts.  Given the nature of rationally non-
discretionary judgments, the rationality of a judgment that figures in the possession 
conditions for a concept is tied to the judgment’s counting as knowledge.  For if the 
judgment weren’t knowledge in those circumstances, then the judgment wouldn’t be 
rationally non-discretionary.  Given this, the conditions that make such a judgment 
rational will be the very conditions that make the judgment true, which in turn implies 
that there will be no real gap between the rationality of such a judgment and the truth of 
the judgment.  
 Peacocke sums all of this up with his ‘Kiplingesque Conditional’.  I quote at 
length: 
Let us fix on a judgement of a given content, the content Σ(F), say, mentioned in 
F’s possession condition.  In the general case, the circumstances mentioned in this 
possession condition may include requirements such as these: that the rationally 
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non-discretionary judgement be made when the thinker is operating in a certain 
mode M (such as that of taking perceptual experience at face value); that it be 
made with certain presuppositions, Prsp; that it is inferred from certain premises, 
Prem; and the judgement is made because the thinker is in some mental state, or is 
enjoying a certain mental event, E.  We can now write the required knowledge-
involving clause for a possession condition for the target concept F as follows, 
using these materials from the possession condition involving judgement.   
Take the informational conditions, call them Inf, corresponding to the 
mode M in which the thinker is operating.  In the case in which, for instance, the 
target concept is an observational [i.e., recognitional] concept, the informational 
conditions Inf would be the conditions for an experience to be a genuine 
perception.  If what I have argued is correct, then the following conditional holds 
for any arbitrary concept F, where Prsp, Prem, and the rest are taken from the 
judgement-involving possession condition. 
    If: 
  the informational conditions Inf are fulfilled; 
everything in the presupposition set Prsp is adequately reached and true, 
and all the premises in Prem are known; 
the thinker is in the mental state or enjoying the mental event E, and 
judges that Σ(F) because he is so, and because he accepts the members of 
Prem, and because he is making the presuppositions Prsp, and because of 
the mode in which he is operating; 
    then: 
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  his judgement that Σ(F) is knowledge. 
This Kiplingesque formulation is just the generalization of the point I was making 
when I said that rationally non-discretionary judgements are knowledge when 
their various properly attained presuppositions are fulfilled, their premises are 
knowledge, and the relevant faculties or mechanisms are functioning properly.  
(1999, pp. 27-28)   
The Kiplingesque Conditional makes it clear that, on Peacocke’s view, there’s virtually 
no gap between rationality, on the one hand, and truth and knowledge, on the other.  An 
obvious worry is that the Conditional ends up being vacuous.  For it looks as if the 
conditions under which rationality requires us to make the judgments that figure in the 
possession conditions for the relevant concepts are identical to the conditions under 
which such judgments are both true and knowledge.  In other words, Peacocke’s ‘optimal 
conditions’ seem to collapse into ‘whatever conditions turn a judgment into knowledge’.  
For the Kiplingesque Conditional says: If a thinker judges that Σ(F) in optimal 
conditions, then the judgment that Σ(F) is knowledge.  But if ‘optimal conditions’ just 
means ‘whatever conditions turn a judgment into knowledge’, then the conditional 
becomes: If a thinker judges that Σ(F) in whatever conditions turn a judgment into 
knowledge, then the judgment that Σ(F) is knowledge. 
But perhaps this is not a bad thing.  After all, Peacocke might say, what else 
would you expect ‘optimal conditions’ to turn out to be, if not the conditions that turn a 
judgment into knowledge?  If the conditions could obtain, and yet the judgment fail to be 
knowledge, he might continue, then they wouldn’t be optimal conditions after all, would 
they?  The problem with this reply, however, is that the Kiplingesque Conditional is 
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supposed to be a summary of Peacocke’s argument for the claim that judgment-
individuation implies epistemic-individuation.  But if Peacocke is willing to accept the 
Conditional as trivial, then it follows that the claim that judgment-individuation implies 
epistemic-individuation is not a substantive one.  In fact, Peacocke sometimes seems to 
suggest that this is how he intends the claim: 
We need to be clear on the conclusion of the reasoning so far.  The conclusion is 
not that there is, for concepts individuated in terms of outright judgement, a layer 
of epistemic requirements in addition to those formulated in terms of judgements.  
The argument is rather that when we appreciate the rationally non-discretionary 
nature of the judgements mentioned in such possession conditions, we are in a 
position to develop an argument that there are requirements for the possession of 
such concepts which can equally be formulated in terms of knowledge.  (1999, p. 
28)   
This is very odd.  For consider again the Judgment Pragmatist, who does not take a 
theory of concepts to be one piece of a larger, philosophical theory about what the world 
and our minds must be like in order for the latter to know about the former, but rather 
simply a piece of explanatory psychology.  For such a Judgment Pragmatist, questions 
about whether such judgments are rationally non-discretionary, or the conditions under 
which such judgments count as knowledge will simply be beside the point.  Most 
psychologists are no doubt agnostic about epistemology in general.  But even Judgment 
Pragmatists who are philosophers (like myself) might explicitly deny that concepts are 
individuated in terms of knowledge. Why?  One reason is that they may think that, pace 
Peacocke, knowledge does introduce “a layer of epistemic requirements in addition” to 
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those of judgment.  Of course, Peacocke will reply that such Judgment Pragmatists 
simply haven’t appreciated “the rationally non-discretionary nature of the judgments 
mentioned in the possession conditions”.  Once they do, Peacocke will continue, they’ll 
see that a judgment’s being rationally non-discretionary, in the circumstances mentioned 
in the possession conditions for the concept, entails that the judgment is both true and 
knowledge.  
But now we come to what I take to be the real worry about the Kiplingesque 
Conditional.  We noted earlier that not all concepts are epistemically individuated.  The 
concept RED may be, but surely QUARK is not.  But it seems that in attempting to show 
that any concept that can individuated in terms of judgment is also an epistemically 
individuated concept, Peacocke has made the Kiplingesque Conditional far too strong.  
For he claims that the “Kiplingesque conditional can … function as one clause of a 
possession condition for the target concept F” (1999, p. 28).  But suppose we take the 
target concept ‘F’ to be QUARK.  It will be true that if all the conditions mentioned in the 
Kiplingesque Conditional are fulfilled, the judgment Σ(QUARK) will be knowledge.  But 
if QUARK is epistemically individuated, then which concepts are not epistemically 
individuated?  Surely our knowledge of quarks is as theoretical and inferential as 
knowledge can get!  Something has gone wrong. 
My diagnosis is that, in attempting to argue that judgment-individuation is 
sufficient for knowledge-individuation, Peacocke has tried to close what is a necessary 
gap between rationality and truth.  Prima facie, the conditions under which a judgment is 
rational are one thing, the conditions under which it’s true are quite another.  Even if we 
grant Peacocke’s claim that truth is a constitutive aim of judgment (which I argued above 
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we shouldn’t), why can’t a rational judgment aim at the truth and miss?  Indeed, it’s 
tempting to read the history of science as one long, extended argument against the 
Kiplingesque Conditional.  Hypotheses that are rational to hold at one point in time are 
shown to be false at another.  Perhaps Peacocke will say that, in hindsight, endorsing 
such hypotheses was not rational after all.  But for scientific realists, at least, there is a 
strong presumption in favor of the view that there’s a significant gap between what’s 
rational and what’s true. 
I’ve argued that Peacocke’s argument for the claim that any concept individuated 
in terms of judgment is also an epistemically individuated concept fails.  But I want to 
end this section with a half-sympathetic conclusion.  Even if the considerations I’ve 
offered against Peacocke’s claim are correct, they’re not necessarily devastating to 
Peacocke’s aims.  As long as some concepts are individuated in terms of judgment, 
Peacocke can still meet the demands of the Regress Argument, which is his primary 
motivation for introducing epistemically individuated concept in the first place.  All that 
Peacocke would need to show is that the judgments that figure in the possession 
conditions for some concepts do in fact meet the conditions necessary for knowledge.  He 
doesn’t need the additional—and as we’ve seen, implausible—claim that such concepts 
can also be individuated in terms of knowledge.  Of course it would take some work to 
show that such conditions are indeed met by the judgments that figure in the possession 
for the relevant concepts.  But nothing in what I said above implies that Peacocke (or 
some epistemologist) couldn’t carry out such work.  
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Similarly, meeting the integration challenge does not require that any concepts be 
epistemically individuated.12 As long as the judgments mentioned in the possession 
conditions for the concepts in some domain meet the conditions for knowledge (whatever 
they turn out to be), then Peacocke can hold onto his claim that the integration challenge 
is to be solved, at least in part, by supplying a theory of concepts for that domain.  Again, 
the real work is to show that the judgments do in fact meet the conditions for knowledge, 
not that the concepts are also individuated in terms of knowledge. 
 
Conclusion 
The interim morals here are twofold: (1) the motivation behind Peacocke’s Knowledge 
Pragmatism does not suffice to show that we ought to adopt it; and (2) Peacocke’s 
argument that Judgment Pragmatists ought to be Knowledge Pragmatists fails.  With 
respect to (1), both the transcendental rationale underlying Knowledge Pragmatism and 
the integration challenge for various domains can be met by a mere Judgment 
Pragmatism.  This bears emphasis.  For while Peacocke’s Knowledge Pragmatism can 
perhaps both explain how some contents can be known non-inferentially and provide the 
means with which to integrate our metaphysics and epistemology for some domains, this 
is not alone sufficient to show that it ought to be adopted on grounds of explanatory 
power.  It’s certainly insufficient to justify Peacocke’s claim that “there is a large circle 
of interrelated notions, including entitlement, knowledge, and even intentional content 
itself, each of whose elucidations ultimately involves the others” (2004a, p. 11).  For a 
normative, epistemological theory can draw upon a theory of concepts, without concepts 
themselves being constitutively tied to entitlement or knowledge, as Peacocke claims.  As 
                                                 
12
 As Alvin Goldman (2001) suggests in his review of Being Known.  
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we saw in Chapter 2, a theorist who approaches the task of providing a theory of concepts 
from the perspective of psychological explanation may view the task as a purely 
descriptive enterprise.  We can now see that this needn’t preclude a theorist who adopts 
Peacocke’s meta-level approach from drawing upon such a descriptive theory in order to 
provide answers to normative, epistemological questions.  
Consider, by way of analogy, someone interested in answering questions about 
how one ought to perform heart surgery of some kind.  Someone interested in such 
questions can clearly draw upon a purely descriptive theory of how the heart in fact 
works.  Indeed, such a theory is plausibly indispensable in formulating a theory about 
how a certain kind of heart surgery ought to be performed.  But this does not require that 
a theory of the heart and how it works must itself be normative.  Just so, a purely 
descriptive theory of concepts may be of indispensable use to someone, such as 
Peacocke, who is interested in normative epistemology.  But this does not require that 
concepts themselves must be elucidated in terms of normative notions such as entitlement 
and knowledge.  That is, a theory of concepts may have normative import, without its 
being the case that concepts themselves are essentially normative.13  
I’ve argued that there are good reasons for Judgment Pragmatists, who approach 
the task of providing a theory of concepts from the perspective of psychological 
explanation, to resist Peacocke’s Knowledge Pragmatism.  Moreover, I’ve argued that 
virtually every step of Peacocke’s argument for the claim that Judgment Pragmatism 
leads to Knowledge Pragmatism is flawed in some way.  It’s clear that what motivates 
Peacocke’s Knowledge Pragmatism is his meta-level approach.  But Peacocke has not 
shown that a theorist who shares his object-level Judgment Pragmatism, but not his meta-
                                                 
13
 I’ve been influenced here by Horwich’s (1998, chapter 8) discussion of the normativity of language.  
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level approach, must endorse his further object-level claim that concepts are 
constitutively tied to rationality and knowledge.  Moreover, as I just suggested, even 
theorists who share his meta-level approach needn’t adopt his object-level theory.  
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CHAPTER 4
 
THE APPEAL TO EXAMPLES AND THE QUINEAN CHALLENGE 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the Chapter 3, I argued that some of the considerations that Peacocke offers in favor of 
his kind of Pragmatism—Knowledge Pragmatism—fail.  These considerations, however, 
presupposed the truth of Judgment Pragmatism, and will thus be of little interest to a 
Concept Cartesian who denies the truth of any form of Pragmatism.  Indeed, the 
Cartesian no doubt agrees with Fodor that if “one asks to hear some serious arguments 
for [Concept Pragmatism], one discovers, a bit disconcertingly, that they are very thin 
upon the ground” (1998a, p. 36).  This complaint applies to both sorts of Concept 
Pragmatism.   
So too, moreover, do some of Fodor’s arguments against Pragmatism.  Over the 
years, Fodor has leveled many such arguments: that Concept Pragmatism either leads to 
semantic holism, which violates the Shareability Constraint, or presupposes an 
analytic/synthetic distinction, which violates Quinean scruples (Fodor 1998a, Fodor and 
Lepore 1992); that it disrespects compositionality, and is thus unable to explain the 
systematicity and productivity of thought (Fodor 1998a, 1998c, 1998d, 2001b, Fodor and 
Lepore 2002); and most recently, that it can’t be formulated without vicious circularity 
(Fodor 2004a).  My aim in this chapter is to consider the first of these arguments, and in 
particular, the recurring Quinean theme in Fodor’s work that there’s no principled way to 
distinguish those inferences and judgments that are constitutive of a given concept from 
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those that are merely ‘collateral’.  If this Quinean claim is correct, and semantic holism is 
not a viable option, then it looks as if we must admit that none of the inferences or 
judgments that a concept figures in are constitutive.  But to admit this would be to simply 
give up on Pragmatism altogether.  This line of reasoning threatens both Judgment 
Pragmatism and Knowledge Pragmatism, since the argument will apply regardless of 
whether one takes constitutive roles to include knowledge or mere judgments and 
inferences.   
Peacocke has attempted to tackle head-on Fodor’s charge that there are no good 
arguments in support of Pragmatism, and that there’s no way to distinguish constitutive 
from non-constitutive roles.  His arguments fall into two classes: there are arguments 
from specific examples, and there are arguments from more general considerations 
having to do with concepts and reasons.  The first class of arguments supports a mere 
Judgment Pragmatism, whereas the more general considerations are meant to support 
Peacocke’s Knowledge Pragmatism.  In this brief chapter, I restrict my attention to the 
former sorts of arguments.  I consider the more general arguments in Chapter 7.   
After spelling out the kind of example Peacocke has in mind, I articulate the 
Quinean Challenge that appeals to such examples face.  I should note at the outset, 
however, that as pressing as this Challenge is, it’s far from decisive.  In Chapter 5, I 
consider the other side of this dialectic, and argue that there are in fact good reasons to 
doubt the position with respect to the analytic/synthetic distinction that motivates the 
Quinean Challenge.  Then, in Chapter 6, I defend a particular strategy for meeting the 
Challenge on empirical grounds.  In this chapter, though, my aim is to make the Quinean 
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challenge to Concept Pragmatism as vivid as possible, which I propose to do by 
considering Peacocke’s recent attempt to meet it, and showing why it fails.   
 
The Examples 
If we focus on perceptual-demonstrative ways of thinking, Peacocke claims, then we’ll 
agree that, contra Fodor, it is possible to say which roles are concept-constitutive.  Here’s 
the kind of example Peacocke has in mind:  
Having a perception of a desk straight ahead of one seems to give grounds, in 
everyday circumstances, for the content ‘that desk is straight ahead’, and that it 
does so seems to be partially constitutive of the identity of the concepts in the 
content.  (2004a, p. 34) 
Or consider someone who sees a blue mug, and subsequently judges that the mug is blue.  
The concepts involved in this case, Peacocke suggests, also seem to be individuated by 
their role in making judgments.  Peacocke says: 
The following is constitutive of this perceptual-demonstrative way of thinking: 
that when the subject is taking perceptual experience at face value, and perceives 
the object, which is seen as a mug and which is presented as that mug, to be blue, 
then the subject is willing to judge That mug is blue.  How could one abandon 
such a sensitivity and replace it with another and still be employing the same 
concept? (2000a, p. 333) 
The question is rhetorical.  It’s supposed to be obvious, or at least prima facie plausible, 
that one who lacked such sensitivity would thereby lack the concept.  Peacocke’s 
suggestion is that the plausibility of these kinds of examples illustrates the implausibility 
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of Cartesianism.  For the Cartesian denies that there’s a constitutive connection between 
the concepts THAT MUG, and BLUE, on the one hand, and perceptions of mugs that 
represent them as blue, on the other.  (Ditto for DESK STRAIGHT AHEAD, and perceptions 
of desks as straight ahead.)  That a perception of a mug as blue leads to (and perhaps 
grounds) the judgment that the mug is blue, according to the Cartesian, is thus not 
constitutive of the concepts involved.  Since Cartesianism denies that such relations are 
concept-constitutive, Peacocke claims that it flies in the face of what seem to be prima 
facie plausible facts about perceptual-demonstrative cases. 
I submit that, at this point in the debate, asking a rhetorical question such as ‘How 
could one abandon such a sensitivity and replace it with another and still be employing 
the same concept?’ is out of place.  Sometimes Peacocke avoids the rhetorical question 
by appealing to what he takes to be obvious: 
[I]t seems obvious that the identity of an observational concept is relevant to the 
issue of why it is that a thinker’s perceptual experience entitles her to make a 
perceptual, empirical judgement.  (2000c, p. 257, my emphasis) 
And, in specifying the roles he takes to be constitutive of the concept PLUS, he simply 
appeals to what seems plausible: 
The additional premise is that finding instances of [the clauses specifying the 
addition function] primitively compelling and doing so because they are of [those 
forms] … are constitutive of a grasp of PLUS.  This additional premise seems 
plausible. … [I]t seems that a thinker is not thinking of the addition function in 
the way of plus unless he finds those instances compelling and does so in part 
because of their form.  (1992a, p. 137, my emphasis)  
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For logical concepts, such as CONJUNCTION, Peacocke appeals to inferences that are 
“primitively compelling”: 
Conjunction is that concept C to possess which a thinker must find transitions that 
are instances of the following forms primitively compelling, and must do so 
because they are of these forms: 
 p 
 q         p C q  p C q 
 p C q  p  q (1992a, p. 6)1 
 
But, like asking the rhetorical question above, appealing to what’s obvious, 
plausible, or primitively compelling is no way to argue against a Cartesian who denies 
that possessing a concept is constitutively tied to making certain judgments or inferences.  
The reason for this is that the Cartesian agrees with Quine that’s there’s no principled 
way to distinguish between those roles that are concept-constitutive and those that aren’t.  
Pointing to properties such as being obvious, plausible, or primitively compelling will 
thus not cut any ice with a Cartesian, like Fodor, who agrees with Quine that such 
properties do not provide us with a principled distinction between matters of meaning and 
matters of fact. 
To feel the force of the Quinean challenge, consider the current controversy over 
whether laws that restrict marriage to heterosexual couples violate the equal-protection 
clause of the constitution.2 Many think that this issue is in part conceptual, in that it 
                                                 
1
 Peacocke characterizes the notion of a “primitively compelling” transition as follows: “To say that the 
thinker finds such transitions primitively compelling is to say this: (1) he finds them compelling; (2) he 
does not find them compelling because he has inferred them from other premises and/or principles; and (3) 
for possession of the concept C in question he does not need to take the correctness of the transitions as 
answerable to anything else” (1992a, p. 6).  See Rey (1996/1999) for a discussion of this notion, and for 
doubts that it’s naturalistically kosher or can successfully meet Quinean demands.  Much of the discussion 
in the present chapter is in the same spirit.   
2
 I owe this example to Georges Rey, who raises it in his Stanford Encyclopedia article “The 
Analytic/Synthetic Distinction”.   
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depends on the meaning of ‘marriage’.  Some opponents of gay marriage, for instance, 
claim that it’s part of the very concept (or definition of) MARRIAGE that it’s a union 
between a male and a female.  Others claim that they find nothing unintelligible or 
contradictory about the concept SAME-SEX MARRIAGE.  I suspect that there are people on 
each side of the dispute who find their own inferential connections obvious, plausible, 
and perhaps even primitively compelling.  Of course they can’t both be right, assuming 
that both share the concept MARRIAGE.  For either the inference from 
MARRIEDHETEROSEXUAL is constitutive of MARRIAGE or it isn’t.  Quine’s challenge is 
to say exactly what would settle the dispute.  That is, Quine demands an answer to the 
following question: What fact about thinkers could possibly make it true that the 
inference from MARRIEDHETEROSEXUAL is a matter of meaning, and not a matter of 
perhaps deeply held empirical belief? 
Now, if it were analytic that marriage implies heterosexuality, then opponents of 
gay marriage would be correct in saying that gay-rights activists are not talking about 
marriage when they claim that same-sex marriage ought to be legal.  Indeed, if 
MARRIAGE  HETEROSEXUALITY were analytic, then those who failed to make the 
inference would thereby lack the concept MARRIAGE.  For analytic inferences are 
concept-constitutive.  Peacocke himself admits that accepting “the theory of possession 
conditions as an account of concepts and content does indeed involve commitment to 
some analogue at the level of thought of the analytic/synthetic distinction” (1992a, 
p.244n7).  
Given this, it seems Peacocke owes the Cartesian an answer to the Quinean 
challenge.  For as Fodor says: 
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[T]here seems to be no way to distinguish the inferences that constitute concepts 
from other kinds of inferences that concepts enter into.  …  Quine shocked 
[philosophers’] faith that ‘defining inference’ is well defined, and hence their faith 
in such related notions as analyticity, propositions true in virtue of meaning alone, 
and so forth.  We have, as things now stand, no account of what makes an 
inference a defining one, and no idea how such an account might be devised.  
(1998a, p. 45)   
Quine’s challenge, then, for those who think that certain inferences or judgments are 
concept-constitutive while others are merely ‘collateral’, is to specify in a principled way 
the properties in virtue of what the constitutive roles are constitutive. 
Those who speak of constitutive properties of concepts without addressing the 
Quinean challenge, run the risk of falling prey to the following criticism of Stephen 
Stich:  
In reading the books and articles of those who invoke the notion of a constitutive 
property, it is easy to get the feeling that one has fallen into a time warp.  These 
philosophers write as though the notion of constitutive properties were entirely 
unproblematic, and they give no indication that they have ever heard of Quine and 
his assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction.  (1996, p. 88n) 
Some prominent Concept Pragmatists are willing to admit that they don’t know how to 
answer Quine’s challenge.  Consider Paul Boghossian’s claims in the following passage 
(he talks of constitutive inferences, but the point applies equally well to judgments): 
If expressions mean what they do by virtue of the inferences they participate in, 
then some inferences are constitutive of an expression’s meaning what it does, 
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and others aren’t.  And the pressing question is: Which are which?  What property 
does an inference have to have, if it is to be meaning-constitutive?  
All the participants to the present debate agree that to this day no one has 
succeeded in providing a systematic answer to these sorts of questions.  As yet, 
there are no plausible accounts out there of what properties an inference must 
have if it is to be meaning-constitutive.  (1994b, pp. 110-111) 
Boghossian wrote that over ten years ago, and it will hardly come as a surprise to 
Cartesians like Fodor if it turns out that Pragmatists have made little progress on this 
issue in the meantime.  For Fodor claims that if Quine is right about there being no 
principled analytic/synthetic distinction, then there is no way to distinguish constitutive 
from non-constitutive roles.  Such a lack of progress will be viewed by Cartesians as 
evidence that there is no such distinction to be drawn.  In fact, Fodor has recently begun 
treating the lack of a principled analytic/synthetic distinction as a datum to be explained, 
taking it to be a virtue of Informational Atomism that it explains why Quine was right that 
there’s no such distinction (1998a, p.71). 
As we’ll see in Chapter 5, there are reasons for thinking that neither the 
philosophical nor the empirical arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction are 
convincing, and thus that Fodor should not take the lack of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction as a datum to be explained by a theory of concepts.  On the other hand, it’s 
clear that Peacocke’s appeal to what’s obvious or plausible isn’t sufficient to show that 
the Cartesian is wrong to deny that there is such a distinction.  In the remainder of the 
chapter, I explain why this is so. 
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Why the Appeal to Examples Fails 
Consider Peacocke’s claim that it’s plausible that thinkers who see a blue mug in broad 
daylight will be willing to judge that it’s a blue mug, and that failure to do so would be 
grounds for denying that they had the concept BLUE MUG.  This is insufficient to refute 
the Cartesian, but not because the claim itself is implausible.  (Who could deny that?)  
Rather, it’s insufficient because what’s needed is an explanatory basis for the claim that 
failing to judge that the mug is blue entails a lack of the concepts, and neither plausibility 
nor obviousness provides this. 
Consider what Fodor says about the relation between seeing a rabbit and judging 
that there’s a rabbit, on the one hand, and possessing the concept RABBIT on the other:  
No landscape is so empty, or so well lit … that your failure to recognize that it 
contains a rabbit entails that you haven’t got the concept RABBIT.  So, it couldn’t 
be that your having the concept RABBIT requires that there are circumstances in 
which you couldn’t but recognize a rabbit as such.  (1995, p. 36, original 
emphasis) 
The same point holds for seeing a dog, judging there’s a dog, and possessing DOG: 
[I]f you try to list the sorts of perceptual environments in which dog-thoughts 
must arise if a creature has the concept DOG, you will find that there aren’t any: no 
landscape is either so barren, or so well lit, that it is metaphysically impossible to 
fail to notice whether it contains a dog.  (1998a, p. 79, original emphasis)  
And Fodor will say the same, of course, for BLUE MUG, or DESK STRAIGHT AHEAD.  
What’s driving Fodor here is his agreement with Quine that’s there’s no principled way 
to distinguish between those inferences/judgments that are reliable because they’re 
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concept-constitutive and those that are reliable even though they’re not concept-
constitutive.  Fodor will thus demand an answer to the Quinean question: What could 
serve as a truthmaker for the claim that a thinker who is unwilling to judge ‘that’s a 
rabbit’ or ‘that’s a blue mug’, in certain circumstances, lacks the concept RABBIT or BLUE 
MUG, where such a truthmaker would rule out the thinker’s merely having an 
idiosyncratic belief about rabbits or blue mugs?   
  
Possible Replies 
Although Peacocke doesn’t attempt to answer this question, one can imagine a Concept 
Pragmatist replying as follows: “Granted, I don’t know what the truthmaker for this claim 
is, but that’s OK.  I’m actually not sure what the truthmaker for lots of claims are, but I 
can nevertheless know that they are true.  For instance, I don’t know the ultimate 
truthmaker for the sentence “The smell of the curry made Eric ill”.  But I can nonetheless 
know that there must be a truthmaker, since I can know that the claim is true.  Similarly, I 
don’t know what fact about thinkers makes it true that failing to judge ‘that’s a rabbit’ or 
‘that’s a blue mug’ in certain circumstances entails a lack of the concept RABBIT or BLUE 
MUG.  But that’s not a problem, since I know it’s true that failing to make such judgments 
manifests their lack of RABBIT and BLUE MUG.  Since we can have knowledge of the truth 
of a claim without having knowledge of the truthmaker in virtue of which it is true, 
what’s the problem?” 
 But this reply misses the point.  Perhaps we don’t know the ultimate truthmaker 
for “The smell of the curry made Eric feel ill”.  But we do have some idea, and, more 
importantly, we can have non-question begging evidence that there must be such a 
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truthmaker.  That is, we can have evidence that Eric feels ill, and that smelling the curry 
put him in that state.  Perhaps “knock-down” evidence that this is so is unavailable, but 
surely strong non-demonstrative evidence is available.  The Cartesian is asking for 
similar evidence that thinkers failing to judge ‘that’s a blue mug’ or ‘that’s a rabbit’ in 
certain circumstances lack the concepts BLUE MUG or RABBIT, again, where this evidence 
rules out the hypothesis that they merely have idiosyncratic beliefs about blue mugs or 
rabbits.  In a certain sense, the Quinean/Cartesian demand for such a truthmaker just is a 
demand for evidence that some connections to judgment are concept-constitutive while 
others are not.  Unlike in the case of the curry’s making Eric feel ill, the 
Quinean/Cartesian will insist, the Concept Pragmatist has not provided any such 
evidence. 
 Second possible reply: “But surely we do have evidence that some divergences in 
judgment manifest a difference at the level of concepts.  Suppose two people are having a 
discussion about rabbits, and one thinks that rabbits are the fastest land animals, while the 
other disagrees.  Surely this divergence in judgment does not count as evidence of a 
conceptual difference.  To insist that it did would be to insist that whether thinkers have 
the concept RABBIT depends upon all of their rabbit-beliefs.  For it’s hard to see how a 
theorist could accept that thinkers lack the concept RABBIT if they believe that rabbits are 
the fastest land animals without accepting that the content of RABBIT is determined by the 
all of one’s rabbit-beliefs.  But to endorse the latter claim is to endorse semantic holism, 
which leads to the claim that people can’t actually have genuine disagreements about 
rabbits, or anything else for that matter, since holism violates the Shareability Constraint.  
So Cartesians and Pragmatists alike ought to reject it.  Let’s agree, then, that 
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disagreement over whether rabbits are the fastest land animals would clearly not count as 
evidence of a conceptual difference. 
“But suppose, in the course of the discussion, a rabbit appears in the vicinity.  One 
person says “Look, there’s a rabbit,” while the other person, for whatever reason, 
withholds judgment on whether it’s in fact a rabbit.  Suppose, moreover, that the latter 
person is not withholding judgment because of poor lighting, etc.  If this kind of 
divergence in judgment occurred, then surely it would count as decisive evidence that the 
thinker who failed to make the judgment lacked the concept RABBIT.  If the conversation 
were to continue, then it would be clear, as Davidson says another context, that the 
thinker had “changed the subject” (1970/2002, p. 120).  There thus can be evidence that 
some judgments are constitutively tied to the possession of certain concepts after all.  I 
just described it.” 
 Again, the Cartesian will insist that this won’t do.  For the Cartesian can admit 
that someone’s failing to judge that something’s a rabbit in certain conditions would 
count as prima facie evidence that they lacked the concept RABBIT.  That is, the Cartesian 
can agree that such circumstanced would count as prima facie evidence that the person 
had “changed the subject,” or was no longer talking about rabbits. (“If you don’t agree 
that that’s a rabbit, then we’re obviously talking past each other,” one might say.)  
However, in the context of a debate between a Cartesian and a Pragmatist about concept 
possession, such evidence is apparently question-begging.  For the Cartesian will simply 
deny that such prima facie evidence in fact counts in favor of a constitutive link between 
concepts and judgment.  For it could also be taken as evidence that the two people have 
divergent beliefs about rabbits.  And, the Cartesian will insist, Quine taught us that 
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there’s apparently no principled way of deciding which of these two views is right.  As 
Fodor says: 
[P]eople can have radically false theories and really crazy views, consonant with 
our understanding perfectly well, thank you, which false views they have and 
what radically crazy things it is that they believe.  Berkeley thought that chairs are 
mental, for Heaven’s sake!  Which are we to say that he lacked, the concept 
MENTAL or the concept CHAIR?”  (1987, p. 125) 
On Fodor’s Cartesian view, it’s true that people’s beliefs and theories mediate the 
mind-world relations that determine conceptual content.  But it’s possible for people 
(especially philosophers!) to believe almost anything, including, as Fodor points out, that 
rabbits are mental.  Some of these differences in beliefs may lead to divergent perceptual 
judgments about whether a given object falls under RABBIT.  For the Cartesian, this is 
perfectly consistent with both thinkers possessing RABBIT, however, so long as the 
mediation between RABBIT and rabbits is reliable. And perhaps there are good, 
explanatory reasons for believing that this is so, despite the divergence in belief.  
We can now see that the Cartesian has a ready reply to Peacocke’s appeal to 
specific examples.  For while it’s prima facie plausible that if thinkers “abandon such a 
sensitivity and replace it with another” they will not “be employing the same concept,” 
the question is whether such prima facie plausibility tells of anything more than an 
intimate connection between perception and judgment.  To return to Peacocke’s example, 
it’s certainly true that if our experience represents something as a blue mug, and we’re 
taking our experience at face value, then we can’t help but judge that that’s a blue mug.  
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That’s a datum that needs explaining.  Peacocke is right that one explanation is that such 
judgments figure in the possession conditions for the concepts involved.   
But it seems to me that if that’s right, it needs to be true that we make such 
judgments in virtue of the constitutive connection between them and the concepts.  The 
appeal to examples does not establish that this is so.  In demanding that Peacocke show 
that such judgments hold in virtue of their constitutive connections to concepts, I’m not 
demanding that he show that we exploit an explicit theory of concepts when we make 
perceptual judgments.  For people clearly do not make perceptual judgments by appeal to 
a theory of concepts—e.g., people don’t justify their perceptual judgments about blue 
mugs by appealing to the possession conditions for BLUE MUG, and any theory that 
demanded that they do so would be absurd.  Rather, the point I’m pressing is that, for his 
argument to be compelling, Peacocke needs to point to a datum that can be explained 
only by appealing to constitutive connections between concepts and judgments.  That is, 
Peacocke needs to point to a fact such that in order to explain it we, as theorists, must say 
that it’s in virtue of the connection between perception and judgment that a thinker 
possesses BLUE MUG, which in my view he hasn’t done.   
Until he comes up with such a fact, the Cartesian has a simpler explanation of the 
datum that Peacocke has pointed to, namely, that there are causal relations between 
perceptions and judgments.  For on any plausible view, perceiving something as a blue 
mug is causally related to judging or believing that it’s a blue mug.  Indeed, this 
connection follows from standard functionalist claims about the individuation of mental 
states, and this is presumably true regardless of which brand of functionalism one 
endorses.  For instance, the intimate causal connection between perception and 
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belief/judgment would surely be part of what Lewis (1972) would ramsify over when 
defining ‘belief’ (and ‘perception’), if he ever bothered to collect the folk-platitudes 
about mental states.  The same goes, I take it, for functionalists who prefer to ramsify 
over whatever can be discovered by a priori philosophical analysis, such as Shoemaker 
(2003).  For if we can know about the nature of mental states from the armchair, then 
surely that perceptual states are intimately related to judgment/belief states is one of the 
things we can know.  The point also applies to those who accept instead some kind of 
psychofunctionalism, which ramsifies over the deliverances of the best empirical 
psychological theory (Lycan 1987, 1988, and Rey 1997).  For it’s part of our best 
empirical theory of mental architecture that the outputs of the perceptual system are 
inputs to the belief/judgment system, and that states of the latter are caused by the former.  
It thus seems that functionalists of all stripes must apparently accept that any account of 
perception must respect its intimate connection with belief and judgment.  Given this, 
functionalism alone can explain the relevant data.  
For our purposes, the important point here is that nothing immediately follows 
about concepts or concept-possession from such claims about the relation between 
perceptual states and beliefs/judgments.  It can be true that judging that something is a 
blue mug is related to perceiving it as a blue mug without its being the case that there’s a 
constitutive connection between the concepts BLUE MUG and the judgment that’s a blue 
mug.  The data might simply reflect something about perception and judgment, or our 
concepts PERCEPTION and JUDGMENT, along functionalist lines.  In Chapter 6, I claim 
that such examples might provide an explanatory basis for constitutive connections if the 
causal relations were subsumed under psychological laws.  But taken by itself, 
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Peacocke’s appeal to examples will not convince Cartesians like Fodor who deny that 
concepts are constitutively connected to judgment.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SALVAGING CONCEPT PRAGMATISM FROM QUINE’S AND 
FODOR’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE ANALYTIC  
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In Chapter 4, Peacocke’s appeals to examples were met with essentially Quinean replies.  
For I argued that such examples do not provided an explanatory basis for the claim that 
some concepts are constitutively tied to making certain judgments, and as a result that 
they are question-begging against Cartesians, who deny that there are any such 
connections.  Philosophers who are either thoroughgoing Quineans themselves, or 
sensitive to the force of the Quinean challenge, will find the arguments of the last chapter 
unsurprising.  For skepticism about specifying concept-constitutive roles in thought and 
judgment goes hand in hand with skepticism about the prospects of drawing a principled 
analytic/synthetic distinction.  As Fodor puts it: 
[I]f … there isn’t an epistemic analytic/synthetic distinction, then the notion of a 
possession condition is infirm and you can’t identify grasping a concept with 
being disposed to draw the inference by which its possession conditions are 
constituted.  (1998a, p. 33) 
In fact, I suspect that many philosophers—Quineans and non-Quineans alike—accept the 
following conditional: If Quine is right about the analytic/synthetic distinction, then there 
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can be no principled distinction between the concept-constitutive and non-concept-
constitutive inferences and judgments.1    
As we saw in Chapter 2, accepting this conditional can lead to semantic holism.  
Ned Block, for instance, says that he accepts holism because “no one has provided a 
convincing reason for including some inferences and excluding others” (1991, p. 40).  
Given the problems with semantic holism, though, some philosophers claim that since 
Quine is right about the analytic/synthetic distinction, then Concept Pragmatism must be 
given up.  At the end of their discussion of Block’s account, for instance, Fodor and 
Lepore say: 
If, as we suspect, Quine is right about the a/s distinction, then the moral of our 
discussion is that [Concept Pragmatism] is false.  (1992, p. 186) 
Stich, a fellow Quinean, is a bit more cautious.  He says: 
[Concept Pragmatists] must either make it plausible that the arguments against the 
existence of the analytic/synthetic distinction are mistaken or that the notion of a 
conceptually necessary property can be made sense of without presupposing or 
entailing the existence of analytic sentences.  (1996, p. 62)  
                                                 
1
 Stich says: “[I]f some properties are constitutive for a concept, and others are not, and if…claims about 
concepts are interchangeable with claims about what our words mean, then it seems there must also be 
some sentences that are true entirely in virtue of meaning and others whose truth or falsity depends in part 
on the way the world is.  That is, there must be some sentences that are analytic and others that are 
synthetic. … Starting more than forty years ago, however, Quine and others offered some enormously 
influential arguments aimed at showing that the analytic/synthetic distinction is untenable.  On Quine’s 
view, and on the view of many other philosophers as well, there are no sentences that are true solely in 
virtue of their meaning.  If this is right, then there are no constitutive or conceptually necessary properties” 
(1996, p. 62).  Rey has the same worry: “[I]f there is no principled basis for distinguishing matters of 
meaning from mere matter of factual belief, then there can be no basis for selecting some and not other 
conditions as constitutive of possession of a particular concept” (1996/1999, p. 339).   
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Questions ensue: What exactly are the arguments that are supposed to show that there is 
no principled analytic/synthetic distinction?  And how, exactly, do they bear on the 
question of whether some roles in inference/judgment are concept-constitutive?   
This chapter pursues these questions, and proceeds as follows.  First, I spell out 
Quine’s arguments against the analytic, and show that the analytic/synthetic distinction is 
perfectly compatible with both his Confirmation Holism and his claims about empirical 
revisability.  I then turn to Fodor’s empirical arguments against the analytic, and focus in 
particular on his arguments against lexical decomposition and definitions.  I argue, first, 
that there are reasons to doubt that these arguments establish their intended conclusion, 
namely, that lexical items lack structure ‘at the semantic level’ and that the corresponding 
lexical concepts are internally unstructured.  Second, and more importantly, I argue that 
even if Fodor’s arguments against lexical decomposition and definition are successful, 
they do not constitute a convincing argument against Concept Pragmatism.  For Concept 
Pragmatism needn’t endorse the view that the conceptual/inferential role of a lexical 
concept is specified by its internal structure.  I then outline what I take to be viable 
version of Concept Pragmatism, according to which meaning relations are captured by 
inference rules, or ‘meaning-postulates’.  This view, it seems to me, deserves to be 
resurrected and reconsidered.  For it allows one to accept the empirical arguments in 
favor of Concept Atomism, while at the same time deny that such arguments imply that 
there’s no analytic/synthetic distinction.  I conclude by answering Fodor’s objection that 
such a view has unhappy consequences concerning the relation between concept 
constitution and concept possession.   
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Quine’s Arguments and their Failure 
Some philosophers are rightly puzzled by Fodor’s and other philosophers’ heavy reliance 
on claims about “what Quine showed” regarding the analytic/synthetic distinction.  As 
they see it, while it’s true that Quine indeed led an assault on the analytic/synthetic 
distinction, it’s far from clear that his arguments establish that there is no such 
distinction.  Perhaps his arguments are best regarded, not as establishing that there is no 
analytic/synthetic distinction, but rather as presenting us with a sort of puzzle: on the one 
hand, there seems to be an undeniable and interesting difference between, say, “bachelors 
are unmarried” and “bachelors are frustrated”—one can see that the former is true merely 
by understanding the meaning of the sentence, while this is not the case with the latter; 
on the other hand, as Quine arguably shows, there has been little success when it comes 
to spelling out a principled distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences.2  
Convinced Quineans, of course, will not see matters this way.  As they see it, 
there’s a different sort of puzzle, which is generated by two facts: (1) there is no 
analytic/synthetic distinction; and (2) it seems to speakers/thinkers that certain 
sentences/thoughts and not others can be seen to be true merely by understanding their 
meaning.  In an attempt to meet this puzzle, Quine (1953a) appeals to what’s “central” in 
the web of belief, and Fodor (1998a) adds to this an appeal to the existence of so-called 
“one-criterion concepts”.  These strategies rely on the idea that we easily confuse 
epistemic facts with semantic ones.  What we naively think of as our semantic intuitions, 
according to Quine and Fodor, are actually intuitions of facts that are merely epistemic.  
In Chapter 6, I consider in detail these attempts to “explain away” (2) so as to hold onto 
                                                 
2
 Thanks to Paul Pietroski for the suggestion that Quine’s arguments are perhaps best viewed as presenting 
a puzzle, and for a discussion that prompted much of the material in this chapter.  
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(1), and argue that they fail.  At this point, however, let’s merely note that those skeptical 
of Quine’s arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction will reject (1).  
What are Quine’s arguments?  To answer this, we need to have clearly in mind 
Quine’s target, which is Frege’s notion of analyticity: truth based on the laws of logic and 
definitions.  A statement is analytic, in Frege’s sense, just in case it is transformable into 
a logical truth by substituting synonyms for synonyms.  I’ll follow Boghossian (1996) 
and refer to this notion as ‘Frege-analyticity’.  It’s clear at the outset of “Two Dogmas” 
that Frege-analyticity is Quine’s target.  Quine says: 
Statements which are analytic by general philosophical acclaim … fall into two 
classes. Those of the first class, which may be called logically true, are typified 
by: 
(1) No unmarried man is married.   
The relevant feature of this example is that it not merely is true as it stands, but 
remains true under any and all reinterpretations of ‘man’ and ‘married’.  If we 
suppose a prior inventory of logical particles, comprising ‘no’, ‘un-‘, ‘not’, ‘if’, 
‘then’, ‘and’, etc., then in general a logical truth is a statement which is true and 
remains true under all reinterpretations of its components other than the logical 
particles. 
But there is also a second class of analytic statements, typified by: 
(2) No bachelor is married.   
The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned into a logical truth 
by putting synonyms for synonyms; thus (2) can be turned into (1) by putting 
‘unmarried man’ for its synonym ‘bachelor’.  (1953a, pp. 22-23)  
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The members of this second class of analytic statements are thus putative examples of 
Frege-analyticity. Quine goes on to say that “[o]ur problem is … analyticity; and here the 
major difficulty lies not in the first class of analytic statement, the logical truths, but 
rather in the second class” (1953a, p. 24). 
Famously, Quine goes on to argue that all extant attempts to define ‘analyticity’ in 
this second sense ultimately involve other, related terms—‘synonymy’, ‘definition’, 
‘semantic rule’, and ‘contradiction in terms’—which are, in his view, equally in need of 
explication.  Indeed, Quine points out that these other notions could just as easily be 
defined in terms of ‘analytic’. They form a “family circle” of intensional notions, and 
Quine’s complaint is that no one has successfully broken out of the circle.  For this 
reason, his argument here is sometimes referred to as the “circle of terms argument”.  
Quine concludes the argument as follows: 
[O]ne is tempted to suppose in general that the truth of a statement is somehow 
analyzable into a linguistic component and a factual component.  Given this 
supposition, it next seems reasonable that in some statements the factual 
component should be null; and these are the analytic statements.  But, for all its a 
priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements 
simply has not been drawn.  That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is 
an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith.  (1953a, pp. 
36-37) 
As many philosophers—following H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson (1956)—have 
pointed out, the circle of terms argument, all by itself, is hardly a reason to deny that 
there’s an analytic/synthetic distinction.  For there are plenty of examples of groups of 
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notions in which each member of the group is defined (only) by mentioning other 
members of the group.  Grice and Strawson mention “morally wrong”, “blameworthy”, 
and “breach of moral rules” (1956, p. 148), and there are lots of examples from scientific 
discourse: the terms in “E = ½ mv2”, “F = ma”, and “F = (gm1m2)/d2” are perhaps 
examples.  But the fact that members of a group of expressions are inter-defined in this 
way is not normally a reason for thinking that the expressions are senseless, or that belief 
in their application is, as Quine says, “an article of faith”.  Indeed, one wonders why this 
argument worries Quine so much.  After all, if there are no analyses, as he claims, then 
surely we shouldn’t reject the analytic merely because we can’t provide an analysis of 
“analytic”! 
Perhaps the circle of intensional notions is different.  Harman (1999), for 
example, suggests that in other cases, some of the terms will be antecedently understood, 
and that this is not the case with the circle of intensional notions.  But one might think 
that there’s a perfectly ordinary notion of ‘sameness of meaning’, and that agreement 
upon use in this case is legitimate justification of the notion (Grice and Strawson 1956).  
And if synonymy can be explained in terms of this ordinary notion of ‘sameness of 
meaning’, then analyticity can be explained in terms of synonymy, as proponents of 
Frege-analyticity claim.  Putnam apparently thinks this, and claims that “where there is 
agreement on the use of the expressions involved with respect to an open class, there 
must necessarily be some kind of distinction present” (1975b, p. 35, original emphasis).  
Needless to say, Harman disagrees.  
But I don’t want to enter further into this dispute.  For the circle of terms 
argument is certainly not the most powerful of Quine’s arguments.  It leaves open both 
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the question of how one should view the relationship between the ‘ordinary’ and 
‘technical’ uses of such intensional notions (as the dispute between Putnam, Grice and 
Strawson, on the one hand, and Harman, on the other, illustrates), and the possibility that 
further research will provide some way of breaking out of the circle.  In this latter regard, 
for instance, philosophers attempting to naturalize content can be seen as attempting to 
break out of the circle, by stating in non-semantic terms what it is for a symbol to have a 
meaning.  If the circle of terms argument were the only argument Quine offered against 
the analytic/synthetic distinction, then it’s doubtful that “Two Dogmas” would’ve been so 
influential. 
Quine’s better argument against analyticity appeals to his epistemological 
claims—in particular, his confirmation holism and his claims about empirical revisability.  
According to Quine’s famous picture, our beliefs about the world form a seamless web, 
and none of our beliefs are immune to revision.  With enough recalcitrant experience, 
even logical and mathematical beliefs could rationally be given up, if doing so would 
preserve the overall coherence, simplicity, etc., of the entire web.  Quine’s epistemology 
thus poses a threat to the traditional picture of Frege, Carnap, and others, according to 
which logic, mathematics (and philosophy) were different sorts of enquiry than physics, 
chemistry, geology, biology, and the other sciences.  The former were taken to be a priori 
disciplines, which deliver necessary truths, whereas the latter were taken to be a 
posteriori disciplines, which deliver contingent truths.  But if Quine is right, what 
distinguishes logic and mathematics from physics and biology is merely that the former 
are more “central” in the web of belief than the latter.  As Quine puts it: 
 127 
[N]o statement is immune to revision.  Revision even of the logical law of 
excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum 
mechanics; and what difference is there in principle between such a shift and a 
shift whereby Kepler superceded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin 
Aristotle? (1953a, p. 43) 
There’s thus no fundamental epistemological difference between logic and mathematics, 
on the one hand, and all of our other beliefs, on the other.  Logical and mathematical 
beliefs can be given up, on Quine’s view, it’s just that it would take a massive amount of 
pressure from the experiential periphery of the web in order for us to be rational in doing 
so.   
This epistemological picture is widely taken to have undermined the traditional 
motivation for positing an analytic/synthetic distinction.  For the reason that Frege, 
Carnap, and others posited analyticity is that they thought it provided a respectable way 
of accounting for the apriority and necessity of logic and mathematics.  As Harman says, 
“the ultimate defence of the full-blooded theory of analytic truth rests on the claim that 
some truths are either necessarily true or knowable a priori” (1999, p. 121).  The idea, 
recall, was that if our a priori justification of mathematics and logic could be explained 
by the relevant terms/concepts being analytically related to one another, then there would 
be no need for what many regard as dubious rationalistic explanations, which posit a 
faculty of the mind (“rational insight” or “rational intuition”) that somehow gives us 
direct—non-experiential—access to necessary truths.  Appealing to analyticities provides 
a much more mundane explanation: if, say, ‘2 + 2 = 4’ were analytic, then if you 
understood its meaning, you couldn’t fail to see that it’s true.  Given this conception of 
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analyticity and the work it is meant to do, it might seem that if Quine is right that no 
beliefs are immune to revision, then we no longer have a reason for believing that there 
are any such analyticities.  For analyticities, it’s often said, are supposed to have just such 
immunity. 
Now, before discussing this line of reasoning any further, I should note that the 
direction of Quine’s argument in “Two Dogmas” is not entirely clear.  In the paper itself, 
Quine’s arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction come before his rejection of 
localism about confirmation.  Given this, it’s natural to read Quine as arguing from a 
rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction to confirmation holism.  Fodor reads Quine 
that way: 
Quine rejects the Positivist account of confirmation because it assumes that there 
are ‘local’ semantic connections (between ‘data sentences’ and ‘theory 
sentences’).  He rejects local semantic connections because they would imply that 
there are urevisable statements.  And he rejects the claim that there are 
unrevisable statements because it is false to scientific practice.  In short, Quine’s 
tactic is to infer Confirmation Holism from the refutation of semantic localism, 
and not the other way round.  (1987, p. 65, original emphasis)  
I’m not so sure about this.  If Quine denies that there are analytic statements (or ‘local 
semantic connections’) because they imply that there are unrevisable statements, and he 
rejects the latter because scientists typically reason holistically, then hasn’t Quine argued 
from confirmation holism to a rejection of the analytic? 3  In any case, regardless of how 
Quine takes the direction of the argument to go, it’s clear that there’s an argument from 
                                                 
3
 In Holism: A Shopper’s Guide, it appears that Fodor has changed his mind on this issue: “[W]hat 
underlies Quine’s rejection of analyticity [is] a recognition of the holistic, nonlocal character of empirical 
inference” (Fodor and Lepore 1992, p. 183).  
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confirmation holism to a denial of the analytic/synthetic distinction.  Quine himself says 
that “the two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical” (1953a, p. 41).  
Is this epistemological argument against the analytic convincing?  In an important 
early discussion, Putnam (1975b) agrees with Quine’s confirmation holism, but says that 
if you deny the existence of the analytic/synthetic distinction, “you will not be wrong in 
connection with any philosophical issues not having to do specifically with the 
distinction” (p. 36).  It’s only when philosophers “attempt to use [the distinction] as a 
weapon in philosophical discussion” (p. 36) that they go wrong.  Putnam assumes, then, 
that confirmation holism is consistent with the existence of an analytic/synthetic 
distinction.  More recently, a number of philosophers have pointed out the shortcomings 
of Quine’s epistemological arguments against the existence of analyticities (and the a 
priori) on just these grounds (BonJour 1998, Horwich 1992, Rey 1993, 1998a, Sober 
2000b).  It’s true that scientists (and the rest of us) do, and ought, to consider how 
accepting a belief affects the rest of our beliefs—our Quinean web—in terms of 
coherence, simplicity, and the like.  But this fact alone doesn’t rule out the analytic.  For 
it may be that upon reflection on the totality of the web, it will turn out that it is in fact 
rational, by Quine’s own empiricist standards, to accept the existence of the analytic and 
the a priori. 
For our purposes, the crucial point to notice here is that contemporary defenders 
of the analytic needn’t be committed to the traditional (positivistic) motivations 
mentioned above.  For it may be that we ought to believe in analyticity, not because it 
affords a nice way of accounting for our apparent a priori knowledge of logic and 
mathematics, but rather because our best empirical theory of the world requires it, e.g., 
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our best linguistic theory.  Similarly, it may be that our belief in the a priori is not itself a 
priori, but rather depends upon our best empirical theory of the abstract structure of the 
mind (Rey 1998a, 2001).  That there’s an analytic/synthetic distinction and a priori 
knowledge, on these sorts of views, are empirical facts and thus ones that a good Quinean 
ought to accept.  Of course, defending the analytic and the a priori on empirical grounds 
requires work, and I want to stress that it’s not my aim to carry out such work.  My point 
is simple and modest: Regardless of whether these empirical defenses of the analytic and 
the a priori succeed, it’s clear that Quine’s epistemology alone does not rule them out.4   
 Given that Quine’s arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction are 
apparently inadequate, it’s worth pursuing the question of exactly which arguments are 
supposed to rule out it out.  In Chapter 4, I argued against Peacocke’s attempt to answer 
the Quinean challenge by appeal to specific examples.  But, one might wonder, if Quine’s 
own arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction aren’t altogether convincing, 
then why should Peacocke and other Concept Pragmatists care about committing 
themselves to it?  After all, if we regard Quine’s assault on the distinction as presenting 
us with a puzzle and not a refutation, as I suggested above, then it’s no objection to 
Peacocke or anyone else to point out that a non-holistic Pragmatism runs afoul of “what 
Quine showed”. 
 
 
                                                 
4
 As Georges Rey has emphasized to me, many philosophers bought into Quine’s confirmation holism 
because it’s very plausible when understood as the claim that “our beliefs confront the tribunal of 
experience as a corporate body”.  What people apparently failed to notice, however, is that in arguing 
against the analytic and the a priori Quine adds an ‘only’ to this formulation: “our statements about the 
external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” (1953a, 
p. 41, emphasis added).  But you can’t get to that claim by pointing out that scientists and the rest of us 
reason holistically.   
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Fodor’s Arguments Against Lexical Decomposition, Definitions, etc. 
Although Fodor often relies on Quine, in some moods he’ll admit that Quine’s arguments 
are not decisive.  For instance, at one point he says: 
It is often, and rightly, said that Quine didn’t prove that you can’t make sense of 
analyticity, definition, and the like. 
Then he adds: 
But so what?  Cognitive science doesn’t do proofs; it does empirical, non-
demonstrative inferences.  (1998a, p. 46)  
It is these non-demonstrative inferences that thus deserve our attention.  For if there’s a 
strong but non-demonstrative argument to the effect that there’s no analytic/synthetic 
distinction—and not just that we don’t know how to draw it in a principled way—then 
Peacocke and other Concept Pragmatists are presumably in trouble.  
 There are a number of strands to Fodor’s empirical, non-demonstrative argument 
against the analytic/synthetic distinction, but foremost among them are his arguments 
against the lexical semantics tradition in linguistics.  My aim in this section and the next 
is to spell out in detail the structure of these arguments, and to show why they’re 
ineffective as arguments against Concept Pragmatism.  
To get a grip on these arguments, let’s begin by supposing, with Fodor and many 
others (including his opponents, e.g. Jackendoff 1992, 2002), that there’s a close parallel 
between the lexical and conceptual systems of the mind.  I use the vague phrase “close 
parallel” since the systems can come apart.  Most obviously, non-linguistic animals might 
possess concepts.  Less obviously, there can be differences between the number of lexical 
items that languages attach to a single conceptual domain: English has one verb for the 
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‘putting on clothes’ domain, whereas Japanese has at least four distinct verbs for different 
aspects of that domain (one verb for putting on headgear, a different verb for putting 
clothes on lower parts of the body, etc.).  English speakers can obviously make a 
conceptual distinction between these different aspects, even though such distinctions do 
not have lexical counterparts (Clark 1983, Keil 1989).   
In what follows, I’ll put to one side concerns about whether concepts can be 
identified with word meanings.  Our concern is with linguistic humans, and the fact that 
the lexical and conceptual systems do not always coincide will not affect the arguments 
that follow.  I’ll thus simply assume for the nonce that words express concepts: the 
lexical item ‘red’ expresses the lexical concept RED, the phrase ‘fast runner’ express the 
phrasal concept FAST RUNNNER, and so on.  On this assumption, the distinction between 
primitive and defined lexical items suggests a corresponding distinction between complex 
and primitive concepts (Fodor et al. 1980; Fodor 1981b).  
According to the lexical semantics tradition, many items in the lexicon exhibit 
structure ‘at the semantic level’.  Two classic examples of lexical decomposition are 
‘bachelor’, which putatively gets decomposed into ‘unmarried adult male’ (Katz and 
Fodor 1963), and ‘kill’, which putatively gets decomposed into ‘cause to die’ (McCawley 
1968).  Although on the surface the lexical items ‘bachelor’ and ‘kill’ appear to be 
primitive, the claim is that at the semantic level they’re in fact structurally complex.  
Given the assumption above, this implies a corresponding claim about the structure of the 
concepts BACHELOR and KILL.  Although they appear on the surface to be primitive, 
they’re in fact structurally complex: BACHELOR has the structure exhibited by 
‘UNMARRIED ADULT MALE’, and KILL has the structure exhibited by ‘CAUSE TO DIE’. 
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Part of what motivates the lexical semanticist is the desire to reduce the number of 
primitives posited in the lexicon.  For it’s plausible that what’s primitive must somehow 
be encoded in the genome.  As Jackendoff says: 
Nearly everyone thinks that learning anything consists of constructing it from 
previously known parts, using previously known means of combination.  If we 
trace the learning process back and ask where the previously known parts came 
from, and their previously know parts came from, eventually we have to arrive at 
a point where the most basic parts are not learned: they are given to the learner 
genetically, by virtue of the character of brain development. (2002, p. 334, 
original emphasis)    
If both lexical items and the corresponding lexical concepts are structurally complex, 
then we can at least imagine a story about how learning them takes place.  Learning the 
concept BACHELOR might consist in constructing (somehow) the concept from its 
constituents, UNMARRIED, ADULT, MALE.  If BACHELOR lacked internal structure, and 
thus didn’t have any constituents, then there obviously wouldn’t be any way of 
constructing the concept from its constituents.  Lexical decomposition is thus seen as a 
strategy for reducing the number of primitive lexical items, which is desirable because 
primitives are ipso facto unlearned.   
It’s worth pointing out that while empiricists assume that the primitives are 
sensory concepts, and that the rest of our concepts are constructed from them via 
association or some other general-purpose learning mechanism (Cowie 1999, Prinz 
2002), modern lexical semanticists rightly (in my view) don’t commit themselves to any 
such claims.  Rather, they simply assume that there are very few lexical items that are not 
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decomposable, and deal with the issue of primitives on a case by case basis (Jackendoff 
2002, ch.11).5  
Part of what leads Fodor to his Atomism is that he thinks that lexical items do not 
have decompositions, and thus that the corresponding concepts do not have structure.  
Fodor assumes that lexical decompositions are definitions, i.e., that decomposing the 
meaning of a lexical item is tantamount to providing its definition.  And since he doesn’t 
think that there are any definitions—or if there are, there are very few—he denies that 
there are any lexical decompositions and that the corresponding lexical concepts have 
internal structure. 
 To get a feel for the argument, it’s worth going through an example of a putative 
decomposition, and to have a look at why Fodor claims it fails.  In his (1981b), Fodor 
considers a proposal of George Miller (1978), who makes the following claim: “When 
nouns of Type M are used as verbs, the meaning of x Ms y is to be construed as ‘x covers 
the surface of y with M’” (p. 104; quoted in Fodor 1981b, p. 285).  Such verbs include 
‘paint’, ‘butter’, ‘color’, ‘dye’, and ‘grease’.  Using ‘paint’ as our example (as Miller and 
Fodor do), the proposal is that ‘x paints y’ is to be decomposed into ‘x covers the surface 
of y with paint’.  The transitive verb ‘painttr’ is thus given an analysis in terms of the 
noun ‘paintn’, along with ‘cover’, ‘surface’, and ‘with’.  On the conceptual side, the 
proposal is that the concept X PAINTStr Y has the structure exhibited by ‘X COVERS THE 
SURFACE OF Y WITH PAINTn’.  
Under the assumption that decompositions are definitions, Fodor argues that this 
analysis fails.  For covering the surface of something with paint is necessary, but not 
                                                 
5
 Fodor’s Concept Atomism famously commits him to an incredibly large number of unlearned concepts 
(Fodor 1975, 1981b).  See Fodor (1998a) for some qualifications.   
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sufficient for painting the surface.  Consider a paint factory that explodes and covers 
some spectators with paint.  As Fodor says, “this may be good fun, but it is not a case of 
the paint factory (or the explosion) painting the spectators” (1981b, p. 286).  The reason 
for this seems obvious: painting is an activity carried out by agents of some kind, and 
factories aren’t agents.  But now consider the improved analysis of ‘x paintstr y’ as ‘x is 
an agent and x covers the surface of y with paintn’. Fodor points out that this doesn’t 
work either, for an agent who knocks over a bucket and covers the floor with paint does 
not thereby paint the floor.  Painting is an intentional action, but covering something with 
paint need not be.  Perhaps, then, ‘x paintstr y’ ought to be analyzed as ‘x is an agent and 
x intentionally covers the surface of y with paintn’.  But again, Fodor says, this won’t 
work: 
It’s got to be that when you cover the y with paint, what you primarily have in 
mind to do (the description, as it were, under which you intend your act) is that y 
should be covered with paint in consequence of your activity. If, like 
Michelangelo, what you primarily have in mind is not (just) that the surface 
should become covered with paint in consequence of your activity, but that there 
should be a picture on the surface in consequence of your activity, then what 
you’re doing when you cover the surface with paint doesn’t count as painting the 
surface.  (1981b, p. 287)   
So, while Michelangelo intentionally covered the ceiling with paint, what he primarily 
intended to do was paint a picture on the ceiling.  Intentionally covering a surface with 
paint, Fodor claims, is thus not sufficient for painting the surface.   
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Perhaps a better analysis of ‘x paintstr y’ is ‘x is an agent and x intentionally 
covers the surface of y with paintn and x’s primary intention in covering the surface of y 
with paintn is that the surface of y should be covered with paintn in consequence of x’s 
having so acted upon it’.  However, when Michelangelo dips his brush into the paint, he 
is intentionally covering the surface of the brush with paint, and it is his primary intention 
that the surface of the brush be covered in paint as a result of his dipping it in the paint.  
But, Fodor claims, surely Michelangelo is not painting his brush when he dips it in the 
paint.  Rather, what he’s doing is putting paint on his brush.  After considering and 
rejecting these proposed improvements on Miller’s account, Fodor concludes:  
I don’t know where we go from here.  For all I know—for all anybody knows—
‘paintstr’ is undefinable; for all I know, you can’t eliminate it even in terms of 
such a very closely related term as paintsn’.  Or perhaps it is definable, but only in 
a reduction base that includes ‘dinasour’ and ‘Chlorodent’.  Either way, the 
present point is that Miller’s examples don’t work.  That’s not surprising; when it 
comes to definitions, the examples almost always don’t work. (1981b, p. 288, 
original emphasis) 
Now, I don’t find Fodor’s argument here all that persuasive.  For instance, in 
some contexts at least, it’s not at all clear that there’s something semantically wrong with 
‘Michelangelo painted the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel’.  Imagine the following context: 
you’re in the Sistine Chapel and someone asks “Remind me again, who painted the 
ceiling?” You reply: “Michelangelo painted the ceiling.” In this context, what you said 
seems perfectly acceptable and true.  Imagine the look you’d get if you instead said: “Do 
you mean ‘Who painted the picture on the ceiling?’ Michelangelo did.”  Or, take the 
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dipping of a brush into a bucket of paint.  Perhaps in most contexts that doesn’t count as a 
painting of the brush.  But what about the artist who dips entire brushes into paint and 
uses them in a piece?  The curator might say, describing how the piece came to be: “she 
painted the brushes and arranged them …”.  Now, I don’t think that any of this is 
decisive.  But, at the very least, it suggests that Fodor moves through the putative 
counterexamples a bit too quickly.   
Fodor has also offered arguments against other proposals of lexical semanticists.  
He argues against analyzing ‘kill’ as ‘cause to die’ (Fodor 1970); against Jackendoff’s 
(1992) analysis of the polysemous verb ‘keep’ as ‘cause a state that endures over time’ 
(Fodor 1998a, pp. 49-56); against Pustejovsky’s (1995) analysis of ‘bake’, ‘begin’ 
(/‘finish’), and ‘enjoy’, as well as his more general arguments for lexical decomposition 
(Fodor and Lepore 2002, ch.5); against Pinker’s (1984, 1989) arguments that positing 
lexical structure is a necessary component of a theory of how children acquire certain 
aspects of syntax (1998a, pp. 56-68); and against Hale and Keyser’s (1993) arguments for 
analyzing ‘denomial’ verbs as phrases that contain the corresponding nouns (e.g. 
analyzing ‘sing’ as ‘do a song’, ‘shelve’ as ‘put on a shelf’, etc.) (Fodor and Lepore 2002, 
ch.6).   
On top of all that, the experimental work of Fodor and others suggests that 
comprehending a sentence does not involve recovering the decompositions of the lexical 
items it contains, which suggests that such structures are not ‘psychologically real’ 
(Fodor et al. 1980).  Indeed, Fodor has recently quipped: “[i]t’s an iron law of cognitive 
science that, in experimental environments, definitions always behave exactly as though 
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they weren’t there” (1998a, p. 46).  This is all supposed to be part of the empirical, non-
demonstrative case against analyticity.   
Now, a lexical semanticist might point out that while Fodor has perhaps shown 
that lexical items can’t be decomposed definitionally, he overlooks the possibility that 
there are, as Jackendoff puts it, “non-definitional forms of decomposition” (2002, p. 336).  
Indeed, one wonders exactly what Fodor takes himself to be doing when he’s providing 
counterexamples and suggesting improvements to proposed analyses of ‘paint’.  It’s 
surely implausible that he’s exploiting an empirical theory of painting when he denies 
that Michelangelo paints his brush when he dips it into the paint.  Could it really be a 
mere empirical fact about painting that dippings of brushes into paint are not paintings of 
brushes?   This is apparently exactly what Fodor’s Concept Atomism implies.  For on his 
view, even if all paintings must in fact be a kind of covering of a surface with paint, this 
does not imply that ‘paintstr’ must have some structure at the semantic level involving 
‘paintn’ and ‘surface’, or that the concept PAINTStr is constitutively connected to PAINTSn, 
SURFACE, etc.  Rather, it merely implies that the property of being a paintingtr is 
metaphysically connected to the properties of being paint, being a surface, etc.   
However, Fodor’s own methodology does not sit happily with this position.  For 
in arguing against lexical decompositions and definitions, Fodor himself seems to be 
engaged in just the sort of traditional, conceptual analysis that he’s attempting to 
undermine.  One might argue that what he’s actually doing when he’s proposing and 
rejecting putative analyses of ‘paintstr’ is exploiting the analytic rules that govern his use 
of ‘paintstr’.  And even if we generously grant that Fodor picks a good point at which to 
stop the analysis (“I don’t know where we go from here…”), it seems to me that his 
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suggestion that PAINTStr bears no constitutive relations to other concepts is entirely 
unwarranted.  For, by his own admission, he’s provided some necessary conditions on the 
application of PAINTStr.  So even if PAINTStr lacks a full-fledged analysis (i.e., necessary 
and sufficient application conditions), there at least appear to be some semantically 
interesting connections it bears to other concepts.  Perhaps such relations are what 
Jackendoff is suggesting with his “non-definitional forms of decomposition”.     
 How is Fodor’s relentless attack on lexical decomposition and definitions related 
to his attack on Peacocke and other Concept Pragmatists?  Here’s how I think Fodor sees 
the connection.  As noted above, the claim that lexical items have structure ‘at the 
semantic level’ implies a corresponding claim about the structure of lexical concepts.  If 
‘bachelor’ and ‘kill’ have structure at the semantic level, then BACHELOR and KILL have 
internal structure that mirrors the lexical decomposition.  On this view, lexical 
semanticists are engaged in conceptual analysis of the concepts corresponding to the 
putatively decomposable lexical items.6  Fodor’s claim, then, is that arguments against 
lexical decompositions are also arguments against the claim that lexical concepts have 
internal structure that can be illuminated by philosophical, or conceptual analysis.  
If lexical semanticists are committed to lexical concepts with internal structure, 
then, the line of thought continues, Concept Pragmatists are committed to lexical items 
having structure at the semantic level.  A claim about the semantic structure of lexical 
items implies a claim about the conceptual structure of lexical concepts, and vice versa.  
As Fodor and Lepore put it: 
                                                 
6
 See Katz (1988, chapter 10) for a defense of the claim that lexical semanticists are effectively engaged in 
Moore-style conceptual analysis. 
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[Concept Pragmatism] constrains grammatical theories since, on standard 
versions of the view, the semantic lexicon of a language is supposed to be the 
component of a grammar that makes explicit whatever one has to learn/know to 
understand the lexical expressions of the language. [It] thus implies that meaning-
constitutive inferences are part of the semantic lexical entries for items that have 
them.  Lexical entries are therefore typically complex objects (‘bundles of 
inferences’) according to standard interpretations of [Concept Pragmatism].  
(2002, p. 90) 
Given this, Pragmatists are committed to the claim that lexical entries specify meaning-
constitutive conceptual/inferential roles, which implies that lexical concepts also have 
internal structure that specifies the conceptual/inferential roles that are concept-
constitutive. 
In order to illustrate what Fodor sees as the contrast between him and the typical 
Concept Pragmatist, consider the following conceptually necessary inference about arctic 
foxes: WHITE VIXEN → WHITE.7  This inference ought to count as analytic on any 
account.  Since the concept WHITE is literally a part of the complex concept WHITE 
VIXEN, then the inference will be guaranteed by the structure of the concept alone.  The 
only way such an inference could fail to be analytic is if conceptual structure failed to be 
compositional.  For if the content of WHITE VIXEN is determined by the content of WHITE, 
the content of VIXEN, and the way the concepts are put together (i.e., ‘AN’ construction), 
then the inference WHITE VIXEN → WHITE will hold in virtue of this fact alone.  In other 
                                                 
7
 Fodor and Lepore’s favorite example is BROWN COW → BROWN, which they contrast with BROWN COW → 
ANIMAL, arguing that only the former is analytic (Fodor and Lepore 2002).  I prefer to contrast WHITE 
VIXEN → WHITE and WHITE VIXEN → FEMALE, for the simple reason that ‘vixens are female’ is a better 
candidate for being analytic than ‘cows are animals’, as Putnam’s (1970, 1975a) radio-controlled robot cats 
example suggests.   
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words, compositionality alone underwrites certain analyticities, and since 
compositionality is a non-negotiable constraint on a theory of concepts (see Chapter 1), 
then any account of concepts must allow for the existence of some analytic inferences. 
As Fodor and Lepore (2002, pp. 20-22) point out, though, it’s possible that 
compositionality underwrites only those analytic inferences that hold in virtue of the 
relation between complex concepts and their syntactic constituents.  On this view, which 
Fodor and Lepore endorse, compositionality entails an analytic/synthetic distinction that 
can distinguish WHITE VIXEN → WHITE from WHITE VIXEN → FAST, but not WHITE VIXEN 
→ FAST from WHITE VIXEN → FEMALE.  If neither WHITE VIXEN → FAST nor WHITE 
VIXEN → FEMALE turns on the compositional structure of WHITE VIXEN, the thought goes, 
then neither is an analytic inference.  
Of course, given Fodor’s assumptions, if lexical semanticists and Concept 
Pragmatists are right, then lexical concepts themselves have compositional structure.  If, 
say, ‘vixen’ is lexically decomposed into a structure that contains ‘female’, and VIXEN 
has internal structure that guarantees the inference from VIXEN → FEMALE, then 
compositionality does entail an analytic/synthetic distinction that distinguishes VIXEN → 
FEMALE and VIXEN → FAST.  (This assumes, of course, that ‘female’, but not ‘fast’, is 
part of the decompositional structure of ‘vixen’, and VIXEN→ FEMALE but not VIXEN → 
FAST is guaranteed by the structure of VIXEN).  Lexical semanticists and Concept 
Pragmatists thus effectively assimilate inferences like WHITE VIXEN → FEMALE to 
inferences like WHITE VIXEN → WHITE.  On their view, both are conceptually necessary, 
analytic inferences, which are underwritten by the compositional structure of concepts.  
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Fodor will turn this argument on its head, and claim that since there is no lexical 
decomposition, and since lexical concepts do not have internal structure, compositionality 
does not underwrite an analytic/synthetic distinction that can distinguish WHITE VIXEN → 
FEMALE and WHITE VIXEN → FAST.  On his view, “the only thing a lexical entry specifies 
is the denotation for the item it describes” (Fodor and Lepore 2002, p. 90).  Since lexical 
items do not have decompositions, and lexical concepts do not have structure, then 
compositionality only entails analyticities that hold between complex concepts and their 
syntactic constituents.  Notice, though, that the way that Fodor sets out the terrain here 
presupposes that the structure of lexical concepts is what underwrites concept-
constitutive inferences.  In other words, Fodor’s (and Lepore’s) claim that the arguments 
against lexical decomposition are also arguments against Concept Pragmatism 
presupposes that both lexical semanticists and Pragmatists are committed to internally 
structured lexical concepts.  
 
Why Fodor’s Arguments Fail.   
I’ve already suggested some reasons to be skeptical of Fodor’s arguments.  But there’s a 
more fundamental reason for skepticism.  As we’ve just seen, Fodor assumes that lexical 
decompositions are definitions, and that providing a definition of a lexical item is 
tantamount to providing an analysis of the corresponding lexical concept, which in turn 
requires that lexical concepts have internal structure.  This assumption underlies Fodor’s 
claim that arguments against lexical semantics are also arguments against Concept 
Pragmatism.  But if Fodor’s attack relies on this assumption, then Pragmatists are not in 
fact vulnerable to it.  Or so I will argue.  In particular, I argue that Peacocke and other 
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Concept Pragmatists need not commit themselves to the claim that lexical concepts have 
internal structure, and that the above line of reasoning is thus insufficient to support the 
claim that their analyses suffer the same fate as those of lexical semanticists. 
 Let’s begin with the observation that in stating the possession condition for 
certain concepts, Peacocke certainly doesn’t seem to be providing definitions.  Rather, he 
appears to be stating conditions that must obtain in order for thinkers to possess certain 
concepts, and, prima facie, these need not be taken as definitional claims about the 
structure of the concepts themselves.  This is especially plausible in the case of 
recognitional concepts.  Possessing such concepts requires that under optimal judging 
conditions, thinkers recognize instances of the concepts as such.  The concept DESK, for 
instance, is supposed to be individuated in this fashion.  But to say that such conditions 
individuate the concept DESK is not to say that such conditions define DESK, or that the 
lexical item ‘desk’ has definitional structure at the semantic level.  For presumably, a 
definition of ‘desk’ would look something like the following: ‘x is a desk iff x is an 
object with a flat surface used for writing, etc. …’.  Such a definition, however it’s 
ultimately spelled out, will apparently make no mention of the sorts of recognitional 
capacities that Peacocke and other Concept Pragmatists invoke in stating the possession 
conditions for DESK. 
Of course, Fodor and Quine will deny that we can provide any such definition of 
‘desk’.  Fair enough.  But it doesn’t beg any questions to point out that if there were a 
definition of ‘desk’ it wouldn’t have on the right-hand side of the biconditional any of the 
specifications that Peacocke mentions in stating the possession conditions for DESK.  
Indeed, Peacocke’s claims about the possession conditions for recognitional concepts 
 144 
seem entirely independent of issues concerning their lexical decomposition, as well as 
those concerning whether lexical concepts have internal structure, definitional or 
otherwise.   
There’s thus apparently no reason to think that if DESK is constitutively tied to 
perceptual judgment in the way Peacocke suggests, then it must have internal structure 
that specifies that it is so tied.  In fact, there’s no reason why Peacocke must deny that 
DESK lacks structure altogether, as the Concept Atomist claims, merely because he is 
committed to DESK’s identity being tied to a thinker’s making certain perceptual 
judgments containing it in certain circumstances.  If this is right, then Fodor’s arguments 
against lexical decomposition and definitions do not apply to proposals about how 
perceptual judgments figure in the possession conditions for certain concepts.  
This issue, is seems to me, may be obscured by the fact that the methodology of 
some Concept Pragmatists—including Peacocke—falls squarely in the tradition of a 
priori, philosophical or conceptual analysis.  For it’s often supposed that philosophers 
who work in this tradition are implicitly committed to a certain view about the nature of 
concepts that, perhaps unbeknownst to them, the arguments of Quine and others have 
undermined.  The idea is that if there’s to be such a thing as philosophical or conceptual 
analysis, then concepts must have structure, which is, as it were, there to be analyzed.  
On this sort of view, Fodor’s complaints about lexical semantics, definitions, and the like 
would have some force against Peacocke’s proposals, since Peacocke’s possession 
conditions would be taken to illuminate conceptual structure.  However, contra the above 
view, a methodology of philosophical, or conceptual analysis does not necessarily 
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presuppose that lexical items have structure at the semantic level, or that lexical concepts 
are internally structured.   
In fact, if one looks at recent attempts by philosophers to defend conceptual 
analysis—e.g., Frank Jackson’s (1998) From Metaphysics to Ethics and George Bealer’s 
(1987) “The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism”—one will not find defenses 
of the claim that lexical concepts have internal structure, or claims that such projects 
depend on such a defense.  Rather, what you’ll find is a defense of the claim that 
conceptual analysis is a crucial component of doing ‘serious metaphysics’ (Jackson 
1998), or that philosophy is an ‘autonomous’ discipline, which ‘empirical science cannot 
eclipse’ (Bealer 1987).  To the best of my knowledge, prominent defenders of conceptual 
analysis do not defend the claim that lexical concepts are internally structured.  
We’ve seen that Peacocke views the task of providing a theory of concepts in 
much the way that Jackson and Bealer view philosophy in general.  Indeed, Peacocke 
claims not only that empirical psychology will not trump philosophical analyses of 
concepts, but that the empirical investigation of a concept cannot even begin until the 
philosopher provides their possession conditions (!): “For any particular concept, the task 
for the psychologist is not fully formulated until the philosopher has supplied an adequate 
possession condition for it” (Peacocke, 1992a, p. 190).  Peacocke’s aim is to provide 
some of these, by working out in an a priori fashion the conditions under which thinkers 
can be said to possess certain concepts.   
But, again, it’s not clear that a methodology of this kind presupposes that lexical 
concepts have internal structure.  It seems to be an underappreciated possibility that such 
a methodology could illuminate necessary conditions on the possession of certain 
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concepts without those conditions reflecting the structure of the concepts themselves.  Of 
course, pointing out that a priori, conceptual analysis is consistent with Concept 
Atomism does not tell us what sort of activity a priori, conceptual analysis is.  If 
philosophers who engage in such an activity are not illuminating the structure of 
concepts, then what are they doing?  How can one arrive at the possession conditions for 
a lexical concept unless those conditions illuminate its structure?  These are interesting, 
and difficult questions.  One possibility that needs to be taken seriously is that conceptual 
analysis is a way of accessing the analytic rules that govern our conceptual competence, 
where these rules do not hold in virtue of structural relations among concepts.  The point 
I’m making is that the claim that such a methodology of analysis does presuppose that 
lexical concepts are internally structured is at least in need of an argument.  And, as far as 
I can tell, neither Fodor nor anyone else has provided one. 
One source of difficulty here is that it’s not clear how to understand claims about 
conceptual structure.  In the literature, debates abound as to the structure of certain 
concepts—e.g., in philosophy there are long-standing debates about FREEDOM, MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY, TRUTH, JUSTICE, EXPLANATION, CAUSATION, GOOD, and PERSON 
(among others), and in psychology there are debates about the structure of less 
(philosophically) interesting concepts such as EVEN (/ODD) NUMBER, APPLE, FEMALE, 
FRUIT, and SPORT (among many others).  But what it is for a concept to have internal 
structure?  It might seem that we must first get straight about this question before we can 
make progress on the question of whether the claims of Peacocke and other Concept 
Pragmatists carry with them an implicit commitment to lexical concepts having internal 
structure. 
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In Fodor’s work, he seems to presuppose that a concept is structurally complex 
just in case it literally has other concepts as constituents.  The idea is clearest in the case 
of concepts corresponding to phrases of natural language, e.g. WHITE VIXEN.  This 
concept is structurally complex since WHITE and VIXEN are quite literally constituent 
parts of WHITE VIXEN.  It follows that a thinker can’t think WHITE VIXEN without 
thinking WHITE and VIXEN, just as one can’t inscribe the words ‘white vixen’ on a page 
without inscribing the words ‘white’ and ‘vixen’, or move a table without moving its 
constituents.  
But what about lexical concepts?  What would it be for them to have internal 
structure?  Fodor’s assumption is that if lexical concepts have structure, then it will be 
just like the structure that phrasal concepts have, except that lexical concepts will not, so 
to speak, wear their structure on their sleeves.  For instance, if BACHELOR has 
definitional structure, then the assumption is that it literally has the concepts 
UNMARRIED, ADULT, and MALE as constituents.  In other words, if the traditional 
analysis is correct, then ‘UNMARRIED ADULT MALE’ is a structural description of 
BACHELOR.  This assumption has the consequence that the thought JOHN IS A BACHELOR 
is more complex than the thought JOHN IS UNMARRIED, since the structure of 
UNMARRIED (whatever it is) is literally a part of the structure of BACHELOR.  As I noted 
above, the experiments of Fodor et al. (1980) and others suggest that this consequence is 
false.  Indeed, Fodor says that this ought to be obvious to untutored intuition: “Does 
anybody present really think that thinking BACHELOR is harder than thinking 
UNMARRIED? Or that thinking FATHER is harder than thinking PARENT?” (1998a, p. 47).  
Of course, the force of the experimental evidence and this appeal to intuition against 
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lexical semantics and definitions depends upon the claim that if lexical concepts have 
structure, then they have other concepts as constituents.  
This understanding of what conceptual structure consists in has a long, venerable 
history.  It is, in effect, the way that Kant (1781/1998) thought of conceptual structure, 
with his “concept containment” model of analyticity, whereby if ‘As are Bs’ is analytic, 
then “the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is (covertly) 
contained in this concept A” (A6-7).  With phrasal concepts, the constituent structure is 
overt, since the names of such concepts are also patently their structural descriptions: 
‘WHITE VIXEN’ serves as both a name and a structural description of WHITE VIXEN.  With 
lexical concepts, as we noted above (and as Kant notes), the constituent structure is 
covert, and thus must be provided by a lexical decomposition, or conceptual analysis. 
 But understanding conceptual structure according to the “concept containment” 
model clearly will not help Fodor’s case.  For again, suppose it’s a possession condition 
for RED that one be willing to judge, that’s red, if one has an experience of an object as 
red in optimal conditions, and that it’s a possession condition for DESK that one be 
willing to judge, that’s a desk, in optimal conditions.  These conditions on concept 
possession do not require that thinkers possess concepts other than those for which they 
are conditions.  Since possessing an internally structured lexical concept—in the 
containment sense of structure—would require possessing more than one concept, such 
possession conditions thus don’t require that the lexical concepts in question have 
internal structure. 
The upshot of all of this is that Concept Pragmatists will be vulnerable to Fodor’s 
arguments against definitions and lexical decomposition, and the concept-containment 
 149 
construal of conceptual structure such arguments depend on, only if they endorse the 
claim that lexical concepts are internally structured.  But since it’s open to Pragmatists to 
deny this claim, Fodor’s arguments against lexical decompositions, definitions, and the 
like do not necessarily apply to them.  In other words, the existence of analyticity and 
constitutive connections among concepts does not imply the existence of internally 
structured lexical concepts.  Given this, arguments against the latter needn’t count as 
arguments against the former.   
 
Keeping Options Open 
Of course, many Concept Pragmatists do believe that lexical concepts are internally 
structured.  Perhaps this belief, when coupled with the belief in conceptual/inferential 
role semantics, constitutes a “Sort of Consensus about concepts in cognitive science” 
(Fodor, 2000b, p. 350).  Even so, I take the above considerations to show that the 
question of whether or not lexical concepts have internal structure is distinct from the 
question of whether Concept Atomism or Concept Pragmatism is correct.  Arguments 
against lexical decomposition, definitions, and the like will thus count as arguments for 
Atomism and against Pragmatism, I submit, only under the assumption that the 
conceptual/inferential role of a lexical concept is specified by its internal structure.  
Although I raised some doubts about Fodor’s arguments against definitions and lexical 
decomposition, Concept Pragmatists can consistently accept these arguments, so long as 
they deny this assumption.   
 Putting (what seems to be) the same point slightly differently, the ‘informational’ 
and ‘atomistic’ components of Informational Atomism can come apart.  That is, it doesn’t 
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follow from the fact that lexical concepts are atoms that their content is determined in the 
covariant way that an informational semantics says it is.  Conversely, that content is 
determined by informational relations does not entail that lexical concepts are atoms.  For 
one might hold a view according to which concepts are structured entities of some kind 
(e.g., that they have prototype or stereotype structure), whose content is nevertheless 
determined by informational relations (Prinz 2002).  Denying Atomism is thus perfectly 
compatible with accepting informational semantics.  (Figure 2 illustrates these various 
options.)   
 
 
 
Figure 2. Four Live Options 
 
It seems clear that Options A, B, C, and D are all open.  The issue of whether 
lexical concepts are internally structured is, prima facie, entirely independent of the issue 
of whether informational or conceptual/inferential semantics is correct.  However, if one 
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support informational semantics.  Indeed, he seems to think that the stand one takes on 
the question of whether concepts are internally structured determines one’s stand on the 
question of how content is determined:  
[W]hat settles the metaphysical issue between informational theories of meaning 
and inferential role theories of meaning is that the former, but not the latter, are 
compatible with an atomistic account of concepts.  (Fodor, 1998a, p. 15) 
Fodor is surely wrong about this.  For, as the above discussion shows, a Concept 
Pragmatist can accept Fodor’s case for Atomism by denying that the 
conceptual/inferential role of lexical concepts is specified by their structure.  In other 
words, Option C is a live one.   
 Now, it’s a bit odd having to point this out, since Fodor himself once favored a 
position very much like Option C.  For in The Language of Thought he endorses 
‘meaning postulates’ as a way of capturing meaning relations without postulating any 
lexical decomposition (Fodor 1975).8  Here’s how Fodor introduces them: 
If entailments that derive from terms in the ‘nonlogical’ vocabulary of a natural 
language do not depend on a process of definition, how are they determined?  A 
standard proposal (since Carnap 1956) is that if we want F to entail G (where one 
or both are morphologically simple expressions of the object language) we should 
simply say that F entails G; i.e., we should add F  G to the inferences rules.  
Such nonstandard rules of inference have come to be called ‘meaning postulates’, 
so the present proposal is that it is meaning postulates that do the work that 
definitions have usually been supposed to do.   (1975, p. 149, original emphasis) 
                                                 
8
 See also J.D. Fodor, J.A. Fodor, and M.F. Garrett (1975).  
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There are number of benefits to this position.  By replacing definitions with meaning 
postulates, one can respect the empirical data that suggests that understanding a sentence 
does not involve recovering the decompositions of the lexical items it contains.  
Moreover, one can respect the intuition that thinking BACHELOR is not harder than 
thinking UNMARRIED, and that entertaining the thought JOHN IS A BACHELOR needn’t 
involve thinking UNMARRIED.  All this could be the case even if the inference from 
BACHELOR to UNMARRIED MALE is analytic, i.e. even if it’s an ‘entailment that derives 
from the nonlogical vocabulary’.  As Fodor puts it: 
[B]achelor gets into the internal language as an abbreviation for a complex 
expression of the internal language: viz., as an abbreviation for unmarried man.  
The abbreviatory convention is stored as a principle of the logic (i.e., as bachelor 
↔ unmarried man).  Since, in the course of learning English, ‘bachelor’ gets 
hooked onto bachelor and ‘unmarried man’ gets hooked onto unmarried man, 
bachelor ↔ unmarried man can be used to mediate such inferential relations as 
the one between ‘x is a bachelor’ and ‘x is an unmarried man’.  (1975, p. 152. 
original emphasis) 
 Positing meaning postulates also allows for a solution to the so-called ‘residuum 
problem’.  Consider what Option A has to say about RED.  In order to capture the 
inference from RED to COLORED, it supposes that the latter is one of the constituents of 
the former.  But what are the other constituents of RED?  It’s hard to see that there could 
be any.  As Janet Fodor says:  
[T]o say that something is red is to say more than that it is colored.  So now at 
least one other component of the meaning of red must be identified.  Let us 
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assume, just for convenience, that there is only one, i.e., that no further analysis is 
possible.  For this component to be independent of the coloredness component, it 
must consist of the concept of redness-but-not-necessarily-coloredness.  But there 
surely is no such concept (or even percept).  There is no property R which does 
not itself contain the property of being colored, such that being red = being 
colored + R.  (1977, p. 150) 
The concept RED is thus unlike the concept VIXEN, or BACHELOR on this score.  A fox is 
exactly like a vixen except that it is not necessarily female, and a male is exactly like a 
bachelor except not necessarily unmarried.  So, the property of being a female is that 
property R such that being a vixen = being a fox + R; and the property of being unmarried 
is that property R such that being a bachelor = being a male + R.  In other words, when 
you “subtract” ‘FEMALE’ from the definition of VIXEN what you have left is ‘FOX’, and 
when you subtract ‘UNMARRIED’ from the definition of BACHELOR what you have left is 
‘MALE’.  But if you subtract ‘COLORED’ from the definition of RED, it doesn’t seem that 
you’re left with anything.  Or, as (Jerry) Fodor puts it, “it looks like the only thing that 
could combine with ‘COLOURED’ to mean red is ‘RED’” (1998a, p. 109). 
Meaning postulates (Option C) provide a nice solution to this problem.  For they 
can accommodate constitutive inferences that do not stem from definitions.  That the 
inference from RED to COLORED is constitutive of RED, on this treatment, does not imply 
that RED has decompositional, or definitional structure.  The inference can hold in virtue 
of an inference rule, or meaning postulate, which effectively specify a one-way 
entailment relation that holds between RED and COLORED.  Given the evidence against 
definitions and lexical decompositions, one could then extend this account to cover those 
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inferences that were traditionally thought to stem from definitional structure.  For even 
the best examples of inferences arising out of definitional structure are arguably faulty in 
some way.9  Rather than insisting on entailments that hold in both directions, one could 
thus give up on definitions and opt instead for meaning postulates that specify one-way 
entailment relations, i.e. necessary but not sufficient conditions.   
It bears emphasis that this approach will have both a simplifying and complicating 
effect on one’s overall theory.  It complicates things because it greatly increases the 
number of inference types in the logic.  For an inference rule is needed for every analytic 
inference connecting “non-logical” concepts.  Rather than inflating the logic in this way, 
some philosophers (e.g., Jerrold Katz (1988)) claim that it’s better to take analytic 
inferences to hold in virtue of complex lexical structure.  But this is where the 
simplifying benefits of meaning-postulates come in.  For positing complex lexical 
structure makes it much more difficult to understand sentence comprehension, and in 
particular how people do it so fast.  As Fodor says:  
[W]e mitigate the mystery [of sentence understanding] insofar as we assume a 
‘shallow’ theory of messages, since the more structural similarity there is between 
what gets uttered and its internal representation, the less computing the sentence 
understander will have to do.  The interest of meaning postulates is that they 
provide a general procedure for complicating the logic in ways that reduce the 
strain on sentence comprehension.  That is, they let us do what psychological 
                                                 
9
 Bachelors aren’t just any unmarried males.  For five-year old boys aren’t bachelors.  But bachelors aren’t 
just any unmarried adult males either.  For the Pope isn’t a bachelor.  And so on, and so forth.  Note that 
even if BACHELOR can ultimately be given a successful definition, it’s doubtful that very many of our 
concepts can.   
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theories need to do: simplify the representation of computations that must be 
carried out on-line.   (1975, p. 152) 
Fodor, Fodor, and Garrett echo this line of argument: 
[B]arring decisive evidence to the contrary, we should assume that the semantic 
representation of a sentence is as much like the surface form of the sentence as we 
can.  For, in doing so, we reduce the load on the processes that must be assumed 
to be performed on-line.  In particular, then, given a choice between assigning a 
process to the comprehension system and assigning it to the inferential system, all 
other things being equal we should choose the latter option.  That is precisely 
what hypothesizing meaning postulates in place of eliminative definitions permits 
us to do.  (1975, p. 526)  
The cost of meaning postulates, this line of reasoning suggests, is worth their theoretical 
payoff.  
Given that Fodor himself once endorsed something like Option C above, it’s thus 
strange to find him claiming that what “settles” the debate between informational 
semantics and a conceptual/inferential role view is that only the former are compatible 
with Atomism.  For the considerations that lead to Atomism are not only perfectly 
compatible with Option C, but can also be used to motivate it.  In any case, Fodor devotes 
an appendix of Concepts to meaning postulates (1998a, pp. 108-112), in which he offers 
an argument against them that’s independent of the issues concerning Atomism.10 
Whereas he once claimed that the theoretical benefits of meaning postulates are worth 
                                                 
10
 If he really believed that Atomism “settles” this issue, then wouldn’t such an appendix be entirely 
unnecessary? 
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their cost, he now seems to think that there are additional theoretical costs, which 
apparently went unnoticed in 1975 and that outweigh the benefits.   
The most important difference between Option C (meaning postulates) and 
Option A (the Sort of Consensus) is that the latter, but not the former, takes analytic 
inferences that link lexical concepts to hold in virtue of their internal structure.  Suppose 
the inference from C to C1 is a constitutive, analytic inference.  According to Option A, 
this inference holds because C is internally structured and has C1 as a constituent.  
Option C claims no such thing, since it says that the inference is guaranteed by a meaning 
postulate, or inference rule, that links C and C1.  On this latter view, there’s a one-way 
entailment relation that holds between C and C1, which is consistent with their being 
primitives.   
So far, so good.  But a problem arises for Option C, Fodor claims, when we 
consider what it must say about the relation between concept constitution and concept 
possession.  Note that on any kind of conceptual/inferential role view, the inferences and 
judgments that constitute a concept C must be coextensive with the ones that a thinker 
must accept in order to possess C.  This constraint doesn’t have anything in particular to 
do with concepts.  Rather, it’s simply a consequence of the nature of the constitution and 
possession relations, or (if you prefer) the meanings of ‘constitution’ and ‘possession’.  If 
one entity a (partly) constitutes another entity b, then you can’t possess the latter without 
possessing the former.  You can’t possess this particular dollar bill, for instance, without 
possessing its constituents.11 This holds for constitutive properties as well.  You can’t 
                                                 
11
 I’m ignoring delicate metaphysical issues here.  Strictly speaking, you can possess a dollar bill without 
possessing its constituents, since a dollar bill can survive the loss of some of its constituents.  There are 
thus counterfactual scenarios in which you possess the dollar bill even though it’s constituted by a different 
set of constituents.  Such issues concerning artifact identity will not affect the point in the text.   
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possess the dollar bill without possessing something that has its constitutive properties.  If 
one of its constitutive properties is that it was produced by the Federal Bureau of 
Engraving and Printing, then you can’t possess the dollar bill without possessing 
something that was made by the Federal Bureau of Engraving and Printing.   
The relation that must hold between concept constitution and concept possession 
is just an instance of this more general truth: the entities and properties that are 
constitutive of a thing must be mentioned in the possession conditions for that thing.  On 
Option A, this relation is guaranteed by the fact that constitutive inferences relate a 
concept to its constituents.  If the inference from C to C1 is constitutive in virtue of the 
latter being a constituent of the former, then it immediately follows that a thinker can’t 
possess C without possessing C1.  On this view, the relation that C bears to C1 is 
analogous to the relation that a dollar bill bears to its constituents.  Given what it is to be 
a constituent, you can’t possess a concept (or a dollar bill) without possessing its 
constituents.  But, Fodor claims, if we adopt Option C then there is no such guarantee, 
which is an unhappy theoretical cost: “[meaning postulates] weaken the architecture of 
your overall theory [by breaking] the connection between the structure of a concept and 
its possession conditions” (1998a, p. 111).   
In my view, this is unconvincing.  It’s true that if certain properties are concept-
constitutive, then a thinker must satisfy (/possess) those properties in order to possess the 
concept.  However, we must sharply distinguish between what’s constitutive of a concept 
and what holds in virtue of conceptual structure.  Fodor slides from talk about the relation 
between concept constitution and concept possession to talk about the relation between 
conceptual structure and concept possession.  But there’s an obvious distinction between 
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concept constitution and conceptual structure.  For, as we’ve seen, properties that have 
nothing to do with conceptual structure might nevertheless be concept-constitutive.  
Again, this point doesn’t have anything in particular to do with concepts.  A dollar bill’s 
being made by the Federal Bureau of Engraving and Printing may be one of its 
constitutive properties, even though (prima facie) this is not a property that relates the 
dollar bill to its constituents.  Just so, certain relational properties might be constitutive of 
a concept even though they don’t hold between the concept and its constituents.  This is, 
in effect, precisely what Option C claims: certain inferences are concept-constitutive even 
though they don’t hold in virtue of conceptual structure.  
There’s thus no reason to think that positing concept-constitutive inferences that 
hold in virtue of inference rules, or meaning postulates, in any way ‘weakens the 
architecture of your overall theory’.  If it did, then my guess is that Fodor’s own theory 
would have an architecture that is just as weak.  To see this, note that Fodor’s 
Informational Atomism also posits the existence of analyticities that do not turn on 
conceptual structure, just as Option C does.  For it falls out of Informational Atomism 
that it’s analytic that, for example, Mark Twain is Sam Clemens, water is H2O, and 
Hesperus is Phosphorus.  The reason for this is as follows: the content of MARK TWAIN is 
Mark Twain, and the content of SAM CLEMENS is Sam Clemens; ‘Mark Twain is Sam 
Clemens’ is thus conceptually necessary in the sense that it’s guaranteed by the content of 
MARK TWAIN and SAM CLEMENS, together with the fact that Twain is Clemens.  (The 
same goes for ‘water is H2O’ and ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’.)  Of course, we can’t know a 
priori that Twain is Clemens (or that water is H2O, or that Hesperus is Phosphorus), and 
it’s surely a virtue of Informational Atomism that it distinguishes between what’s analytic 
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and what’s a priori in this way.  However, the present point is that Fodor’s architectural 
point against Option C would, if sound, apparently hold against his own view as well, 
since it too posits analyticities that don’t hold in virtue of conceptual structure.12   
In any case, I don’t think that the architectural point holds against Option C.  
Meaning postulates constrain theories of concept possession just as decompositional 
theories do, they just do so in a different manner.  If the inference from C to C1 is 
concept-constitutive and holds in virtue of a meaning postulate or inference rule, then in 
order to possess C, thinkers must be willing to make the inference from C to C1.  And, 
just as you can’t possess C without possessing C1 if the latter is a constituent of the 
former, you can’t be willing to infer C1 from C unless you possess C1.  Option C thus 
places constraints on concept possession just as Option A does.  As far as I can tell, 
Fodor’s architectural point does not give us a reason to think that a theory that links 
concept constitution to concept possession via meaning postulates is in any way weaker 
than a theory that links them via conceptual structure.  Meaning postulates are still 
apparently a viable option. 
It’s reasonably clear what the Quinean/Fodorean response to this will be: if what’s 
constitutive of a concept does not hold in virtue of its structure, then there’s nothing to 
                                                 
12
 In case the reader is worried that I’m being uncharitable in saying that it follows from Informational 
Atomism that ‘water is H2O’, ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, and the like are analytic, here’s Fodor himself 
admitting as much: “Informational semantics may well have to say that ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ carry the same 
information, hence that they have the same content, hence that they mean the same.  So, it’s true both that 
‘Cicero’ means Tully and that ‘Tully’ means Cicero.  It also follows that ‘Cicero was Cicero’ and ‘Cicero 
was Tully’ are both analytic (though, of course, the second isn’t knowable a priori)” (1994, p. 110).  If 
‘Cicero was Tully’ is analytic because ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ carry the same information, then ‘water is H2O’ 
is analytic too, since ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ carry the same information.  It’s worth pointing out that this does 
not sit happily with some of Fodor’s claims elsewhere.  As we saw above, in his discussion of the 
constraints that compositionality places on a theories of meaning and concepts (e.g. Fodor and Lepore 
2002), Fodor is at pains to point out that analyticity and compositionality come to pretty much the same 
thing: that the analytic inferences are those that turn on the compositional structure of concepts, and that the 
inferences that turn on the compositional structure of concepts are the analytic inferences.  Of course, if 
‘water is H2O’ is analytic, then compositionality and analyticity come apart, since the inference from 
‘water’ to ‘H2O’ does not turn on the compositional structure of WATER.   
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constrain a theory of concept constitution.13 In other words, the objection will be that 
there’s no substance to my simply saying that such a theory is constrained because the 
constitutive relations that hold between concepts are a matter of them being linked by 
meaning postulates.  The Quinean/Fodorean rhetorical refrain will thus be: what 
distinguishes the relations that hold in virtue of meaning postulates or inferences rules, 
and those hold as a matter of mere empirical belief?  Concept Cartesianism thus raises a 
challenge against the sort of Concept Pragmatism I’ve been defending that is precisely 
analogous to the challenge that Quine raised against Carnap.  In the next chapter, I argue 
that the Pragmatist has the resources to meet at least part of this challenge.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter we’ve seen that Quine’s epistemological arguments against the 
analytic/synthetic distinction are far from convincing.  Contemporary defenders of the 
distinction needn’t endorse the traditional, positivistic motivations behind it, and giving 
up on these motivations opens up the possibility of an empirical defense of the analytic 
that is fully compatible with Quine’s Confirmation Holism and claims about empirical 
revisability.  Moreover, we’ve seen that Fodor’s empirical arguments against the analytic 
have problems.  First, the methodology of his arguments against lexical decomposition 
                                                 
13
 One might take this to be in the spirit of both Hume and Kripke.  Hume tells us that there are no 
necessary relations between distinct existences, and many contemporary metaphysicians construct their 
theories around this.  (Lewis (1983, 1986) is perhaps the most famous modern Humean; see Ellis (2001) for 
a nice critical discussion of the role of the “Humean Supervenience Thesis” in contemporary metaphysics.) 
Necessary connections between concepts that do not hold in virtue of conceptual structure thus might 
violate some philosophers’ metaphysical scruples, since they would count as necessary connections 
between distinct existences.  (A concept and its constituents, however, are arguably not distinct existences.  
‘Constitution’ is generally taken to pick out a metaphysical relation that is weaker than identity, but 
nevertheless stronger than relations that imply distinctness.)  One might take such constitutive connections 
among concepts to go against the spirit of Kripke, too, at least if one reads Kripke in a way that invites the 
following claim: all (metaphysical) necessities are structural in nature.  In any case, a full defense of Option 
C would certainly sort out the metaphysics more than I’ve done here.   
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and definitions appears to be at odds with the very view he is attempting to motivate.  
Second, and more importantly, the success of his arguments does not spell disaster for 
Concept Pragmatism.  Whereas Fodor assumes that Concept Pragmatism is committed to 
the view that concept-constitutive inferences and judgments are specified by conceptual 
structure, we’ve seen that it is committed to no such thing.  Concept-constitutive roles 
and the analyticities they engender do not imply that lexical concepts are internally 
structured.  Arguments against such internal structure thus count as arguments against 
analyticity and concept-constitutive roles only if the latter are taken to hold as a matter of 
conceptual structure.  If we don’t take concept-constitutive roles to be specified by 
conceptual structure, as I’ve suggested, then one can accept Fodor’s arguments for 
Concept Atomism without giving up on Concept Pragmatism.   
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CHAPTER 6 
 
PROSPECTS FOR MEETING THE QUINEAN CHALLENGE 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Let’s take stock.  In Chapter 4, we saw that Peacocke’s examples are consistent with a 
Cartesian denial of a constitutive connection between concepts and perceptual judgments.  
Perceiving something as red plausibly requires that, in certain conditions, one judges that 
(say) that’s red.  Peacocke takes this to support the claim that there’s a constitutive 
connection between RED and the corresponding recognitional judgment.  But as we’ve 
seen, the Cartesian has an alternative explanation.  That judgments with certain contents 
tend to follow perceptions with certain contents can be explained merely by the 
functional nature of judgment and perception.  For ‘perception’ is plausibly defined 
functionally in terms of ‘belief’ or ‘judgment’.  Rather than showing anything about the 
metaphysics of concepts, then, the Cartesian can insist that Peacocke’s examples merely 
illustrate the functional nature of mental states themselves.  And, as Fodor has long 
insisted, one can be a functionalist about mental states without being a functionalist about 
their contents.   
Moreover, we’ve seen that the Cartesian will insist that the Pragmatist’s claim 
that some judgments and not others are concept-constitutive commits him to an 
analytic/synthetic distinction, which the Pragmatist hasn’t told us how to draw.  
Peacocke’s perceptual-demonstrative examples, for instance, apparently do not provide 
an explanatory basis for the claim that some divergences in judgment manifest a 
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difference in concepts, while others merely indicate a difference in empirically held 
belief.  Peacocke is right to point out that some examples seem obvious or plausible, and 
that thinkers find some inferences/judgments and not others primitively compelling.  But 
we’ve seen that this is not sufficient to meet the Quinean challenge, and that such 
examples thus leave this challenge intact and unanswered.   
 In Chapter 5, however, we had a look at the other side of this dialectic.  We saw 
there that Quine’s best arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction are 
unconvincing, and that confirmation holism and empirical revisability are perfectly 
compatible with the existence of a principled analytic/synthetic distinction (and even the 
a priori).  Given the failure of Quine’s arguments, we turned to Fodor’s “empirical, non-
demonstrative” case against analyticity and conceptual connections: his arguments 
against lexical decomposition and definitions.  I argued that the force of these arguments 
depends upon presupposing the ‘concept-containment’ notion of conceptual structure, 
and that, for precisely this reason, Concept Pragmatism is not necessarily vulnerable to 
them.  For, contra Fodor (in at least some of his moods), the question of whether lexical 
concepts have constitutive roles in thought and judgment is independent of the question 
of whether those concepts are internally structured.  Lexical concepts can be relationally 
individuated in terms of their roles even if they lack structure altogether.  In addition, we 
saw that Fodor is wrong to suppose that such a view does not have the resources to 
explain the relation between an account of what’s constitutive of a concept and its 
possession conditions.    
Now, all of this leaves us in a somewhat puzzling dialectical situation.  Chapter 4 
acknowledges the force of the Quinean challenge and the Concept Pragmatist’s apparent 
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failure to meet it, and Chapter 5 acknowledges that both Quine’s and Fodor’s arguments 
against the analytic are far from convincing.  My aim in what follows is to take some 
preliminary steps towards resolving the apparent tension here.  I consider, in particular, 
two things: (1) the prospects for meeting the Quinean challenge, noting both the promise 
and limitations of a recent strategy that attempts to do so; and (2) Peacocke’s (2004a, 
2004b) recent remarks concerning the relation between Quine’s attack on the 
analytic/synthetic distinction and his own project.  I argue that the Quinean challenge can 
be met for constitutive connections among concepts, and briefly consider a promising 
strategy for meeting it in the case of constitutive connections between certain concepts 
and perceptual judgments.  I conclude the chapter by showing that Peacocke’s most 
recent attempt to meet the Quinean challenge fails.   
 
The Quinean Challenge Revisited. 
Recall that the Quinean challenge is to provide some data, the best explanation of which 
is that there are constitutive, analytic connections among concepts.  Given the arguments 
of Chapter 5, the existence of such data would not require the hypothesis that lexical 
concepts are internally structured.  For one natural way of spelling out such a hypothesis 
would be to say that meaning relations are captured by inferences rules, or meaning 
postulates, which hold between lexical items that lack structure at the semantic level.  
Explaining the data in this fashion would thus render the hypothesis immune to Fodor’s 
empirical arguments for Concept Atomism.   
Of course, pointing this out is insufficient to meet the Quinean challenge.  For 
while the arguments against lexical decomposition and definitions are certainly Quinean 
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in flavor, they’re nevertheless distinct from the Quinean challenge itself.  The challenge 
arises for all theorists who claim that there are meaning relations, or constitutive 
connections among concepts, regardless of whether or not they make the additional claim 
that such connections hold in virtue of conceptual structure.  For Quine challenges the 
very existence of meaning relations, and this challenge is independent of the issue of 
whether such relations are structural in nature, or instead hold in virtue of inference rules, 
or meaning postulates.  In other words, a Concept Pragmatist can reply to Fodor’s 
arguments against lexical decompositions and definitions by denying that analyticities 
hold in virtue of conceptual structure, but this is not yet to reply to the Quinean 
Challenge.   
Indeed, Quine’s attack was originally leveled against Carnap’s meaning 
postulates.  Fodor expresses the Quinean challenge with some rhetorical questions that 
echo Quine’s original complaint:  
Imagine two minds that differ in that ‘whale → mammal’ is a meaning postulate 
for one but is ‘general knowledge’ for the other [an example from Partee (1995)].  
Are any further differences between these minds entailed?  If so, which ones?  Is 
this wheel attached to anything at all?  (1998a, p. 112) 
The worry is that meaning postulates merely provide us with an idle label for those 
connections and inferences we wish to treat as constitutive.1 But it’s the burden of those 
who endorse meaning postulates to spell out a principled reason for treating some 
connections among concepts as constitutive in the first place, and thus answer Fodor’s 
rhetorical questions.  Can defenders of such connections show that the wheel is attached 
                                                 
1
 See Quine (1966a). 
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to something after all?  Providing some data the best explanation of which is that there 
are analytic connections would, I take it, do just that.   
In attempting to provide such data, philosophers have found inspiration in the 
Chomskyan revolution in linguistics.  Paul Horwich (1992) and Georges Rey (1993a, 
forthcoming a, b), for instance, argue that an explanatory basis for the analytic can be 
provided by the same sort of data that linguists use to support their hypotheses about 
syntax.  Linguists take speakers’ judgments about whether certain strings of words are 
“acceptable” or “unacceptable” as data to be explained by hypotheses about the structure 
of the language faculty.  Of course, this isn’t to say that linguists’ theoretical claims about 
syntax can always be overridden by the judgments of speakers.  Indeed, when one bears 
in mind Chomsky’s competence/performance distinction, one would expect certain 
strings to be judged ungrammatical by speakers, despite the fact that they nevertheless 
count as grammatical according to linguistic theory.  For the gap between judgments of 
acceptability and grammaticality can plausibly be explained by appeal to performance 
limitations, e.g. processing effects (Larson and Segal 1995, p.560n.17; Pietroski and Rey 
1995).   
Just as speakers’ intuitions about grammaticality can be used as data by the 
linguist, the thought goes, speakers’ semantic intuitions can be used as data for the 
concept theorist.  In particular, people make judgments of synonymy, antonymy, 
redundancy, entailment, and contradictoriness, all of which can be used in constructing a 
semantic theory (Katz 1972).  Convergences in peoples’ judgments provide a potentially 
powerful explanatory basis for constitutive connections among concepts.  As we noted in 
Chapter 5, it certainly seems that there’s an interesting difference between “bachelors are 
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unmarried” and “bachelors are frustrated”—one can see that the former is true merely by 
understanding the meaning of ‘bachelor’, while this is not true of the latter.  I take it that 
all competent speakers of English agree with this.  Correspondingly, thinkers who 
possess BACHELOR will find the thought JOHN IS A MARRIED BACHELOR to be (in some 
sense) unintelligible, or unthinkable.  This would certainly seem to count as prima face 
evidence that “bachelors are unmarried” is analytic, and correspondingly, that BACHELOR 
is constitutively connected to UNMARRIED (i.e., it’s a condition on possessing BACHELOR 
that you must be willing to infer from BACHELOR to UNMARRIED).2   
Many philosophers agree, including convinced Quineans.  Fodor, for example, 
admits that such analytic intuitions at least count as prima facie evidence for constitutive 
conceptual connections: 
… I want to concentrate on the argument that the very fact that we have intuitions 
of analyticity makes a formidable case for there being intrinsic conceptual 
connections.  I’m sympathetic to the tactics of this argument.  First blush, it surely 
does seem plausible that bachelors are unmarried is a different kind of truth from, 
as it might be, it often rains in January; and it’s not implausible, again first blush, 
that the difference is that the first truth, but not the second, is purely conceptual.  I 
agree, in short, that assuming they can’t be otherwise accounted for, the standard 
                                                 
2
 In what follows, I don’t wish to place much weight on the term ‘intuition’.  It seems unlikely to me that 
the term picks out a unified class of states (or perhaps even a natural kind appropriate for psychological 
theorizing).  I use it, in a very rough manner, to cover a range: those peculiarly compelling judgments that 
thinkers make relatively quickly after considering a possible state of affairs (“an object couldn’t be both red 
and not colored”), considered judgments that require a bit more reflection (“oh right, I see, justified true 
belief couldn’t be sufficient for knowledge”), as well as judgments that fall somewhere else on the 
spectrum.  It’s worth pointing out that the locution “intuition of analyticity” is a theoretical way of 
describing what’s going on in the head of a thinker.  Ordinary thinkers don’t have the intuition that it’s 
analytic that, say, red things are colored.  Rather, they have the intuition that nothing red could fail to be 
colored.  Perhaps they even have intuitions that they can see that “red things are colored” is true merely by 
knowing the meanings of ‘red’ and ‘colored’.  The theorist who has the concept ANALYTIC describes such 
intuitions as “intuitions of analyticity”.  Perhaps once you possess ANALYTIC, the concept itself can figure 
in the content of the intuition, so that you can have intuitions of analyticity.   
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intuitions offer respectable evidence for there being cases of intrinsic conceptual 
connectedness.  (1998a, pp. 71-72, original emphasis)   
Even Quine himself admits that if there were widespread agreement among 
speakers/thinkers about a range of cases, then that would give him pause.  He says:  
The fact remains that, if evidence should accumulate to suggest that there is an 
impressively broad range of sentences which nearly all informants would put into 
list A [which includes such intuitively “analytic” statements as ‘no bachelors are 
married’ ‘black swans are black’, etc.], this would be a uniformity worth studying.  
A study of common traits of such sentences, and of psychological mechanisms 
behind them, might help us on some semantical points which have been ill served 
by the uncritically posited dichotomy between analytic and synthetic.  (1967, p. 
54) 
It’s not implausible that there is an impressively broad range of cases, which goes 
well beyond ‘bachelors are unmarried’ and the like.  Consider the following list, which 
includes some hoary examples but also some not-so-hoary ones: 
(1) John is unmarried if he’s a bachelor. 
(2) Vixens are female foxes. 
(3) Desks are furniture. 
(4) John is a male sibling if he’s a brother.  
(5) Nightmares are dreams. 
(6) The car is colored if it is red.  
(7) John has lots of money if he is rich. 
(8) If John runs, then John moves.   
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(9) John believes that P if he knows that P.   
(10) If the door is closed then it is not open.   
(11) John is an adult if he is 40 years old.   
(12) John is naked if he is nude. 
(13) If John boiled the water, then the water boiled.   
(14) If John persuaded Bill to leave, then Bill intended to leave.  
(15) John tried to get Bill to decide to leave if John encouraged Bill to leave.   
(16) If John lifted the cup then the cup rose.   
(17) Bill died if John killed him. 
I assume that all competent speakers of English would assent to (1)–(17), and would 
agree that determining their truth requires no more than understanding their meaning.  
Moreover, I take it that speakers would find the denials of (1)-(17) to be in some sense 
unintelligible.  If peoples’ judgments were to converge on these and other such cases, 
then, as both Quine and Fodor admit, that would count as prima facie evidence that (1)-
(17) are analytic, and that the relevant concepts are constitutively connected.  That is, the 
hypothesis that there are analyticities offers a prima facie plausible explanation of the 
fact that speakers’ judgments about these and other such cases converge in the ways that 
they do.   
Again, on the sort of view being suggested, that (1)-(17) are analytic needn’t be 
taken to imply that the relevant lexical concepts are internally structured.   For we can 
understand the Chomskyan defense of analyticity as claiming that the analyticities that 
are posited to explain the analytic data hold in virtue of facts that are entirely internal to 
the language faculty, in the same way that the rules of grammar hold in virtue of facts 
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internal to the language faculty.  On a standard cognitivist understanding of linguistic 
theory, the rules of grammar are represented—either explicitly or implicitly—in the 
language faculty (Larson and Segal 1995).  And many linguists claim that certain 
inferences hold simply in virtue of our being competent speakers of a language.  The 
inference in (13), for instance, arguably holds in virtue of our linguistic competence 
(Pietroski 2003b), and we can understand the other inferences in (1)-(17) in a similar 
fashion.  Rather than taking the inference in (17) to hold in virtue of the internal structure 
of KILL, one may take it to hold in virtue of a rule, internal to the language faculty, which 
guarantees the validity of the inference from ‘x killed y’ to ‘y died’.  The Chomskyan 
analogy could thus plausibly be developed along the same lines with which I defended 
Concept Pragmatism in Chapter 5.   
Now, as both Horwich and Rey stress, if analyticities reside in the abstract 
structure of the mind in the way that the Chomskyan analogy suggests, then they may not 
play the epistemological role for which they were historically invoked.  For whereas 
analyticities were traditionally taken to be obvious and readily available to introspection, 
the analytic rules that govern our conceptual competence need not be obvious to 
untutored intuition, any more than the rules of grammar are.  The examples above happen 
to be relatively obvious.  But think of the subtlety of the scenarios concerning painting 
we considered in Chapter 5, which, on this sort of view, can plausibly be taken to reveal 
the analytic rules governing PAINTTR.3 Positing analyticities for broadly explanatory 
                                                 
3
 Think, too, of the range of scenarios that philosophers come up with in order to reveal the constitutive 
connections among our concepts: Gettier-style cases as evidence against the traditional analysis of 
knowledge; Putnam’s Twin-Earth and Burge’s arthritis cases as evidence for an externalist treatment of 
meaning and mental content; Block’s Inverted-Earth case as evidence against representationalist theories of 
consciousness; Davidson’s Swampman as evidence against teleological theories of content; and so on and 
so forth.  
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reasons thus requires giving up on the claim that we can know prior to empirical 
investigation exactly which conceptual connections are analytic.  Not only that, but 
analyticities so conceived will not have the privileged epistemic status they were once 
given.  After all, that the rules governing our conceptual competence have certain 
contents and structure does not guarantee that the things in the world to which our 
concepts apply will cooperate with such rules. 
Unlike the behavioristic conception of analyticity shared by the Positivists and 
Quine, the Chomskyan analogy thus suggests that analyticities need not be unrevisable.  
As Horwich puts it:  
[T]here might be evidence that under certain circumstance certain contents of the 
language faculty (in particular the ‘meaning postulates’) are revised, constituting 
a change in language.  We might find out that such changes are pragmatically (as 
opposed to epistemologically) driven—that they result, unlike normal changes in 
belief, from a practical desire to achieve an overall simplification in our network 
of beliefs-representations.  (1992, pp. 100-101, original emphasis)   
Such changes could also be theory-driven.  For instance, noting a suggestion made by 
Wittgenstein (1953/1958) and Ziff (1959), Rey remarks that it might turn out that, upon 
investigation, the inference from THINKING ALIVE is analytic (forthcoming a, p. 17).  
Nevertheless, there may be strong theoretical reasons for supposing that being alive is not 
a necessary condition on being a thinking thing, in which case it could turn out that 
according to our best theory it is analytic, but false that thinking things are alive.  If this 
were the case, the concept THINKING (or THOUGHT) would be used scientifically in a way 
that forgoes some of its constitutive connections to other concepts. 
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This idea is rather Kripkean in spirit, since it takes (some of) the analytic rules 
that govern our concepts to be mere reference fixers.  Thus, in the case above, it may turn 
out to be analytic that thinking things are alive.  On the Chomskyan view under 
discussion, this would amount to there being a constitutive connection between 
THINKING and ALIVE.  However, if upon empirical investigation of the world, it turns out 
that what we we’re getting at with our term ‘thought’ (or concept THOUGHT) isn’t 
necessarily connected to the property of being alive, then our best empirical theory would 
tell us both that it’s analytic that thinking things are alive and that it’s false that thinking 
things are necessarily alive.  The analytic connections would thus be used merely to fix 
the reference of ‘thought’, and philosophers and scientists could then use the term 
‘thought’ while ignoring those connections.4   
 
Alternative Accounts 
Given that the Chomskyan strategy posits analyticities and constitutive connections for 
broadly empirical/explanatory reasons, Quineans are forced to take such data seriously.  
In order to avoid postulating analyticities, they must give some alternative explanation of 
the data that does not posit genuine constitutive connections.  The general Quinean 
strategy for offering such an alternative explanation is to, first, grant that it seems to us 
that certain statements can be seen to be true merely by understanding the relevant terms, 
or possessing the relevant concepts, and second, argue that our intuitions of analyticity 
                                                 
4
 Another potentially promising possibility can be found in the internalist conception of semantics found in 
Chomsky (2000) and Pietroski (2003a, forthcoming), according to which meanings “constrain without 
determining” reference and truth conditions.  This sort of view divorces meaning and truth-conditions in a 
way that sits nicely with the psychological notion of analyticity under discussion, and would seem to allow 
for the possibility of false analyticities.  But working out the details is well beyond the scope of this 
dissertation (and, ipso facto, this chapter!).    
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are in fact the result of something other than analyticity itself.  In this section, I consider 
the alternative accounts of Quine, Fodor, and Margolis and Laurence, and argue that each 
of them fails.   
 Quine provides two alternative explanations of the analytic data, one that invokes 
the origin of some of our beliefs, and one that invokes the centrality of some of our 
beliefs.  Let’s start with the first.   
The way in which we learn certain terms/concepts, Quine says, leads to the 
mistaken sense that some claims can be seen to be true solely by understanding what they 
mean: 
[O]ur intuitive semantics rates ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ as synonymous.  
…  But now what can have been the cause of those intuitive ratings themselves?  
Not, I think  …  an implicit sociological guess that under extraordinary 
stimulation most people would hold ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried man’ coextensive.  
A likelier place to seek the cause is in  …  how we whose mother tongue is 
English learn ‘bachelor’.  We learn ‘bachelor’ by learning appropriate 
associations of words with words.  …  One looks to ‘unmarried man’ as 
semantically anchoring ‘bachelor’ because there is no socially constant stimulus 
meaning to govern the use of the word; sever its tie with ‘unmarried man’ and you 
leave it no very evident social determination, hence no utility in communication.  
(1960, p. 56)   
Putting aside worries about the behavioristic conception of word learning Quine is 
assuming here, it’s clear that this won’t work as a general explanation of our analytic 
intuitions.  For there can surely be convergences in people’s judgments about cases that 
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are not a result of how they learned the relevant terms.  Even if Quine’s explanation 
works for BACHELOR and the like, it clearly won’t work for analytic data that concerns 
concepts for which it is quite difficult to come up with constitutive connections (e.g., 
more abstract concepts like DEMOCRACY, or FREEDOM).  Moreover, even for cases that 
do fit Quine’s story about word learning, people have no problem at all dissociating the 
relevant terms.  Kripke’s (1972) treatment of proper names illustrates this (Rey 1993a).  
The concepts COLUMBUS and DISCOVERER OF AMERICA, for instance, no doubt fit 
Quine’s story for many people.  But people have no problem imagining that someone else 
discovered America, e.g., the Chinese.  Since there is analytic data for cases that don’t fit 
Quine’s story, and cases that fit Quine’s story for which there’s no analytic data, his 
explanation is clearly insufficient.   
 Quine’s other, more well-known, alternative explanation appeals to a different 
epistemic property of concepts, namely, being central in the web of belief.  The idea here 
is that thinkers confuse the epistemic property of centrality for the semantic property of 
analyticity.  It only seems to us that certain statements can be seen to be true solely in 
virtue of their meaning, so the explanation goes, because those statements are at (or near) 
the center of our belief systems.  As Fodor puts it: “Quine’s point (utterly convincing in 
my view) is that what pass for intuitions of analyticity are in fact intuitions of centrality; 
and centrality is an epistemic relation, not a semantical one” (1990, x-xi, original 
emphasis).   
The appeal of this explanation is clear enough.  Since the analytic/synthetic 
distinction was traditionally invoked to explain the puzzling epistemic and modal status 
of logic and mathematics, Quine’s confirmation holism was thought to have undermined 
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the need for analyticity.  For confirmation holism implies that with enough recalcitrant 
experience even the claims of logic and mathematics can rationally be given up.  Of 
course, it might seem to us that such claims (“2 + 2 = 4”, “P or not P”, etc.) are immune 
to revision.  But, Quine says, that’s just because such claims occupy a central place in our 
overall theory of the world.  The idea, then, is that the reason we have such a hard time 
imagining that so-called ‘analytic’ claims could turn out to be false is that giving up on 
them would require a massive amount of revision to rest of our belief system. 
 While this explanation is perhaps plausible in the case of logic and mathematics, 
like Quine’s first explanation, it is hardly sufficient as a general explanation of the data.  
For a belief’s having the property of centrality is neither necessary nor sufficient for it’s 
seeming analytic.  Consider, for instance, Russell’s (1921) famous hypothesis that the 
world has existed for only five minutes.  Although the hypothesis is compatible with all 
of our present experiences (and, according to Russell, our memories) we all believe that it 
is false, and this belief surely occupies a central place in our web of belief (think of the 
amount of revision required to give that up!).  Nevertheless it doesn’t at all seem analytic 
(Rey 1993a).  For unlike the examples in (1) – (17) above, it’s very easy for us to imagine 
that the belief is false.  In other words, however implausible the five-minute hypothesis 
may be, it is nevertheless perfectly intelligible.  This suggests that being central is not 
sufficient for seeming analytic.   
Moreover, the examples in (1) – (17) illustrate that being central is not even a 
necessary condition for seeming analytic.  For our beliefs in (1) – (17) seem as analytic as 
any belief could, yet they aren’t the least bit central to our overall theory of the world.  
Giving up on them would hardly have a massive effect on the rest of our beliefs.  Indeed, 
 176 
the only beliefs affected would seem to be those concerning what the relevant terms mean 
(Rey 1993a).  If I were to give up my belief that ‘if x killed y, then y died’ and instead 
decided to use ‘kill’ to cover cases that I would now refer to as ‘attempted killings’, I 
wouldn’t need to change any beliefs other than those that concern what ‘kill’ means.  
Being central is thus not even necessary for seeming analytic.  Quine’s appeal to 
centrality won’t suffice as a plausible alternative explanation of the analytic data.   
 While Fodor apparently used to believe that centrality is all that is needed for a 
Quinean explanation of our intuitions of analyticity (see the above quote from Fodor 
1990), his most recent favored alternative explanation involves an appeal to Putnam’s 
(1983) “one-criterion” concepts.  As we saw earlier, Putnam endorses confirmation 
holism and is in general sympathetic with Quine’s attack on the analytic and the a priori, 
in the sense that he does not think that there are analyticities that can do interesting 
philosophical work.  However, he doesn’t think that agreeing with Quine about this 
requires giving up on all analyticities.  In particular, Putnam claims that the putative 
analyticities that reside out at the periphery of our web of belief—those analyticities that, 
as we just saw, can’t be explained away by appeal to centrality—remain intact even after 
Quine’s confirmation holism is swallowed whole.  The hoary examples of analyticities 
involving bachelors, vixens, killings, brothers, etc. all fit this category, and Putnam’s 
proposal is that these analyticities arise because the corresponding concepts are one-
criterion concepts.  Putnam explains the proposal as follows: 
The idea, in a nutshell, is that there is an exceptionless ‘law’ associated with the 
noun ‘bachelor’, namely, that someone is a bachelor if and only if he has never 
been married; an exceptionless law associated with the noun ‘vixen’, namely that 
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something is a vixen if and only if it is a female fox; etc.  Moreover, this 
exceptionless law has, in each case, two important characteristics: (1) that no 
other exceptionless ‘if and only if’ statement is associated with the noun by 
speakers; and (2) that the exceptionless ‘if and only if’ in question is a criterion, 
i.e., speakers can and do tell whether or not something is a bachelor by seeing 
whether or not it is an unmarried man; whether or not something is a vixen by 
seeing whether or not it is a female fox; etc.  (… I contend that only a few 
hundred words in a natural language have this ‘one-criterion’ character: most 
words are either associated with no exceptionless criterion, or with more than 
one.).  (1983, p. 89) 
So, analyticities will involve concepts for which there is only one criterion, i.e., only one 
‘way of telling’ whether or not the concepts apply to a given object. 
The problem with Putnam’s proposal as an account of the analytic is that there 
appears to be no way of individuating criteria that does not itself appeal to analyticity.  
One could count criteria by counting synonyms (e.g., ‘unmarried man’ and ‘not married 
man’ are the same criterion since they’re synonymous), but this won’t help since, as 
Quine famously points out, analyticity can just as well be defined in terms of synonymy.  
As Fodor says: “it looks as though Putnam’s construal of analytic connection in terms of 
one-criterion concept leaves us back where we started; in a tight circle of interdefined 
semantic-cum-conceptual vocabulary” (1998a, p. 82).  
This doesn’t worry Fodor, though, since unlike Putnam he is not out to defend 
analyticity for a small handful of beliefs out at the periphery of our web.  Rather, he is 
merely interested in explaining away our intuitions of analyticity.  And he argues that 
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Putnam’s one-criterion concepts can be put to use for this purpose, even if it will not 
work as an account of analyticity itself.  The idea is that if a concept has just one way of 
telling whether or not it applies, then this will give rise to an intuition of analyticity.  
Fodor explains his account as follows: 
[S]uppose you think the only epistemic route from the concept C to the property 
that it expresses depends on drawing inferences that involve the concept C*.  
Then you find it intuitively plausible that the relation between C and C* is 
conceptual; specifically, that you can’t have C unless you also have C*.  And the 
more you think that it is counterfactual supporting that the only epistemic route 
from C to the property it expresses depends on drawing inferences that involve 
the concept C*, the stronger your intuition that C and C* are conceptually 
connected will be.  (1998a, p. 83, original emphasis)  
Fodor considers a couple of examples to illustrate how this is supposed to work.  
He says, for instance, that on his account DOGS ARE ANIMALS comes out as a “relatively 
poorish” candidate for analyticity, and that this is as it should be.  The reason is that there 
are many ways of telling whether something is a dog that do not rely on deploying the 
concept ANIMAL.  As Fodor puts it, “there are lots of plausible scenarios where your 
thoughts achieve semantic access to doghood but not via your performing inferences that 
deploy the concept ANIMAL” (1998a, p. 84).  The most common way of telling whether 
something’s a dog is by the way it looks, but we also apply DOG on the basis of barks and 
jingling collars.  The point is that none of these ways of telling involve inferences 
containing ANIMAL.  When I see a dog and then apply DOG (e.g., judge that’s a dog) I 
don’t do this via a deployment of ANIMAL, and this would seem to be true even if 
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perception is always inferential.  Since DOG is not a one-criterion concept, we shouldn’t 
have any strong analytic intuitions concerning it.  And, Fodor says, we don’t.  (But see 
below.) 
The same point applies to other metaphysical necessities, such as “water is H2O”.  
There are lots of ways of determining whether something is water—its look, taste, 
location, etc.—that do not rely upon deploying the concept H2O.  So even though 
Informational Atomism has it that WATER and H2O are synonymous (since they express 
the same property), Fodor’s account explains why we don’t think that there’s a 
constitutive, analytic connection between the concepts themselves: WATER is not a one-
criterion concept.  But, Fodor says:  
I can’t imagine how I might determine whether John is a bachelor except by 
determining that he’s male and un- (viz. not) married.  …  Hence the intuitive 
analyticity of bachelors are unmarried.  …  I’m suggesting that it’s the epistemic 
property of being a one-criterion concept—not a modal property, and certainly not 
a semantic property—that putative intuitions of analyticity detect.  (1998a, p. 84) 
 There are a few points I want to make about Fodor’s account of our analytic 
intuitions.  First, it’s not entirely clear why Fodor’s complaint against Putnam’s account 
doesn’t also apply to his own account.  That is, it’s not clear why Fodor gets to treat 
UNMARRIED MALE and NOT MARRIED MALE as the same criterion (“un – (viz. not) 
married”) without specifying a principle of individuation for criteria, whereas Putnam’s 
account fails precisely because he doesn’t provide such a principle.  Fodor might reply 
that failing to provide a way of counting criteria isn’t a problem for his account, since he 
isn’t interested in giving an account of analyticity itself, but rather just some faulty 
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intuitions.  But it’s not clear why this should matter.  Since Fodor’s claim is that 
intuitions of analyticity arise for those concepts that have one-criterion, it’s prima facie 
plausible that he too needs to provide some way of counting criteria. 
 Moreover, it’s not entirely clear why Fodor thinks he’s warranted in claiming that 
BACHELOR has only one criterion.  Note that the reason that DOG and WATER are not one-
criterion concepts is that people associate with each concept a lot of contingent 
information—“dogs bark, have a certain look to them, etc.,” “water is found in the lakes 
and streams, comes out of the taps, quenches thirst, etc.”—that can be used as (rough and 
ready) ways of telling whether the concept applies.  And Fodor uses this point in 
motivating his account.  But I take it that the same holds for BACHELOR.  Bachelors are 
unmarried men, but they’re also people who tend to lead certain lifestyles.  For instance, I 
can tell whether John is a bachelor by finding out whether he spends a lot of time at 
singles bars.  I might also check to see if he wears a wedding ring, or whether he lives 
alone.  Or I might just ask one of John’s friends or relatives whether he’s a bachelor.  Of 
course, none of these are surefire ways of determining whether John is a bachelor.  But 
this is also true of the multiple criteria Fodor cites in the case of WATER and DOG.  Not 
everything that looks like a dog is a dog, and not everything that looks and tastes like 
water is water.  But if this doesn’t disqualify those ways of telling as genuine criteria for 
WATER and DOG, it’s not clear why the above tests for BACHELOR shouldn’t count as 
genuine criteria too, in which case even BACHELOR won’t count as a one-criterion 
concept and Fodor’s alternative explanation fails.   
 Now, Fodor seems to be aware of this criticism, and in the following passage is 
apparently attempting to preempt it: 
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What Putnam must have had in mind, and what I too propose to assume, is that 
some ways of telling pretty clearly depend on others.  It’s the latter—the pretty 
clearly independent ones—that you are supposed to count when you decide 
whether something’s a one-criterion concept ….  (1998a, pp. 82-83, original 
emphasis)   
So perhaps for each concept there will be many ways of telling whether it applies.  But, 
Fodor says, this is not a problem for his account since some ways of telling depend upon 
others.  I can tell whether John is a bachelor by finding out whether he spends a lot of 
time at singles bars, or by finding out whether he is unmarried and male.  But that the 
former is a way of telling, Fodor will say, depends upon the latter’s being a way of 
telling, but not vice versa.  That is, finding out that John is at the singles bars every night 
wouldn’t count as a way of telling that John is a bachelor if it weren’t for the fact that 
finding out that John is an unmarried male counts as a way of telling that he’s a bachelor.  
But finding out that John is unmarried and male would be a way of telling whether John 
is a bachelor even if finding out that John spends every night in the singles bars wasn’t 
(e.g., even if there weren’t any singles bars).  Similarly, asking John’s friends whether 
he’s a bachelor is a way of telling that depends upon finding out his gender and marriage 
status as a way of telling, but not vice versa. 
 Although this is an interesting suggestion, I’m not sure it works.  Note, first, that 
we seem to have analytic intuitions concerning concepts that aren’t one-criterion 
concepts.  Again, consider DOG.  Fodor is surely right that DOGS ARE ANIMALS is a 
“relatively poorish” candidate for analyticity.  For we have (relatively) no problem 
imagining that dogs are radio-controlled robots from outer space (Putnam 1970, 1975a).  
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But what about DOGS ARE OBJECTS?  This thought seems to have all the characteristics of 
analyticity: we think that understanding the meaning of “if x is a dog, then x is an object” 
is sufficient for determining its truth; we find the denial of “if x is a dog, then x is an 
object” to be unintelligible; and so on.  But these analytic intuitions can’t be account for 
by Fodor’s one-criterion-concept story, since DOG is not a one-criterion concept.  So it 
looks like being a one-criterion concept is not a necessary condition for giving rise to 
analytic intuitions. 
 Perhaps, though, DOGS ARE OBJECTS does have the property of being central in 
our web of belief, in which case such analytic intuitions can be accounted for by Quine’s 
strategy.  But it’s not clear whether Fodor takes his explanation to replace, or supplement, 
Quine’s explanation.  He says, for instance: “[W]hat I say about analyticity intuitions is, 
of course, a lot like what Quine says; except that he takes the epistemic property to be 
centrality whereas I think it’s one-criterionhood” (1998a, p. 86, my emphasis).  If we take 
Fodor at his word here, then DOGS ARE OBJECTS will be a problem since it’s intuitively 
analytic but doesn’t have the right epistemic property, namely one-criterionhood.  But 
Fodor goes on to say: “I doubt that either story covers all the cases, and there’s no 
obvious reason why they shouldn’t both be true” (1998a, p. 86).  If this is right, then 
Fodor can perhaps appeal to centrality to explain away our intuitions concerning DOGS 
ARE OBJECTS, and the like, and then appeal to one-criterionhood to explain away the 
others.5 
                                                 
5
 Another option available to Fodor is to appeal to metaphysical necessities.  For perhaps some of our 
intuitions of analyticities are a result of our taking certain claims to be metaphysically necessary.  For 
instance, Fodor could make such an appeal in explaining away Katzian intuitions about Putnam’s robot 
cats, for it’s plausible that “cats are animals” is metaphysically necessary, even if it’s not conceptually 
necessary.  Perhaps the same goes for “cats are objects”.   
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In any case, there are other problems with Fodor’s account.  Consider again the 
concepts WATER and H2O.   Fodor’s story about why we don’t have intuitions that WATER 
is constitutively connected to H2O is that WATER is not a one-criterion concept.  But don’t 
all the ways of telling whether some stuff is water depend upon telling whether it’s H2O?  
The reliability of seeing how some watery stuff looks, tastes, etc. as ways of telling 
whether the stuff is water would seem to depend upon the reliability of checking whether 
the stuff is H2O as a way of telling whether it’s water.  That is, seeing what the stuff 
looks like and tastes like wouldn’t be a good way of telling whether the stuff is water if 
checking on the stuff’s chemical composition wasn’t a good way of telling whether it’s 
water, but not vice versa.  If this is right, then all the ways of telling whether some stuff is 
water do asymmetrically depend upon checking its chemical composition as a way of 
telling, in which case even WATER is a one-criterion concept.  However, if WATER is a 
one-criterion concept, then on Fodor’s account we should have the intuition that it’s 
constitutively connected to H2O.  But we don’t.  In particular, we don’t think that 
accepting the inference from WATER to H2O is necessary for possessing WATER.  “Water 
is H2O” may express a metaphysical necessity (Kripke 1980), but it surely doesn’t 
express a conceptual one.  (The ancients didn’t lack the concept WATER, for instance, just 
because they didn’t know any modern chemistry.)  
 However, perhaps this is unfair to Fodor.  For maybe there are different kinds of 
asymmetric-dependency relation that can hold between criteria, only some of which will 
be relevant to determining whether a concept has just one criterion.  In the case of 
WATER, for instance, the plethora of ways of telling whether it applies to some stuff will 
depend upon checking the stuff’s chemical composition as a way of telling, but in a 
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metaphysical sense of dependence.  In other words, the reliability of telling that some 
stuff is water by seeing that it’s clear and potable depends upon checking its chemical 
composition as a way of telling, but the latter is reliable because water’s being H2O is a 
metaphysical necessity.  And perhaps the sort of reliability Fodor has is mind is 
epistemic, not metaphysical.  Indeed, Fodor seems to suggest just this in the following 
passage: 
You can tell, pretty reliably, whether stuff is water by, for example, how it looks, 
how it tastes, where it’s located, its specific heat, its specific gravity, what it says 
on the bottle, which tap it came from, and so on and on.  No doubt, the fact that 
all these ways of telling work depends on a bundle of metaphysical and nomic 
necessities; but your employing the tests doesn’t depend on, and isn’t usually 
rationalized by, your knowing that this is so; pretty clearly, the various tests for 
being water are largely epistemically independent.  (1998a, p. 83)   
But it’s not clear why this should matter.  Suppose that someone determines that 
John is a bachelor because he’s been give a list of bachelors and John’s name appears on 
the list.  I don’t see any reason for thinking that this way of telling isn’t ‘epistemically 
independent’ of checking John’s gender and marriage status, just as checking what it says 
on a bottle of some watery stuff is ‘epistemically independent’ of checking the stuff’s 
chemical composition.  What exactly is the contrast here?  Fodor can say that applying 
BACHELOR to John on the basis of his appearing on a list of bachelors is ultimately 
‘rationalized’ by one’s knowing that appearing on the list is correlated with gender and 
marriage status.  But why say this?  Because the concepts UNMARRIED and MALE must 
actually be deployed when one infers that John is a bachelor because John’s on the list 
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and everyone on the list is a bachelor?  Surely not.  But it’s not clear what else Fodor 
could mean by saying that all the ways of telling whether BACHELOR applies are 
epistemically dependent on checking gender and marriage status.  It seems plausible that 
what rationalizes the application of BACHELOR to John in the above scenario is that 
appearing on the list is actually correlated in the world with being unmarried and male.  
As far as I can tell, Fodor hasn’t said anything that rules this out.  But then there’s no real 
contrast between the sorts of dependencies exhibited by BACHELOR’s criteria and 
WATER’s criteria, and the objection above stands. 
 Moreover, as Rey (forthcoming b) points out, there are one-criterion concepts that 
don’t seem to give rise to analytic intuitions.  For example, I might only know of one way 
to determine whether ACID applies to something, and that is to see whether it turns litmus 
paper pink.  All the other ways of telling—e.g. sending the stuff over to the chemistry 
building—may depend in the right sorts of ways on that way of telling.  But the thought 
ACIDS TURN LITMUS PAPER PINK doesn’t seem to be analytic, since the content of ACID 
isn’t plausibly determined by the way we happen to test for acidity.  This doesn’t seem to 
be the case with BACHELOR, however.  As Rey puts it: 
‘[B]achelor’ marks a superficial kind, whose nature is pretty much exhausted by 
the linguistics of the matter: unlike the case of litmus paper and acidity, the 
reason that gender and marriage status are the best way to tell whether 
someone’s a bachelor is that that’s just what ‘bachelor’ means!  Indeed, should a 
chemist propose revising the test for acids in the light of better theory—perhaps 
reversing the dependency of certain tests—this would not per se constitute a 
change in the meaning; by contrast, should, say, a feminist propose, in the light of 
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better politics, revising ‘bachelor’ to include women, this obviously would.  
(forthcoming b, p. 30, original emphasis)   
Part of Rey’s point here is not only that one-criterionhood isn’t sufficient for seeming 
analytic, but also that the analytic would seem to be required for explaining why some 
ways of telling asymmetrically depend upon others.  One wants to know why asking 
John’s friend as a way of telling depends upon checking John’s gender and marriage 
status as a way of telling, and the most plausible explanation is that the content of 
BACHELOR just is unmarried male.  If this is right, then Fodor can’t help himself to the 
idea that some criteria are asymmetrically dependent on others in explaining away our 
analytic intuitions, since analyticity itself is needed to explain just such asymmetric 
dependence. 
 Rey also points out that both relatively abstract concepts such as FREEDOM and 
KNOWLEDGE, and empty concepts like DEMON pose a prima facie problem for Fodor’s 
account.  For although we clearly have analytic intuitions concerning these concepts, they 
don’t seem to be one-criterion concepts.  We have analytic intuitions concerning 
FREEDOM and KNOWLEDGE, yet we just as clearly don’t have even one adequate criterion 
for either of them.  Perhaps we have some necessary conditions on their application, but 
nothing that’s criterial.  Similarly, we have analytic intuitions concerning DEMON, yet 
there isn’t obviously any way to tell whether something is a demon. 
 I want to conclude this section by considering one more attempt to explain away 
our analytic intuitions, which is found in Margolis and Laurence’s (2003) recent paper 
“Should We Trust Our Intuitions? Deflationary Accounts of the Analytic Data”.  For not 
only are Margolis and Laurence notable Quineans about concepts, but theirs is (to my 
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knowledge) the only other extant attempt to explain away our analytic intuitions, i.e. to 
provide what they call a “deflationary” as opposed to a “face-value” account of the 
analytic data.  If we can show that their account is inadequate, then we will have shown 
that the alternative explanation that posits genuine constitutive connections among 
concepts is still in the running.  Indeed, if I’m right that none of the extant Quinean 
accounts of the seeming analytic—Quine’s, Fodor’s, or Margolis and Laurence’s—is 
adequate, then, assuming there are no other Quinean alternatives, then the hypothesis of 
constitutive connections is the only other available alternative.  Showing that these 
accounts are inadequate thus provides powerful evidence in favor of the analytic, and 
thus an empirically motivated Judgment Pragmatism.   
Let’s begin by noting, with Margolis and Laurence, that face-value theorists must 
posit some psychological mechanism whereby the putative analyticities generate our 
analytic intuitions.  I suspect that some philosophers who are enthusiastic about the role 
of intuitions in philosophical enquiry don’t realize that they’re committed to the existence 
of some mechanism that links our intuitions and the concepts that they putatively reveal 
the nature of.  For in many areas of philosophy it seems to be simply taken for granted 
that consulting our intuitions reveals the nature of our concepts (and presumably the 
things in the world they pick out).  But, someone might ask, why think that our intuitions 
reveal anything about the nature of concepts?  Alvin Goldman and Joel Pust (1998) 
would reply that it’s “almost a matter of definition … [that] a concept tends to be 
manifested by intuitions that reflect or express its content” (p. 188, original emphasis). 
But to their credit, Goldman and Pust don’t posit a mysterious “faculty of 
intuition” (as some recent conceptual analysts have done) reminiscent of the claims of 
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some traditional rationalists.  For they go on to say that there’s good reason to posit some 
psychological mechanism that links our concepts and intuitions:  
[A]lthough we do not currently know the precise causal route that connects 
concept structures with their conscious manifestations, it is extremely plausible, 
from any reasonable cognitive-science perspective, that there should be such a 
causal route.  (Goldman and Pust 1998, p. 188) 
This point is worth bearing in mind, since it’s an empirical commitment of the 
explanatory argument for analyticity that I’m defending.  The argument that our analytic 
intuitions provide data the best explanation of which is that there are genuine constitutive 
connections among our concepts, requires that there be a mechanism of some sort that 
links the analyticities themselves with our intuitions of analyticity. 
The key idea of Margolis and Laurence’s paper, however, is that once a 
psychological mechanism is posited to explain our intuitions, deflationary accounts, 
which attempt to explain away the analytic data, can co-opt the very same explanatory 
mechanism, but without positing any analyticities!  Their strategy is thus to make explicit 
an empirical commitment of face-value accounts, and then to argue that that very 
commitment shows that the analyticities themselves are not doing any explanatory work 
in face-value theories.  While I think Margolis and Laurence are absolutely correct in 
drawing attention to the explanatory burden face-value theorists face, I do not think they 
have succeeded in showing that analyticities themselves are explanatorily useless.  In the 
remainder of this section I explain why.   
Margolis and Laurence consider two possible mechanisms that might generate our 
analytic intuitions, one ‘theory-based’ and one ‘similarity-based’.  Since the difference 
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between these is irrelevant for our purposes, I’ll focus on the theory-based account.6  On 
this view, our analytic intuitions are generated by what they call an “implicit theory of 
meaning”.  Such a theory might be developed along the lines of Jackson (1998), who 
takes our intuitions to reflect a “folk theory” of the relevant kinds, in much the way that 
“folk psychology” is taken to underwrite our inferences and judgments concerning the 
mental states of others.7 In my view, Jackson is motivated by exactly the right reason:  
[O]ur classifications of things into categories … is not done at random and is not 
a miracle.  There are patterns underlying our conceptual competence.  They are 
often hard to find … but they must be there to be found.  (1998, p. 64) 
Of course, one needn’t agree with Jackson that the implicit theory is a folk theory, but the 
difficulty of coming up with analyses does at least suggest that the theory is in some 
sense implicit.  Recall from Chapter 5, for instance, the difficulty in providing an analysis 
of the concept PAINTStr (!); and when it comes to concepts such as KNOWLEDGE or 
FREEDOM it notoriously becomes even more difficult to provide analyses.  However we 
understand it, though, Margolis and Laurence tell us that the implicit theory “takes 
categorization judgments as input and generates, among other things, judgments that 
certain claims have a special status owing to the meaning of their constituent terms” 
(2003, p. 15).  When we reflect on the patterns we find in our judgments, the principles of 
the implicit theory thus serve to generate what we take to be intuitions of analyticity.   
                                                 
6
 They describe the similarity-based account as follows: “[I]nstead of an implicit theory that generates 
intuitions of analyticity, there is a psychological mechanism embodying a similarity metric that classifies 
categorization judgments as being more or less alike.  According to this classification, claims that are 
analytic constitute a natural similarity class.  For example, Bachelors are unmarried would be judged to be 
more like vixens are female than either would be judged to be like grass is green.  This gives rise to the 
intuition that claims that are analytic constitute a special class” (Margolis and Laurence, 2003, p. 16). 
7
 Jackson explains his view as follows: “My intuitions about which possible cases to describe as cases of K-
hood, to describe using the term ‘K’, reveal my theory of K-hood (remembering, but suppressing in the 
interests of keeping things simple, that this ‘revelation’ may be far from straightforward).  In as much as 
my intuitions are shared by the folk, they reveal the folk theory” (1998, p. 37).   
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 Once such a theory is posited, however, Margolis and Laurence claim that the 
analyticities themselves become unnecessary.  They argue as follows: 
[D]eflationists can simply mimic the face value accounts without committing 
themselves to any real analyticities.  The models canvassed in the previous 
section [i.e. the ‘implicit theory’ and ‘similarity-based’ models] are all 
psychological accounts of the genesis of intuitions; they make no essential appeal 
to the existence of analyticities.  As a result, deflationists are free to co-opt those 
models more or less wholesale.  (2003, p. 17, original emphasis)   
Note the oddity of Margolis and Laurence’s remark here.  Since the mechanisms that 
generate our intuitions are psychological in nature, they claim, such mechanisms do not 
involve an ‘essential appeal to the existence of analyticities’.  But why the contrast 
between psychology and analyticity?  The whole point of the Chomskyan analogy and the 
explanatory argument for the existence of analyticity is to put the analytic/synthetic 
distinction on a par with the other posits of our best psychological theory.  There are, of 
course, those who don’t take Chomskyan linguistics to be part of cognitive psychology 
(Devitt and Sterelny 1989, Devitt forthcoming), and these theorists would perhaps cut off 
the Chomskyan strategy before it could even begin.  But surely Margolis and Laurence 
do not want to rest their argument against the empirical case for the analytic on that, 
especially since Laurence has argued to the contrary elsewhere (Laurence 2003).  One 
immediately wonders, then, whether Margolis and Laurence have taken to heart the 
implication of the explanatory argument they’re criticizing, namely, that analyticity be 
psychologized.   
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 They continue their argument by considering how the deflationary theorist could 
co-opt the face-value theorist’s implicit theory: 
On these models, intuitions of analyticity are the product of an implicit theory 
which takes sets of categorization judgments as input and delivers as output 
intuitions of analyticity.  Nowhere in these models is an appeal made to actual 
analyticities.  So a deflationist can happily adopt such a model, while denying that 
there are any analyticities.  The implicit theory may imply that certain claims are 
analytic, but who’s to say that it’s right?  The theory doesn’t have to be true in 
order to be explanatory; people would have the very same intuitions either way.  
In other words, analyticity per se does no explanatory work in accounting for our 
intuitions of the seeming analytic.  (2003, p. 17, first emphasis added) 
Again, it seems to me that Margolis and Laurence have not realized an important 
implication of the view they’re attempting to undermine.  Recall from our earlier 
discussion that the Chomskyan analogy allows for an interesting divergence between 
what’s analytic and what’s true.  For what’s analytic, on this view, is a matter of what the 
empirical facts about the structure and contents of our minds turn out to be.  There’s thus 
no reason for thinking that analyticities, so conceived, must be true.  (Recall Rey’s nice 
example of “thinking things are alive”.) Margolis and Laurence, then, are absolutely right 
that an implicit theory that explains the genesis of our analytic intuitions wouldn’t have to 
be true in order to be explanatory.  But this is not to the point.  For the fact that a false 
theory would be just as explanatory as a true theory doesn’t show that analyticities 
themselves are unnecessary in explaining the analytic data, except under the assumption 
that analyticities are ‘true in virtue of meaning’.  But although this is perhaps a traditional 
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conception of analyticity, it is precisely what the explanatory defense of the analytic is 
suggesting that we abandon.  To psychologize analyticity is to give up on its necessary 
connection to truth.  Of course, our best theory of the world might have it that some 
claims are both analytic and true, but they don’t, as it were, ‘inherit’ their truth from their 
analyticity.  Contra Margolis and Laurence, then, the mere fact that the principles of an 
implicit theory may turn out to be false does not show that such principles can’t engender 
analyticities.   
 
Concepts, Perceptual Judgments, and Analyticity Revisited  
I’ve been defending the explanatory argument for the existence of constitutive 
connections among concepts.  We’ve seen that the fact that there are convergences in 
peoples’ judgments about statements such as (1)-(17) provides a powerful explanatory 
basis for the claim that there are analytic rules governing our competence with the 
relevant concepts.  Moreover, we’ve seen that the alternative explanations of this data—
Quine’s, Fodor’s, and Margolis and Laurence’s—are all inadequate in some way.  In this 
section, I want to consider whether this explanatory strategy will be of any help to 
Concept Pragmatists who believe that there are constitutive connections between some 
concepts and perceptual judgments.  In other words, I’m interested in whether we’re now 
in a position to meet the Quinean Challenge with respect to recognitional concepts that 
we considered in Chapter 4.   
To begin, note that the analytic connections that we’ve been discussing so far are 
such that there will plausibly be plenty of data that is clearly relevant to the question of 
whether there are such connections.  For people clearly have intuitions about (1)-(17) and 
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the like.  But is there similar evidence in the case of the putative constitutive-connections 
between certain concepts and perceptual judgments?  Consider the claim that there’s a 
constitutive connection between the concept RED and judging that’s red in certain 
conditions.  As we saw in Chapter 4, Peacocke is surely correct in saying that it’s 
plausible that a thinker who is staring at a red object (in good lighting conditions, with a 
properly functioning perceptual system, etc.) but is unwilling to judge that the object is 
red, lacks the concept RED.  However, I argued in Chapter 4 that such plausibility is of no 
use in attempting to convince a Cartesian that there’s a constitutive link between the 
concept and the perceptual judgment.  What we’re after now is some data that can 
provide an explanatory basis for postulating such a constitutive connection, which, unlike 
appeals to what’s plausible or obvious, the theorist interested in concepts for the purposes 
of psychological explanation has reason to take seriously. 
Now, I suspect that most people share Peacocke’s intuitions that in order to 
possess certain concepts (e.g. RED, DESK, etc.), one must be willing to make certain 
perceptual judgments (e.g. that’s red, that’s a desk, etc.) when having experiences of 
certain kind (e.g. of a red object, of a desk, etc.).  That is, it’s plausible that people’s 
judgments will converge on the claim that certain concepts are such that you can tell 
whether they apply just by looking.  But they obviously won’t have such intuitions for 
certain other concepts.  I take it that no one thinks that if you possess BACHELOR, then 
you can tell just by looking whether someone’s a bachelor.  Is the fact that thinkers will 
converge on such judgments enough to provide an explanatory basis for the existence of a 
certain class of recognitional concepts?  One might think so.  For it’s prima facie 
plausible that if we can provide an explanatory basis for the existence of constitutive 
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connections among concepts (e.g., BACHELOR’s being constitutively connected to 
UNMARRIED MALE, etc.), then a similar basis can be provided for the existence of 
constitutive connections among certain concepts and perceptual judgments.   
Paul Horwich, for instance, begins a recent article with some examples of the sort 
of thing the Concept Pragmatist takes to concept-constitutive, and recognitional concepts 
are included as a matter of course: 
For the sake of concreteness (and to a very first approximation) here are some 
examples of the sort of meaning-constitution claims that may issue from [the use 
theory of meaning/Concept Pragmatism]: 
“true” means what it does to us in virtue of our provisional underived acceptance 
of instances of the schema, “<p> is true ↔ p” 
“bachelors”’s meaning is engendered by our underived acceptance of the sentence 
“The bachelors are the unmarried men” 
“red”’s meaning stems from our underived propensity to accept “That is red” in 
response to the sort of visual experience normally provoked by observing a 
clearly red surface 
… 
“and” means what it does in virtue of our underived acceptance of the two-way 
argument schema, “p, q // p and q”.  (2004, pp. 351-352)   
Many Concept Pragmatists will no doubt join Horwich in taking the concept-constitutive 
roles for recognitional concepts to be on a par with the constitutive roles for non-
recognitional concepts, at least to the extent that they think that the same kind of evidence 
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that exists for one exists for the other.  Thus if there’s an explanatory basis for one, the 
idea would go, there ought to be an explanatory basis for the other.   
 While I feel the pull of this, it seems to me that there’s a striking difference 
between the sort of data that exists for the concept-constitutive roles of recognitional 
concepts like RED, and the data that exists for the roles of non-recognitional concepts like 
GOOD or BACHELOR.  While thinkers clearly do have intuitions about what’s constitutive 
of something’s being good, or something’s being a bachelor, it’s not clear that they have 
intuitions concerning what’s constitutive of the concept RED.  For that simply doesn’t 
seem to be the kind of thing that thinkers have intuitions about.  Ask people whether 
something could be red without being colored, and most will find it unintelligible.  But 
ask them whether something could be the concept RED if it didn’t bear any relation to 
perceptual judgments or beliefs, and I suspect that most people won’t know quite what to 
say.  Speaking for myself, I simply don’t have intuitions about this.  
It’s thus important to distinguish two questions here, the conflation of which I 
suspect leads Concept Pragmatists to treat the evidential basis of recognitional concepts 
as on a par with the evidential basis of non-recognitional ones:  
(A) Could a thinker possess RED without being willing (or disposed) to judge 
that’s red when having an experience of an object as red? 
(B) Could something be the concept RED if it weren’t tied to perceptual 
judgments? 
People plausibly have intuitions about (A), and will say “no”.  This is exactly the kind of 
data that Peacocke invokes in his argument that appeals to examples.  As we’ve seen, it’s 
intuitive that someone who (in good lighting conditions, etc.) is having an experience of 
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an object as red, but is not willing to judge that’s red, does not possess the concept RED.  
Peacocke’s theoretical claim that such perceptual judgments figure in the possession 
conditions for recognitional concepts thus has intuitive support.  But again, as we saw in 
Chapter 4, these intuitions can plausibly be given an alternative Quinean/Cartesian 
explanation, which does not involve positing a constitutive connection between RED and 
the perceptual judgment.  For these intuitions might just as well be taken to reflect the 
nature of our concept PERCEIVE AS—e.g., that it is constitutively tied to JUDGE THAT, or 
BELIEVE THAT, as I take it standard functionalism about mental states implies.  Or, 
instead of taking them to reflect something about our mental-state concepts, they might 
be taken to reflect our best guesses as to the metaphysics of perceiving as, or judging 
that.   
It seems to me, then, that in order for Concept Pragmatist to meet the 
Quinean/Cartesian challenge for recognitional concepts on explanatory grounds, it must 
be the case that people have intuitions about (B), and in particular that they converge on 
“no”.  This would constitute data that would bear on the question of whether something 
could be the concept RED if it weren’t constitutively connected to perceptual judgments, 
and thus on the very issue that divides Cartesians and Pragmatists with respect to 
recognitional concepts.  For that issue is the metaphysical one of whether it’s constitutive 
of the concept itself that it’s connected to perceptual judgment.  Both Cartesians and 
Pragmatists agree that it’s intuitively plausible that one who fails to make certain 
perceptual judgments does not possess the concept RED.  But appealing to data 
concerning people’s intuitions about whether someone could possess RED if they weren’t 
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willing to make certain perceptual judgments can’t settle the issue of what constitutes the 
concept itself.  Data concerning peoples’ judgments (B) would seem to be required.   
After all, the Cartesian claims that RED does not have any possession 
conditions—or, if you prefer, that the only condition on thinkers’ possessing RED is that 
they have the corresponding mental representation that allows them to think thoughts 
about red—and thus that it’s metaphysically possible not only that a mind could possess 
RED and no other concepts, but also that a mind could possess RED without having any 
perceptual apparatus whatsoever.  A mind, according to this metaphysical view, thus 
could possess RED and yet be incapable of making a perceptual judgment that something 
is red.  Recall here Fodor’s point about “Informational Theology”: God’s thoughts could 
have immediate semantic access to being red (Fodor 1998a, p. 79).  That is, God’s 
thoughts about red might be unmediated by epistemic capacities of any kind.  While I do 
not find such extreme Cartesian Atomism plausible, my finding it so is plausibly not a 
result of consulting my intuitions.  My nervous system doesn’t tell me that there’s 
“something odd” about Fodor’s claim, in the way it tells me there’s something odd about 
the possibility of an object that’s red but not colored, or a married bachelor.  I suspect 
that other thinkers’ intuitions are the same on this score. 
The point here is that while the Chomskyan, explanatory strategy for defending 
constitutive connections among concepts has a fighting chance against the skepticism of 
Quine and Fodor, it’s far from clear that strategy will work in defending constitutive 
connections between concepts and perceptual judgments.  This will come as no surprise 
to Fodor.  For he argues not only that there isn’t any empirical evidence in favor of 
recognitional concepts, but that there’s in fact quite strong empirical evidence against 
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them.  In particular, Fodor thinks that “it’s sort of provable that there aren’t any 
recognitional concepts” (1998c, p. 36), since they’re existence, he thinks, is incompatible 
with the fact that concepts are productive and systematic.8 I don’t wish to engage with 
Fodor over the compositionality of recognitional concepts.9 For even if it can be shown 
that recognitional concepts are compatible with a principle of compositionality that’s 
strong enough to explain the productivity and systematicity of thought, there’s still the 
prior question of whether such concepts exist.  If the above considerations are correct, 
then the Quinean challenge that Peacocke and other Concept Pragmatists face with 
respect to recognitional concepts can’t be met on the kind of explanatory grounds 
suggested by the Chomskyan analogy. 
There’s a further promising move the defender of recognitional concepts could 
make at this point, which is consistent with the broadly Quinean strategy we’ve been 
considering.10 This move depends on an assumption concerning the relation between laws 
of nature and properties, namely, that the genuine properties and relations that exist are 
those that figure in laws of nature.  On this view, there is not a property corresponding to 
every predicate of natural language, nor even most predicates.  Rather, the number of 
genuine properties is much smaller than the number of predicates, and is determined by 
the laws that exist at a world.11 In the case of mental properties, then, the idea would be 
that the mental properties that exist—or, if you prefer, the mental predicates that pick out 
genuine natural kinds—are those that figure in genuine psychological laws. 
                                                 
8
 See also Fodor (1998d) and Fodor and Lepore (2002). 
9
 It seems to me that there are plausible moves that Concept Pragmatists can make here, though.  See, for 
example, Grandy (1998), Horgan (1998), Carruthers (2000), Prinz (2002), and Robbins (2002).   
10
 Thanks to Peter Carruthers for the suggestion, and for a discussion that prompted the next few 
paragraphs.   
11
 See Lewis (1983) and Armstrong (1997) for a defense of so-called “sparse” conceptions of properties.  I 
once heard Barry Loewer (at a talk given to the UMD philosophy department) say that properties and laws 
are a “package deal”.  This nicely describes the view I have in mind.     
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Now, one might make use of this idea in defending the existence of recognitional 
concepts on empirical grounds.  For if there are psychological laws that relate certain 
concepts to percepts, then, given the assumption above, there are plausibly constitutive 
connections between the two.  And concepts that bear constitutive connections to 
percepts are, of course, recognitional concepts.  For instance, suppose it’s a psychological 
law that (ceteris paribus) in a normal functioning human, the concept RED will come to 
be entokened when one has an experience that represents something as red.  Since the 
law picks out the states by reference to their contents, the law could be taken to describe a 
constitutive connection between experiences of that type and judgments of that type.  We 
thus ought to believe that RED is a recognitional concept, the thought goes, because 
there’s a psychological law that describes the relation it bears to percepts.  Rather than 
appealing to empirical facts about the intuitions and considered judgments of thinkers, 
this strategy appeals to the empirical fact that there are psychological laws that describe 
how certain concepts are related to perception.    
As I said, I think this is a promising move.  I’m not entirely sure, though, that it 
will convince a Cartesian.  Note, first, that Cartesians can happily admit that the genuine 
mental properties are those that figure in laws of nature.  Moreover, Cartesians can admit 
that when someone judges that’s red as a result of perceiving something as red, this event 
is subsumed by a genuine psychological law.  However, one prima facie worry with this 
way of defending recognitional concepts is that it apparently requires the existence of so 
many psychological laws.  For I suspect that if there are any recognitional concepts, then 
there are lots of them.  The putative class of recognitional concepts presumably includes 
not only color concepts, but the other response-dependent concepts, as well as some 
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artifact concepts too.  Are there really so many such laws, one for each recognitional 
concept and the corresponding percept?   
The Cartesian might insist that what’s going on is that the instances of all of these 
distinct (putative) laws are actually instances of a more general law that holds between 
perception and judgment, which does not pick out the respective states in terms of their 
contents.  Rather, they might claim that the law simply describes a relation that holds 
between perceptual states and judgment states, not their contents.12 The psychological 
law would thus describe how the perceptual system and judgment/belief system are 
causally related: the outputs of the former are received as inputs to the latter, and cause 
states in such a way that respect their contents (e.g., if you experience the apple as red, 
then you come to believe that it’s red, etc.), even though it doesn’t type the states in 
terms of their content.  The law, so conceived, thus wouldn’t warrant the claim that there 
are constitutive connections between some concepts and percepts, i.e. that there are 
recognitional concepts.   
Not only does this view have the virtue of simplicity, but one might claim that 
there’s no loss of explanatory power either.  For perhaps the instances of the diverse 
(putative) laws can all be explained by positing the general law that holds between the 
states.  The law could be put as follows:  If one perceives something as an F, then (ceteris 
paribus) one will (be willing to) judge that it’s an F.  Any particular instance of a 
perceptual state leading to a judgment state, in a content-respecting way, could thus be 
subsumed under this general law.   
                                                 
12
 This reply is reminiscent of the reply to Peacocke’s appeal to examples that I offered on behalf of the 
Cartesian in Chapter 4.  
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A potential problem here, though, is that there must be some way of delimiting the 
range of the general law, since not all concepts are such that one is willing to non-
inferentially apply them on the basis of having certain experiences.  The concepts QUARK 
and ELECTRON, for instance, are obviously not recognitional, since scientists apply them 
on the basis of experience by presupposing massive amounts of theory.  Such judgments 
are thus clearly inferential.  And the defender of recognitional concepts may argue that in 
order to capture the distinction between these sorts of concepts and concepts like RED, 
one must posit more specific laws that do make essential reference to the contents of the 
states they subsume.  If an argument along these lines can be developed and defended, 
then perhaps there is an explanatory basis for recognitional concepts after all, although 
one of a different kind than that suggested by the Chomskyan analogy. 
 
Peacocke’s Recent Remarks on Analyticity  
In his recent paper “Three Principles of Rationalism” and also in his book The Realm of 
Reason, Peacocke argues that the Quinean challenge does not threaten the kind of 
Concept Pragmatism he favors.  But his arguments are quite different from those I 
offered in Chapter 5.  For Peacocke makes the surprising claim that his views carry no 
commitment to an analytic/synthetic distinction that either Quine or Fodor ought to find 
objectionable.  Since this may come as a bit of a shock given everything I’ve said up to 
this point (and rightly so!), I want to conclude this chapter by considering Peacocke’s 
recent claims in a bit more detail.    
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Consider the following passage, in which Peacocke is responding to a recent 
essay of Fodor’s, in which he (Fodor) makes his usual points about Concept Pragmatism 
presupposing an analytic/synthetic distinction it doesn’t know how to draw: 
Fodor may be surprised by the extent of my agreement with his points about the 
analytic/synthetic distinction.  The reason that this agreement can exist without 
incoherence is that we ought to distinguish very sharply between a theory of the 
analytic and a theory of the a priori.  An attack on the applicability and the very 
intelligibility of the notion of the analytic, the idea of truth purely in virtue of 
meaning, is not thereby an attack on the applicability and intelligibility of the a 
priori.  (Peacocke 2004b, p. 92, my emphasis)   
This passage is telling, for it illustrates that Peacocke takes Quine’s arguments against 
analyticity to be directed at what Boghossian calls the “metaphysical notion of 
analyticity,” according to which a proposition S is analytic if and only if S owes its truth 
value completely to its meaning, and not at all to the “facts” (1996, p. 363).  Peacocke 
makes clear that he joins Quine in rejecting the metaphysical notion of analyticity:   
Fourteen years before ‘Two Dogmas’ Quine had already in ‘Truth by Convention’ 
argued against the idea that any sentence could be true by convention, or indeed 
true purely in virtue of meaning alone.  In my judgement, the arguments Quine 
gave there, and especially those given later in ‘Carnap and Logical Truth’, 
constitute one of his most enduring contributions to philosophy.  To make clear 
what it is that I will later be opposing to Quine’s vision I should say that my own 
view … is that Quine’s arguments in ‘Truth by Convention’ and ‘Carnap and 
Logical Truth’ are decisive.  …  Contemporary theorists … should not be 
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involved with the uninstantiated and uninstantiable notion of ‘true purely in virtue 
of meaning’.  (2004a, p. 27) 
Indeed, I think it’s fair to say that the received view in philosophy—shared by Quineans 
and non-Quineans alike—is that Quine definitively showed that the idea of a proposition 
(or statement) that is true solely in virtue of its meaning ought to be abandoned.13 
Why did Carnap and the other positivists to whom Quine was reacting accept the 
metaphysical notion of analyticity?  As Boghossian (1996) points out, it’s because in 
addition to providing an analytic theory of a priori knowledge, they were also concerned 
to provide a linguistic theory of necessity.  Necessary truths, they hoped to show, were 
the result of conventional decisions about how we use language.  What drove them to this 
was their fear of admitting the existence of necessities in the world, which they regarded 
as metaphysical and mysterious.  Nowadays, and perhaps somewhat ironically, it seems 
that the idea of truth solely in virtue of meaning is regarded as more mysterious than the 
necessity it was introduced to explain away. 
Quite apart from Quine’s attack on convention in “Truth by Convention” and 
“Carnap and Logical Truth”, the linguistic theory of necessity, like the metaphysical 
notion analyticity it invokes, can seem obviously wrong.  As Boghossian says: 
                                                 
13
 Consider the following rhetorical questions of Boghossian’s: “What could it possibly mean to say that the 
truth of a statement is fixed exclusively by its meaning and not by the facts?  Isn’t it in general true—
indeed isn’t it in general a truism—that for any statement S, S is true iff for some p, S means that p and p?  
How could the mere fact that S means that p make it the case that S is true?  Doesn’t it also have to be the 
case that p?” (1996, p. 364, original emphasis).  Pietroski, another defender of analyticity, also rejects the 
metaphysical notion of analyticity: “If a sentence is true by virtue of anything it is true by virtue of how the 
world is.  A sentence is true when the world is the way the sentence says it is” (2003b, p. 181).  Horwich 
also rejects metaphysical analyticity: “the truth of any sentence will inevitably depend, not merely on what 
it means—on what proposition it expresses—but also on whether that proposition is true” (1998, p. 152, 
original emphasis).  Some Quineans go on to make the further point that this is true not only of sentences 
like ‘bachelors are unmarried’ or ‘cats are animals’, but logical truths as well.  Harman asks, rhetorically: 
“[W]hy doesn’t the truth expressed by “Copper is copper” depend in part on the general fact that everything 
is self-identical?” (1999, p. 119).  Devitt concurs: “In virtue of what is ‘All unmarrieds are unmarried’ true?  
The localist could, and I think should, answer as follows: it is true partly in virtue of what it means and 
partly in virtue of the way the world is, the fact that all unmarrieds are unmarried” (1996, p. 22). 
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In general, I have no idea what would constitute a better answer to the question: 
What is responsible for the truth of a given class of statements? than something 
bland like ‘the world’ or ‘the facts’; and … I cannot see how a good answer might 
be framed in terms of meaning, or convention, in particular.  (1996, p. 365) 
Rey, too, thinks that the positivist appeal to convention was hopeless, right from the start.  
Commenting on Carnap’s claim that the reason that being married and being a bachelor 
are necessarily incompatible properties is that it’s specified by the relevant meaning 
postulates, Rey says: 
It’s one thing to think that the relations of words to reality is conventional, quite 
another to think this of the relations among the concepts or properties themselves 
(if it is up to us whether being a bachelor is compatible with being married, why 
not choose to be both?!).  (1993a, p. 66, original emphasis) 
Peacocke shares the view of Boghossian and Rey, and agrees that a defense of the 
analytic and a priori need have no truck with conventionalism, stressing that his 
alternative to Quine “is emphatically not a variant of a Carnapian approach” (2004a, p. 
51).   
 How, then, does Peacocke respond to the Quinean challenge?  As far as I can tell, 
his response to Quine in The Realm of Reason is two-pronged.  First, he points out that 
Quine’s argument has a lacuna, and does not rule out his kind of Concept Pragmatism, 
with its attendant claims about the a priori.  Second, he spells out a detailed rationalistic 
alternative to Quine’s picture, which he claims is “an elaboration and generalization of 
the classical rationalist tradition present in different forms in Leibniz, Frege, and some 
parts of Gödel” (2004a, p. 51).  The first prong is meant to show that Quine’s arguments 
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don’t rule out the kind of position Peacocke favors, and the second prong is meant to 
show that there is a viable, non-Quinean alternative when it comes to providing a theory 
of meaning and epistemology.  For our purposes, the details of Peacocke’s alternative do 
not matter.  Rather, I want to say a few things about the first prong of his response to 
Quine.   
 We’ve already seen some of shortcomings of Quine’s arguments, and Peacocke 
points out that Quine essentially assumes the verificationist claim that “an a priori content 
is one whose meaning-constituting evidential conditions are always confirmed by the 
evidence” (2004a, p. 33).  Peacocke claims that a truth-conditional theory of content, 
which does not take content to be exhausted by evidential relations, is thus not vulnerable 
to Quine’s attack.  In fact, Peacocke argues in detail that truth-conditional theories of 
content have the resources to solve the problems that plague verificationism (2004a, pp. 
34-51).  Peacocke thus rightfully joins Quine in rejecting the metaphysical notion of 
analyticity, and goes on to claim that a priori contents are true, at least in part, in virtue 
of their truth-conditions obtaining:  
[A]n outright a priori method of coming to accept a given content p is one with 
the following distinctive property.  It is entailed by the possession-conditions for 
the concepts composing p, together with the way their semantic values are 
determined, their mode of combination in the content p, that use of the given 
method guarantees that p will be true in any world in which the method is applied.  
(2004a, p. 33)   
Rejecting the metaphysical notion of analyticity, Peacocke is apparently claiming, leaves 
it open that there could be a priori contents, whose a priori status is explained by the 
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possession conditions of the concepts that make them up, and which are true in virtue of 
their truth-conditions holding.  Peacocke thus says that “the Quinean critique of 
analyticity, both in its epistemological and its constitutive aspects, does not carry over to 
those approaches to the a priori which reject the notion of analyticity” (2004b, p. 93).   
However, assuming I’ve understood him correctly, there are problems with 
Peacocke’s proposal.  First off, note the somewhat odd character of the dialectic.  At least 
since the publication of A Study of Concepts, critics have pointed out that Peacocke’s 
theory of concepts owes an answer to the Quinean challenge.14 And I argued in Chapter 4 
that his most recent attempts to distinguish constitutive from non-constitutive conceptual 
roles—namely, his appeal to examples—is question-begging against Quine and Fodor.  
But now, Peacocke is apparently claiming that he in fact agrees with Quine and Fodor 
that there are no analyticities!  So we have, on the one hand, Peacocke’s critics claiming 
that his proposed possession-conditions commit him to an analytic/synthetic distinction, 
which makes him vulnerable to the Quinean challenge.  On the other hand, Peacocke 
himself is apparently claiming that his view is not vulnerable to the Quinean challenge 
precisely because he agrees with Fodor and Quine that there are no analyticities.  What is 
going on?   
A plausible diagnosis, it seems to me, is that Peacocke and his Quinean critics 
(including me) are, at least to some extent, talking past one another.  What bothers Fodor 
                                                 
14
 Even Boghossian says that Peacocke’s appeal to roles that thinkers find primitively compelling won’t 
work: “[T]hese conditions are insufficient for answering the Quinean challenge: a non-constitutive, though 
highly obvious, form of inference may also be found compelling because of its form, and not on the basis 
of inference from anything else.  So these conditions cannot be what distinguish between a constitutive and 
a non-constitutive inference” (1996, p. 391n38).  Later in the same paper, Boghossian says that he doesn’t 
have a fully thought-through proposal about how to distinguish constitutive from non-constitutive roles, but 
somewhat puzzlingly tells us in a footnote to see Peacocke’s A Study of Concepts “for a good start” (1996, 
p. 391n43, my emphasis).  Needles to say, it’s not clear how to square these claims.  I take this as further 
evidence that the issues in this neck of the woods are incredibly difficult and not all that well understood.  
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and other Quineans about Peacocke’s proposal isn’t that it’s committed to the existence 
of analyticities, understood in the metaphysical sense.  That is, Quineans do not claim 
that Peacocke’s project founders because it’s committed to the existence of truths that are 
true in virtue of meaning alone, i.e. metaphysical analyticities.15  Rather, what worries 
Quineans is that Peacocke is committed to an epistemic notion of analyticity, i.e. a notion 
of analyticity that is meant to do justificatory work.   
Consider, for example, Peacocke’s claim that certain contents can be known a 
priori, in part, because the concepts that make them up have the possession conditions 
that they do: “I think the a priori is possible only because certain principles and 
transitions are mentioned in the possession condition for a given concept” (2004b, p. 93).  
Indeed, according to the Moderate Rationalism defended in The Realm of Reason, “for 
any a priori way of coming to know a given content there is a substantive explanation of 
why it is an a priori way of coming to know that content, an explanation which involves 
the nature of the concepts in the given content” (2004a, p. 155).  As we’ve seen, in taking 
certain principles and transitions (or roles) to be concept-constitutive, it seems that 
Peacocke is committed to an analytic/synthetic distinction.  And the present point is that 
the distinction Peacocke needs here is presumably epistemic.  
There are, I think, two dimensions to the epistemic nature of such analyticities.  
First, as we just noted, Peacocke takes the concept-constitutive roles to underwrite our a 
priori knowledge of certain contents.  This is not to say that such concept-constitutive 
roles guarantee the truth of certain contents in which the concepts figure.  I take this to be 
Peacocke’s point in rejecting the notion of ‘truth purely in virtue of meaning’, i.e. 
                                                 
15
 Well, perhaps some of them do claim this, but this is plausibly because the metaphysical and epistemic 
dimensions of analyticity are not distinguished as often as they should be.  
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metaphysical analyticity.  But rejecting metaphysical analyticity, and coupling his claims 
about the possession conditions for certain concepts with a truth-conditional theory of 
content, is not enough to stave off Quinean attacks.  For the analyticities that Peacocke is 
committed to do have epistemic import: they are, after all, part of what makes a priori 
knowledge possible!  Given Peacocke’s Moderate Rationalism, it’s thus very odd to find 
him saying that “we ought to distinguish very sharply between a theory of the analytic 
and a theory of the a priori” (2004b, p. 92).  For according to Moderate Rationalism, it’s 
the constitutive possession-conditions on concepts, which presumably carry a 
commitment to the existence of analyticities, that explain why certain contents can be 
known a priori.  
The second epistemic dimension has to do with the fact that Peacocke takes the 
specification of concept-constitutive roles to be the business of a priori, philosophical 
investigation of concepts.  I argued above that, at least in certain cases, this need not 
commit him to the claim that the lexical concepts have internal structure, or that there are 
analyticities in the concept-containment sense.  However, if certain principles and 
transitions are concept-constitutive, and which of them are so can be discovered a priori, 
then presumably this is a result of their being analytically connected to the concepts.  
That is, Peacocke seems to be committed to the traditional view of analyticities according 
to which they are readily available to competent users of concepts (or perhaps highly 
reflective philosophers).  
But this epistemic notion of analyticity is precisely what Quine and Fodor will 
claim Peacocke can’t presuppose.  For Quine’s challenge to defenders of such a notion is 
to specify a principled distinction between, for example, the transitions in thought that 
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one accepts as a result of the meaning of concepts, and those that one accepts as a result 
of one’s empirical theory of the world.  This is, of course, precisely why those who 
defend analyticities on Quinean, explanatory grounds give up on the traditional epistemic 
role that the analytic was often thought to play.  For by doing so the analytic/synthetic 
distinction becomes just one more piece of our empirical theory of the world.   
 
Conclusion. 
In this chapter I’ve argued that there are good explanatory reasons for believing that there 
are constitutive connections among concepts, and that all of the extant alternative 
explanations of the analytic data are insufficient.  These two arguments, if correct, 
constitute a powerful empirical case for Judgment Pragmatism.  I also argued, however, 
that although there is not a similar kind of explanatory basis for the existence of 
recognitional concepts, there is a promising strategy for defending such concepts on 
explanatory grounds of a different kind, namely, by an appeal to psychological laws.  Of 
course, this strategy needs to be articulated and defended further.  But since neither 
Quine’s nor Fodor’s arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction are decisive, and 
there are good reasons for positing constitutive connections among concepts in general, 
perhaps Pragmatists can assume for the nonce that some concepts are constitutively tied 
to perceptual judgments. 
Furthermore, we’ve just seen that Peacocke’s own recent reply to the Quinean 
challenge apparently misses the mark.  While it’s true that part of the attack on the 
analytic/synthetic distinction involved an attack on the notion of truth solely in virtue of 
meaning, Peacocke can’t reply to Quine merely by pointing out that he avoids any 
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commitment to such a notion.  For Quine challenged not only the metaphysical notion of 
analyticity, but also its epistemic counterpart.  And, as I just suggested, since it appears 
that Peacocke is committed to an epistemic analytic/synthetic distinction, he is thus 
apparently still vulnerable to the Quinean challenge after all.  One of the great virtues of 
taking a theory of concepts to have its proper home in a theory of psychological 
explanation is that it frees Concept Pragmatism from such vulnerability.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
RATIONALITY, CONTENT, AND FORM: THE DIALECTICAL ROLE 
OF FREGE CASES 
 
 
 
The point of appealing to senses in semantic theories is to provide the extra degree of freedom—
the ‘mode of presentation’ of a referent—that allows extensionally distinct belief states to be type-
identical and allows type-distinct belief states to be extensionally identical. My guess is that, when 
all the dust has settled, it will be mental representations—syntactic structures in the Language of 
Thought—that play this semantical role. 
-Jerry Fodor  (1994, p. 24) 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Informational Atomism is a species of semantic theory according to which reference, or 
denotation is all there is to meaning.  In the philosophy of mind and language, such 
theories have a variety of names: ‘Russelianism’, ‘Millianism’, ‘Direct Reference 
Theory’, or ‘the “Fido”-Fido theory’.  What all these views have in common is the idea 
that reference is exhaustive of meaning.1  Such theories claim, for instance, that the 
meaning of a proper name is its bearer, and that the meaning of a predicate is a property.  
For our purposes, this can be put in terms of the corresponding concepts: for instance, the 
content of the concept DANIEL BOONE is the individual, Daniel Boone, and the content of 
the concept PIONEER is the property, being a pioneer.  
There are well known problems with any such purely referential theory of 
meaning.  As we noted in Chapter 1, two problems stand out: those raised by Putnam’s 
Twin-Earth examples, which putatively show that concepts with (what we pre-
                                                 
1
 This is true at the level of primitives, in any case.  Also, it’s worth pointing out that such theorists may 
adopt an inferential role (i.e., non-referential) account of the logical constants, as indeed Fodor (1990) 
himself once did; but see Fodor (2004a).   
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theoretically think of as) the same content can differ in reference, and those raised by so-
called ‘Frege cases’, which putatively show that concepts that differ in content (again, 
pre-theoretically) can nevertheless be identical in reference.  As we noted, Putnam and 
Frege together apparently show that conceptual content and reference are independent in 
both directions.  Any adequate theory of concepts must account for both Twin-Earth 
cases and Frege cases.  In this chapter I put the former to one side and focus on the latter, 
and consider their dialectical role in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept 
Pragmatists.  I ultimately argue against the Cartesian’s treatment of Frege cases, but 
suggest that Peacocke is also mistaken in thinking that they support Knowledge 
Pragmatism.  My suggestion should by now be familiar: Embedding a theory of concepts 
in an explanatory psychology allows for a theory that splits the difference between 
Informational Atomism and Knowledge Pragmatism.   
 
Peacocke’s ‘General Argument’ for Pragmatism 
In Chapter 4, I considered the first of Peacocke’s two arguments for Concept 
Pragmatism—the appeal to particular examples—and argued that it would not convince a 
Cartesian.  Whereas the appeal to examples is (I suggested) best viewed as an argument 
in favor of mere Judgment Pragmatism, Peacocke’s second, ‘general argument’ is meant 
to support the stronger form of Pragmatism, Knowledge Pragmatism.  Recall that the 
distinction here is between a Pragmatism that individuates concepts in terms of mere 
judgment and a Pragmatism that individuates concepts in terms of knowledge (i.e., one 
that posits epistemically individuated concepts).  I take as a starting point this general 
argument for Knowledge Pragmatism, as it will serve as a useful springboard into our 
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discussion of the dialectical role of Frege Cases.  I argue that it presupposes a treatment 
of Frege cases that the Cartesian will deny.  
Peacocke summarizes this argument as follows:  
It is a general argument in support of Fregean IRS [Inferential Role Semantics] 
accounts that they can explain facts about the rationality of making given 
judgments in given circumstances, and thereby, also account for the epistemic 
status of those judgments.   (2000a, pp. 333-334)  
Peacocke’s favorite example involves the concepts SQUARE and (REGULAR-) DIAMOND, 
which are distinct but coreferential recognitional concepts.  It’s prima facie plausible that 
perceiving something as a square, in optimal conditions, rationally requires (a 
willingness to make) the judgment that that’s a square, but not the judgment that that’s a 
diamond.  Indeed, assuming the thinker doesn’t know that being a square and being a 
diamond are identical properties, the latter judgment will be irrational in those 
circumstances.  Moreover, the former judgment will plausibly be justified and count as 
knowledge, whereas the latter judgment, if made, won’t.  
If SQUARE and DIAMOND are epistemically individuated, Peacocke claims, then 
these differences in rationality and epistemic status can be explained.  For, if it’s 
constitutive of SQUARE that judgments that objects are square are rationally non-
discretionary when accompanying perceptions of objects as squares, and constitutive of 
DIAMOND that judgments that objects are diamonds are rationally non-discretionary when 
accompanying perceptions of objects as diamonds, then only the former judgments will 
count as knowledge when thinkers are perceiving objects as squares and taking their 
experience at face value.  Given such considerations, Peacocke claims the following:  
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[W]hen the rationality of some particular transition turns on the identity of the 
particular concepts it involves, the rationality of the transition is grounded 
ultimately in the IRS-involving possession conditions for those particular 
concepts.  In fundamental, constitutive cases, the rationality of the transition can 
be founded in constitutive features which contribute to the individuation of the 
concept and are mentioned in its IRS.  (2000a, p. 334)  
Such an account thus “promotes an integration of the theory of concepts with 
epistemology” (200a, p. 334), which, Peacocke assumes, is a good thing.   
In the context of a debate between a Pragmatist and a Cartesian about concept 
possession, however, Peacocke can’t simply assume that “an integration of the theory of 
concepts with epistemology” is a good thing.  For as we’ve seen, those who approach 
concepts from the perspective of psychological explanation doubt that normative 
epistemology places substantive constraints on a theory of concepts, and will thus be 
reluctant to go in for such integration.  Of course, they needn’t outright deny that 
epistemology places any constraints on a theory of concepts.  If epistemologists discover 
that a judgment’s having some property P is necessary and/or sufficient for its being 
justified, or for a thinker to be entitled to make it (or for it to be rationally non-
discretionary, etc.), then, prima facie, one’s theory of concepts ought not preclude too 
many of our judgments from having P.  For instance, a theory of concepts that implies 
that we’re rarely justified in making perceptual judgments is (ceteris paribus) worse than 
a theory that doesn’t have this implication.  But a theorist can allow this without allowing 
that some concepts are essentially tied to judgments with property P.  That is, a theorist 
can admit that normative epistemology places some minimal constraints on a theory of 
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concepts without admitting the kind of ‘integration’ Peacocke has in mind.  Peacocke 
thus can’t take integration (in his sense) with epistemology as itself a desideratum on a 
theory of concepts.   
I am thus not impressed by Peacocke’s claim that Knowledge Pragmatism ought 
to be endorsed because it can explain epistemological facts about the rationality and 
epistemic status of certain judgments.  But in saying this, someone might object, aren’t I 
implicitly adopting a priori views about which theories explain what facts?  And doesn’t 
this run counter to the approach to the meta-level question about concepts I’ve been 
suggesting we ought to adopt, namely, that one take concepts to have their proper home 
in an explanatory psychology?  After all, if I’m a good Quinean about how we ought to 
approach the task of providing a theory of concepts, then surely I should accept that 
(ceteris paribus) theories that explain more are better than theories that explain less.   
To see how one might respond to this, recall the strategy I suggested for the 
Judgment Pragmatist in Chapter 3.  I claimed that one can draw upon a theory of 
concepts in answering normative questions about the epistemological status of certain 
judgments, but that this needn’t involve a commitment to the claim that the concepts 
themselves are constitutively tied to rationality and knowledge, with all of their 
normative dimensions.  The Judgment Pragmatist thus potentially has the resources 
available to do all of the explanatory work here that needs to be done.  One might then 
make the further claim—implicit in some of Fodor’s discussions—that a theory of 
concepts isn’t the right kind of thing to provide explanations concerning the rationality 
and epistemic status of certain judgments. 
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What explains facts about the rationality and epistemic status of judgments on 
Fodor’s view?  Like his theory of content, Fodor’s epistemology is externalist.  Although 
he rarely discusses issues in epistemology, he hints at various places that he favors some 
or other version of reliabilism.  For instance, consider the following passage, in which 
Fodor discusses the relation between semantic and epistemic access:  
Informational semantics says that it’s because the mediation between dogs and 
DOG-tokens is reliable that there is a community of dog-thinkers, creatures whose 
mental processes fall under the intentional laws about dog-thoughts.  Just so, 
epistemologists (have been known to) say that it’s the reliability of the mediation 
between dogs and one’s dog-thoughts that justifies one’s knowledge claims about 
dogs.  This convergence of views is all to the good, of course; the requirements 
that epistemology places upon epistemic warrant ought to be ones that the theory 
of content allows many of one’s beliefs to actually meet.  (1998a, pp. 75-76, 
original emphasis)   
Applying this to the square/diamond case, the rationality and epistemic status of one’s 
judgment that that’s a square or that’s a diamond will depend upon whether the 
mediation between squares and diamonds and the respective judgments are reliable ones.  
Although one would of course like to see reliabilism worked out in detail, the question of 
whether or not this can be done successfully is moot.2 The important point here is that 
such an account, if it can ultimately be spelled out, will not appeal to the possession 
conditions for concepts in explaining facts about rationality and justification.  
                                                 
2
 Debates about reliabilism concern foundational issues about the form an epistemological theory ought to 
take.  For a representative sample of the large literature on the internalism/externalism debate in 
epistemology, see the papers in Kornblith (2001), and Sosa and BonJour (2003).   
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Now, one might think that it’s a bad idea to rest the defense of one’s theory of 
concepts on an epistemology that’s yet to be worked out in full.  Of course, one can’t 
accuse Fodor here of holding his theory of concepts hostage to particular epistemological 
claims.  But he is committed to claiming that the data Peacocke appeals to in his general 
argument for Knowledge Pragmatism ought to be explained by one’s epistemology, and 
not one’s theory of concepts.  And this alternative explanation requires that there be a 
defensible reliabilist epistemology.  Peacocke expresses his skepticism about the 
prospects of providing such an epistemology as follows:3 
The property of a transition of tending to lead to true judgements (or to do so 
when its premises are true) is not by itself enough to make a transition entitling.  
Pure reliability of a transition is not by itself enough to make the transition 
entitling, as, in my judgement, many examples in the discussion of pure 
reliabilism over the years have shown.  If I am wrong about this, and there is a 
form of pure reliabilism that can capture a rationality requirement, all well and 
good.  For what it is worth, I myself am sceptical that any such form of reliabilism 
exists.  (2004a, pp. 11-12) 
Given the current context, though, Peacocke is surely wrong to suppose that all is ‘well 
and good’ if there’s a form of reliabilism that explains the relevant facts about the 
rationality and epistemic status of judgments.  For this would apparently undermine his 
general argument, since one wouldn’t need to posit epistemically individuated concepts to 
explain the facts he points to.  I take it, then, that the viability of Peacocke’s general 
argument for Knowledge Pragmatism does depend (albeit indirectly) on facts about 
rationality and justification not being reconstructed in reliabilist terms.   
                                                 
3
 Peacocke speaks here in terms of entitlement rather than justification or knowledge, but this is irrelevant. 
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 Elsewhere, when writing in the context of the debate between Cartesianism and 
Pragmatism, Peacocke makes it clear that he does not think Cartesians like Fodor can 
give an explanation of these facts that is ‘outside’ the theory of concepts: 
[N]ot all kinds of reliability yield knowledge, as epistemologists have long 
known, and as the square/regular-diamond example further illustrates.  It seems 
to me that the Fregean IRS theorist has the resources to explain satisfactorily why 
not all kinds of reliability yield knowledge.  I doubt that Fodor’s approach does.  
(2000a, p. 334) 
What, exactly, is the crucial fact here that needs explaining?  What would it be for ‘not 
all kinds of reliability to yield knowledge’?  Here’s what I think is at issue.  Consider 
again the square/diamond case: the judgment that that’s a diamond will be reliably true 
given a perception that represents something as a square; this is true even though, in the 
given circumstances, the judgment that that’s a square will count as knowledge and the 
judgment that that’s a diamond won’t.  It’s this fact—and presumably other facts like 
it—that Peacocke thinks gives Knowledge Pragmatism a leg up on Cartesianism.  The 
question we face, then, is the following: Since Knowledge Pragmatism offers an 
explanation of this fact, should we adopt it on grounds of explanatory power?  
   The answer to this, I submit, will depend upon the answer to another question, 
namely, What determines whether a thought or judgment is rational?  One answer to the 
latter question is that whether a thought or a judgment is rational turns on its content, and 
the identity conditions for the concepts that make up it up.  If this is correct, then one 
might think that the crucial fact Peacocke points to provides prima facie support for 
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Knowledge Pragmatism.4 But Peacocke can’t simply assume that issues about the 
rationality of thought turn on issues concerning content.  For as we’ll see, on Fodor’s 
view issues about rationality turn on the form, not the content of thought.  It seems to me, 
then, that we must get clear on this question before we can address the question of 
whether Peacocke’s Knowledge Pragmatism is more explanatorily powerful than either 
Judgment Pragmatism or Concept Cartesianism.  To do this, we must come to grips with 
the issues raised by Frege cases.  Let’s begin with the problem they pose for purely 
referential theories of meaning.  
 
Substitution Failures, Senses, and MOPs 
If a purely referential theory of meaning—e.g. Informational Atomism—is true, then we 
ought to be able to freely substitute coreferential concepts for one another salva veritatae.  
The reason for this is simple.  If the content of a concept is exhausted by its referent, then 
two concepts with the same referent ought to make the same contribution to the content 
of an entire thought.  For if there were something that one but not the other of two 
coreferential concepts contributed to the content of a thought, then their content wouldn’t 
be exhausted by reference.  In short, a purely referential theory of meaning implies that 
coreferential concepts are synonyms.  On the assumption that synonyms have the same 
effect on the truth-value of thoughts containing them, it seems that the truth or falsity of a 
thought containing one concept ought to be unaffected by substituting another, 
coreferential concept in its place.  It’s for this reason that Fodor admits that “the status of 
                                                 
4
 I argue below, though, that even if facts about rationality turn on facts about content, this needn’t be taken 
as support for Knowledge Pragmatism.   
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conceptual atomism depends, rather directly, on whether coreference implies synonymy” 
(1998a, p. 14).5  
But, prima facie, coreference does not imply synonymy.  Consider the following 
sets of coreferential concepts: HESPERUS and PHOSPHORUS, WATER and H2O, SQUARE 
and DIAMOND, HEAT and MEAN MOLECULAR KINETIC ENERGY, CORIANDER and 
CILANTRO, JOCASTA and OEDIPUS’ MOTHER.  Despite the fact that the members of each 
pair are coreferential, it’s prima facie plausible that they differ in content, and it’s very 
easy to generate substitution failures involving such concepts that illustrate this.  First, 
though, consider some sentences that do not generate a substitution failure: 
(1) Hesperus is Hesperus. 
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus.  
On the face of it, (1) and (2) differ in meaning.  For it certainly seems that (2) might have 
been false, whereas (1) is necessarily true (since everything is necessarily identical with 
itself).   One might take this apparent difference in modal status to account for the 
apparent difference in meaning.  The idea would be that (1) and (2) can’t have the same 
meaning since (1) is a priori and necessary, and (2) is a posteriori and contingent.  
However, as Kripke (1980) persuasively argues, although (2) is known a posteriori it is 
nevertheless necessarily true, just as (1) is.  I thus take it that if (1) and (2) differ in 
meaning, it’s not because of a difference in their modal status.   
                                                 
5
 Fodor ought to say ‘Informational Atomism’ here, not ‘Conceptual Atomism’.  Given the discussion in 
Chapter 5, it should come as no surprise to find Fodor writing under the assumption that the informational 
and atomistic components of Informational Atomism can’t come apart.  But as I argued there, they can.  It’s 
the informational component of Informational Atomism whose status depends on whether coreference 
implies synonymy.  Atomism is not at issue here.   
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 This is where Frege cases come in.  For they present cases in which the putative 
difference in content does not turn on any modal differences.  Consider the following 
sentences: 
(3) John believes that Hesperus is Hesperus. 
(4) John believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
Prima facie, the truth of (3) doesn’t imply the truth of (4), since it’s possible that John 
doesn’t know what we know, namely, that Hesperus = Phosphorus = Venus.  This creates 
a problem for purely referential theories of meaning.  For since ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus’ are coreferential, they ought to make the same semantic contribution to the 
sentences in which they occur, and thus be substitutable for one another salva veritatae.  
But this doesn’t seem to be the case.  For it’s prima facie plausible that (3) can be true 
and (4) false.  Since the only difference between (3) and (4) is a coreferential term, it thus 
seems that purely referential theories of meaning violate substitutivity.  
Some referential theorists bite the bullet here, and claim that the thought 
expressed by (3) is identical to the thought expressed by (4).  Prominent among them is 
Nathan Salmon (1986), who claims that “anyone who knows that Hesperus is Hesperus 
knows that Hesperus is Phosphorus, no matter how strongly he or she may deny the 
latter” (p. 83).  Of course this is highly counter-intuitive.  For I take it that most, if not all, 
speakers have a very strong intuition that the truth of (3) does not imply the truth of (4).  
Salmon thus owes us an explanation of our faulty intuitions; and he provides one.  He 
argues, in effect, that when we think that (3) could be true and (4) false we’re confusing 
pragmatics for semantics.  Details aside, the basic idea is that while (3) and (4) have the 
same semantic content—i.e. they express the same thought (or proposition)—they 
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nevertheless differ in their pragmatic implications.  For instance, (3) implies that John is 
thinking of Hesperus as ‘Hesperus’ and not as ‘Phosphorus’.  Given this implication, 
which he claims is merely pragmatic, we come to think that (3) could be true and (4) 
false, when in fact they literally express the same thought and thus have the same truth 
condition.6 
 But one might complain that the intuition that (3) and (4) can differ in truth-value 
is too strong to be trumped by what may be an otherwise attractive theory.7 For it can 
seem obvious and undeniable that (3) and (4) can differ in truth-value, and some may feel 
it’s within their rights to claim that any theory that implies otherwise ought be rejected.  
Of course, it’s not at all obvious how to settle conflicts between our intuitions and our 
theories.  As Fodor once quipped in another context, perhaps the best thing to do in such 
situations is to get your intuitions fixed!  In any case, it’s examples like (3) and (4) that 
have traditionally led theorists away from purely referential theories and towards Fregean 
theories, which recognize an aspect or layer of meaning that goes beyond mere reference.   
While there’s a sense in which coreferential terms have the same meaning, these 
theorists claims, there’s another sense in which they clearly differ in meaning, since they 
differ in what Frege called ‘cognitive significance’.  Thus  
(1) Hesperus is Hesperus 
is uninformative, while  
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus 
                                                 
6
 Soames (2002) also defends a view of this kind. 
7
 The bullet-biting view has been attacked by both proponents and opponents of a purely referential theory 
of meaning.  See, e.g., Crimmins and Perry (1989), Braun (1998), Devitt (1996), Pietroski (2000), and 
Recanati (1993).  
 223 
is potentially informative.  Fregeans posit senses in an attempt to explain why 
coreferential terms can differ in such properties.  On their view, it’s because a thinker can 
grasp the sense of ‘Hesperus’ without grasping the sense of ‘Phosphorus’ that (1) is 
uninformative and (2) is potentially informative.  Moreover, it’s a difference in sense that 
explains why it would be irrational for a thinker to deny (1), while it can be perfectly 
rational to deny (2).  It also explains why (3) and (4) can differ in truth-value.  Fregeans 
will claim that the thought (or proposition) expressed by (1) differs from the thought 
expressed by (2), and the thought expressed by (3) differs from the thought expressed by 
(4).  Positing senses thus captures our intuitions about sentences like (1) and (2), and (3) 
and (4), and offers a potential explanation of relevant facts about the rationality and 
epistemic status of judgments.    
What are senses?  What, for instance, is the sense of ‘Phosphorus’?  Frege says 
that a sense is a ‘mode of presenting’ a referent (a MOP), and many Fregeans follow 
Evans’ (1982) gloss on MOPs as ‘ways of thinking’ about a referent.  A typical claim is 
that a sense or MOP of (say) ‘Phosphorus’ is a description that Venus satisfies, e.g. ‘the 
brightest star in the morning sky’.  On this sort of view, it is natural to take senses to be 
determined by the inferential relations that ‘Phosphorus’ bears to other terms.  Fregeans 
thus typically claim that the aspect of meaning that goes beyond reference will be 
provided by an conceptual/inferential role semantics.  A less typical claim is that MOPs 
are non-descriptive, e.g., that they involve causal properties that determine reference 
(Devitt 1996).  For our purposes, the important thing to note is that Fregeans propose that 
there’s a semantic difference between (1) and (2), and (3) and (4).  Unlike many of those 
who endorse purely referential theories of meaning, Fregeans take each of these to 
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express distinct thoughts, and thus take MOPs to be identical with Fregean senses 
(/meanings/contents).  
Peacocke’s theory of concepts, of course, is guided by just this line of reasoning.  
For his theory of concepts put forward in A Study of Concepts is built around a criterion 
of concept individuation based on the Fregean notion of ‘informativeness’: 
Concepts C and D are distinct if and only if there are two complete propositional 
contents that differ at most in that one contains C substituted in one or more 
places for D, and one of which is potentially informative while the other is not.  
(1992a, p. 2) 
Since (2) is potentially informative, it follows from Peacocke’s informativeness criterion 
that HESPERUS and PHOSPHORUS must be distinct concepts, despite the fact that they’re 
coreferential.  He combines this with the standard Fregean view that what distinguishes 
coreferential concepts is conceptual/inferential role.  Peacocke claims, moreover, that this 
combination implies that reasons and rationality are constitutively tied to concepts: 
What all Fregean IRS theories, of whatever stripe, agree upon is the central place 
of reasons and rationality in the individuation of concepts.  Reasons for making 
judgements are central in any Fregean theory, since the informativeness criterion 
appeals to what can be reasonably judged in given circumstances.  (2000a, p. 332) 
According to Peacocke, then, the informativeness criterion leads to the claim that there 
are constitutive connections between rationality and concepts.  For the informativeness 
criterion individuates concepts at the level of Fregean sense, and sense properties are 
what explain the relevant facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain 
judgments—e.g., why it can be rational to deny (2), but irrational to deny (1).   
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It should be clear by now that I don’t think Peacocke is right about this 
implication of a Fregean conceptual/inferential role semantics.  I argue below that one 
can accept the latter without making the further claim that concepts are constitutively tied 
to reasons and rationality.  For now, though, let’s just note that it’s surely a virtue of the 
informativeness criterion that it gets some crucial facts right here: coreferential 
concepts—WATER and H2O, SQUARE and DIAMOND, CORIANDER and CILANTRO, 
JOCASTA and OEDIPUS’ MOTHER—are surely distinct, and psychological explanations 
require that they be treated as such.  John is surprised to find out that coriander is 
cilantro, and Oedipus is disgusted when he discovers that Jocasta is his mother.  
Explaining and predicting such behavior requires that the concepts that are the 
constituents of the relevant mental states—i.e., CORIANDER and CILANTRO, and JOCASTA 
and MOTHER—be treated as distinct.  I take it that any theory that implies otherwise 
ought to be rejected.   
As we noted above, Informational Atomism implies that coreferential concepts 
are synonyms.  If it’s a law that tokenings of WATER covary with (instances of) the 
property being water, and (instances of) being water = (instances of) being H2O, then it’s 
a law that WATER covaries with (instances of) being H2O.  Informational Atomism thus 
implies that WATER and H2O are synonyms.  And the same goes for other coreferential 
concepts.  Why does Fodor adopt a theory that has this patently unintuitive consequence?  
Because, if coreference is not sufficient for synonymy, then at least some aspect of 
meaning must be determined by the internal role of term.  In other words, denying that 
coreference implies synonymy invites a conceptual/inferential role semantics.  And Fodor 
would rather live with the counter-intuitive claim that coreferential concepts are 
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synonyms than adopt a theory of concepts that requires an appeal (however small) to 
conceptual/inferential role.   
Of course, one can believe that there is water in the cup without believing that 
there is H2O in the cup, since one can have the concept WATER without having the 
concept H2O.  Indeed, this is precisely the situation that the vast majority of humans have 
found themselves in.  Even if coreferential concepts are synonyms, then, they are 
nevertheless distinct.  Given this, Informational Atomism commits Fodor to the claim 
that “content individuation can’t be all there is to concept individuation” (1998a, p. 15, 
original emphasis).  Or, as he puts it elsewhere, “if intentional contents are broad, then 
something other than content must be able to distinguish between propositional attitudes” 
(1994, p. 49).  What else could be involved in concept individuation?  If coreferential 
concepts are distinct, and they are distinct not in virtue of any differences in meaning or 
content, as Informational Atomism requires, then Fodor must appeal to non-semantic 
differences to distinguish them.  But if there’s no semantic difference between  
(5) John believes that there is water in the cup 
and 
(6) John believes that there is H2O in the cup  
then what explains the fact that the truth of (5) does not imply the truth of (6)?  On 
Fodor’s view, the key is to understand that such substitution failures can indicate a 
difference in belief state, without indicating a difference in belief content.  
There is widespread agreement that beliefs are to be analyzed as relations, e.g. 
between people and propositional contents.  For an informational semantics, taking 
beliefs to be two-place relations will not do, though, since it says that the that-clauses in 
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(5) and (6) express the same proposition.  That is, according to informational semantics, 
the proposition that there is water in the cup just is the proposition that there is H2O in the 
cup.  Suppose that beliefs are mere two-place relations.  It follows that if John bears the 
belief-relation to the proposition that there is water in the cup, he thereby bears the belief-
relation to the proposition that there is H2O in the cup.  Prima facie, this is the wrong 
result.  So it looks as if informational semantics can’t take beliefs to be mere two-place 
relations.   
In light of this, Fodor suggests instead that we conceive of beliefs (and other 
propositional attitudes) as mediated relations between people and propositions.  That is, 
he suggests that beliefs should be analyzed as three-place relations between people, 
propositions, and mediating representations.  On this view, the truth of (5) still implies 
that John stands in the belief-relation to the proposition that there is water in cup.  It’s just 
that John stands in that relation by standing in a relation to an internal representation that 
expresses the proposition.  The truth of (6) implies that John stands in the very same 
belief-relation to the proposition that there is water (/H2O) in the cup.  But in this case he 
stands in that relation by standing in a relation to a different internal representation that 
expresses the very same proposition.  Distinct mediating representations can thus be 
identical in their content.  
 It’s worth pointing out that Fodor has long held that propositional attitudes are 
mediated relations to propositions, even before he opted for a thoroughgoing externalist 
semantics (Fodor 1975, 1980).  In these earlier days, however, the claim was motivated 
by his computationalism.  The guiding idea is that if mental processes are computational, 
then it’s plausible that mental states are relations to internally structured representations, 
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which are individuated by their formal, syntactic properties.8  For computational 
processes are sensitive only to the purely formal properties of the representations that 
they’re defined over.  Indeed, it’s this fact that provides both the potential power and 
limitation of the computational theory of mind (Fodor 1983, 2000a; but see Carruthers 
2003).  
In the earlier days, though, Fodor combined his computationalism with an 
internalist theory of content, according to which the contents of states that figure in 
psychological laws are fixed by properties entirely within the skin of the organism (Fodor 
1987, 1991b).  On this view, the content that’s necessary for psychological explanation 
supervenes on the internal properties of the organism’s nervous system.  This ‘narrow’ 
theory of content sits nicely with the computational theory of mind, since one can at least 
see how there could be computationally sufficient conditions for being in a mental state 
with a certain (narrow) content.  But once Fodor gave up on the view that psychological 
explanation requires a notion of narrow content, and went in for a purely externalist 
(/informational) theory of content, he faced the difficult task of reconciling this with the 
computational theory of mind.  For if content is determined by certain external (e.g., 
informational/causal/nomic, etc.) relations that an organism bears to its environment, then 
                                                 
8
 In what follows I use ‘formal’ and ‘syntactic’ interchangeably.  Strictly speaking, of course, these are not 
the same thing.  For computational relations could be defined over representations that do not have a 
syntax.  Rotating a mental image, for example, might be a computational process that is sensitive only to 
the formal properties of the representation.  But mental images don’t have a syntax.  Being syntactic is thus 
one way of being formal, but representations needn’t have syntactic descriptions in order for computational 
processes to be defined over them.  As Fodor says: “What makes syntactic operations a species of formal 
operations is that being syntactic is a way of not being semantic.  Formal operations are the ones that are 
specified without reference to such semantic properties of representations as, for example, truth, reference, 
and meaning.  Since we don’t know how to complete this list (since, that is, we don’t know what semantic 
properties there are), I see no responsible way of saying what, in general, formality amounts to.  The notion 
of formality will thus have to remain intuitive and metaphoric, at least for present purposes: formal 
operations apply in terms of the, as it were, shapes of the objects in their domains” (1980, p. 227). 
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it is far from clear how content and computation are supposed to hang together.  As 
Fodor says:  
[I]t is, to put it mildly, obscure how a thing could satisfy the conditions for having 
its external relations simply in virtue of having the internal relations that it does.  
…  But if internal relations don’t guarantee external relations, then computational 
relations don’t guarantee intentional relations.  …  Computational mechanisms 
implement intentional laws only if computational properties can somehow 
guarantee intentional ones.  But there seems to be no way they could do so on the 
assumption that the metaphysics of content is informational.  (1994, pp. 14-15)  
Since Fodor does not wish to give up on informational semantics, he has to show how the 
computational theory of mind is compatible with a purely externalist theory of content 
after all.  In his Jean Nicod lectures—published as The Elm and the Expert—he attempts 
to do just this.   
For our purposes, the interesting thing to see here is that the problem of 
reconciling computationalism with externalism about content mirrors the constraint that 
Frege (and Twin) cases impose on a theory of concepts.  The truth of (5) does not imply 
the truth of (6); that John believes that there’s water in the cup does not imply that John 
believes that there’s H2O in the cup.  As we’ve seen, this fact is prima facie puzzling if 
informational semantics is true, since the latter implies that WATER and H2O are 
synonyms.  The point can be put in terms of the relation between computation and 
content: Frege cases are cases in which distinct computational mechanisms implement 
beliefs with identical contents.  In other words (and roughly put), if Frege cases show that 
reference doesn’t determine sense, then (assuming computationalism) they show that 
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content relations don’t determine computational ones.  (Twin cases, of course, illustrate 
the same point but from the other direction: the same computational mechanism can 
implement beliefs with distinct contents, where content is specified externalistically.)  
We can now see how Fodor’s treatment of Frege cases links up with his 
computational theory of mind.  Since informational semantics precludes an appeal to a 
semantic difference to explain why the truth of (5) does not imply the truth of (6), 
mediating internal-representations are perfectly suited to task.  As we noted above, 
computationalism already requires that such representations be individuated by their 
formal (i.e., non-semantic) properties.  A computational theory of mind can thus happily 
be combined with an informational semantics that can handle Frege cases, so long as 
mediating internal-representations can play the role of Fregean MOPs.  Fodor thus says: 
It’s really the basic idea of RTM that Turing’s [computational] story about the 
nature of mental processes provides the very candidates for MOP-hood that 
Frege’s story about the individuation of mental states independently requires.  If 
that’s true, it’s about the nicest thing that ever happened to cognitive science.  
(1998a, p. 22) 
To sum up, then, the idea is this.  While John’s ‘water-MOP’ has the same content as his 
‘H2O-MOP’, they are nevertheless syntactically distinct.  For they are, as it were, spelled 
differently: they have different formal properties, and will thus differ in the causal 
relations they enter into in virtue of having those properties.  This is why John in (5) will 
behave differently than John in (6).  Informational Atomism thus apparently forces Fodor 
to reject the Fregean claim that MOPs are identical with senses (/meanings/contents), and 
claim instead that MOPs are the representational vehicles of thoughts, which are 
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individuated by their purely formal properties.  Fodor’s burden is to make this claim 
plausible, for otherwise coreference will not be sufficient for synonymy and 
Informational Atomism will be in trouble.  In what follows I consider Fodor’s attempt to 
do just this, and argue that it fails.  However, as we’ll see, a defeat for Cartesianism here 
is not tantamount to a victory for Peacocke’s Knowledge Pragmatism.  Indeed, there’s a 
plausible middle ground.   
 
Mates, Kripke, and MOPs 
Fregeans argue that substitution tests show that there’s a semantic difference between 
coreferential but distinct concepts.  Recall their argument: since coreferential concepts 
are not substitutable for one another salva veritatae—as (3) and (4), and (5) and (6) 
show—and synonyms are freely substitutable for one another salva veritatae, it follows 
that coreferential concepts are not synonyms.  This putatively shows that there’s a 
semantic difference between coreferential but distinct concepts, contra Informational 
Atomism. 
 Fodor rejects this argument because he thinks that even synonyms are not 
substitutable for one another salva veritatae.  Following Mates (1950), he claims that 
synonyms can fail substitution tests, and thus that substitution tests are not tests for 
synonymy.  Consider the concepts LAWYER and ATTORNEY, which would seem to be 
synonymous if any concepts are.  Assuming that they are, the following sentences should 
not generate a substitution failure: 
(7) John is an attorney. 
(8) John is a lawyer. 
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And they don’t.  The truth of (7) guarantees the truth of (8).  But now consider: 
(9)  John believes that all attorneys are attorneys. 
(10) John believes that all attorneys are lawyers. 
Perhaps (9) is true if and only if (10) is true.  But while it doesn’t seem possible to 
wonder whether (9) is true, it does seem possible to wonder whether (10) is true.  What 
might lead us to doubt (10)?  Well, we might wonder whether John acquired ATTORNEY 
and LAWYER in such a way that he believes that there is a difference, however slight, 
between attorneys and lawyers.  For instance, he might think that lawyers are just like 
attorneys, except only the latter are members of the American Bar Association.  Surely 
this is at least possible.  But if it is, then the following sentences apparently do generate a 
substitution failure: 
(11) Bill does not wonder whether John believes that all attorneys are attorneys. 
(12) Bill does not wonder whether John believes that all attorneys are lawyers.  
Such iterated attitude-contexts are known as ‘Mates cases’, and they at least suggest that 
substitution tests are not tests for synonymy.  In this case, the truth of (11) does not 
guarantee the truth of (12), despite the fact that ATTORNEY and LAWYER are synonyms.  
Fodor thus says that Mates cases “[throw] doubt on the claim that failures of substitution 
salva veritate in belief contexts are ipso facto arguments for nonsynonmy” (1990, p. 165). 
 If Mates cases do indeed show that synonymous expressions can fail substitution 
tests, then this would apparently undermine the claim that Frege cases show that there 
must be a semantic difference between coreferential but distinct concepts.  Indeed, Fodor 
uses Mates cases to motivate his claim that MOPs are not identical with Fregean senses.  
Why do Mates cases suggest this?  Well, as Fodor points out, whatever else Fregean 
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senses are, synonymous expressions must share them.  Assuming that ATTORNEY and 
LAWYER are synonyms, then, they must share a Fregean sense.  But Mates cases 
apparently show that ATTORNEY and LAWYER are not freely substitutable for one another 
salva veritatae.  Fodor draws the following conclusion: “if … MOPs just are whatever it 
is that the substitution test tests for, then it’s unlikely that MOPs are senses” (1998a, p. 
16, original emphasis).  
 This argument is a potentially powerful weapon for those who wish to defend a 
purely referential theory of content against the standard Fregean considerations.  It’s thus 
no surprise to find that Saul Kripke, who (along with Burge and Putnam) is in large part 
responsible for the spread of purely referential/externalist theories of meaning in 
philosophy of mind and language, offers a similar defense of such theories against the 
standard Fregean considerations.  In his famous paper “A Puzzle about Belief,” Kripke 
argues that the opacity of belief contexts needn’t count in favor of Fregeanism over 
Millianism (about proper names).  One of his arguments is that, sometimes at least, 
positing Fregean senses does not in fact explain failures of substitutivity.  In the cases 
that putatively generate substitution failures, Kripke points out that people often don’t 
assign distinct senses to the relevant coreferential terms.  For instance, to the extent that 
people do assign senses to ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’, they’re plausibly identical; a typical 
thinker might associate each name with the description ‘was an ancient Roman orator’.  
But if this is typical, then the standard Fregean explanation for substitution failures 
involving ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ would seem to be undermined.  Since ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ 
clearly can generate substitution failures, it would seem that they must be associated with 
different MOPs.  But if Kripke’s observation is correct, and the names are associated with 
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the same sense, then this suggests that MOPs are not Fregean senses.  (Kripke himself 
does not draw this conclusion, at least in these terms).  
 Fodor offers what seems to be essentially the same argument, or at least a related 
argument for the same conclusion9: 
Suppose I tell you that Jackson was a painter and that Pollock was a painter, and I 
tell you nothing else about Jackson or Pollock.  Suppose, also, that you believe 
what I tell you.  It looks like that fixes the sense of the names ‘Jackson’ and 
‘Pollock’ if anything could; and it looks like it fixes them as both having the same 
sense: viz. a painter.  (Mutatis mutandis, it looks as though I have fixed the same 
inferential role for both.)  Yet, in the circumstances imagined, it’s perfectly OK—
perfectly conceptually coherent—for you to wonder whether Jackson and Pollock 
were the same painter.  (Contrast the peculiarity of your wondering, in such a 
case, whether Jackson was Jackson or whether Pollock was Pollock.)  So, then, by 
Frege’s own test, JACKSON and POLLOCK count as different MOPs.  But if 
concepts with the same sense can be different MOPs then, patently, MOPs can’t 
be senses.  (1998a, p. 16) 
What this Kripke-esque argument and the Mates cases suggest, Fodor claims, is that 
substitution failures do not show that coreferential concepts are not synonymous.  Rather, 
they suggest that MOPs are syntactically, not semantically individuated: 
[W]hat’s going on doesn’t seem to have to do with meaning.  Rather, the 
governing principle is a piece of logical syntax: If ‘a’ and ‘b’ are different names, 
then the inference from ‘Fa’ to ‘Fb’ is never conceptually necessary [unless the 
                                                 
9
 In a footnote, Fodor says: “By the way, I have the damnedest sense of déjà vu about the argument in the 
text; I simply can’t remember whether I read it somewhere or made it up” (1998a, p. 17n).  Perhaps he read 
it in “A Puzzle About Belief”? 
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inference from ‘Fa’ or ‘Fb’ to a=b is conceptually necessary, e.g. if ‘Fa’ is ‘a has 
the property of being identical to b’].  …  It looks like the moral of this story 
about Jackson and Pollock is the same as the moral of Mates’s story about 
[lawyers and attorneys].  Frege’s substitution test doesn’t identify senses.  
Correspondingly, if it is stipulated that MOPs are whatever substitution salva 
veritate turns on, then MOPs have to be sliced a good bit thinner than senses.  
Individuating MOPs is more like individuating forms of words than it is like 
individuating meanings.  (Fodor 1998a, p. 17, original emphasis) 
Supposing, then, that differences between the rationality of thoughts turn on the 
MOPs associated with them, it follows that on Fodor’s view such differences in 
rationality turn on the syntax, not the content of thoughts.  This shows that, in this 
context, Peacocke’s assumption that the rationality of a thought depends upon its content 
is contentious.  The Cartesian will thus reject Peacocke’s general argument for 
Knowledge Pragmatism, at least to the extent that it depends on this assumption.   
In his recent book, The Realm of Reason, Peacocke offers the following argument 
for Pragmatism, which also turns on an assumption the Cartesian will deny:  
[I]t cannot simply be that evidence is wholly irrelevant to meaning and content.  
In fact, for anyone who employs a notion of content constrained by Fregean 
consideration of cognitive significance, it is a consequence of the very nature of 
intentional content that evidence cannot be completely irrelevant.  If, when we 
hold background information constant, there is something that is evidence for p 
but not evidence for q, it follows that p and q are distinct Fregean Thoughts.  If 
we apply Frege’s classical test, someone with that evidence could rationally 
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believe p but not believe q.  Even if they do not exhaust meaning, and even if they 
are not fundamental, evidential factors cannot be excluded from any epistemically 
significant notion of content.  (2004a, p. 34)  
We can now see that this argument is unconvincing, for two reasons.  First, it may be that 
evidence and rationality must figure in the individuation of any “epistemically significant 
notion of content”.  But, at a certain level, the very issue at hand here is whether content 
is epistemically significant.  In particular, for those who approach a theory of concepts 
and content from the perspective of psychological explanation, the normative, 
epistemological properties of content do not make an appearance at the level of content-
ascription.  If an epistemically significant notion of content is one that is constitutively 
connected to such normative properties, then it’s question-begging for Peacocke to argue 
that since concepts and content are epistemically significant, evidence and rationality 
must be involved in their individuation.  
Second, it’s false that any theory constrained by Fregean considerations of 
cognitive significance must posit an epistemic dimension to the individuation of concepts 
and content, or admit that “reasons and rationality” occupy the “central place … in the 
individuation of concepts” (Peacocke 2000a, p. 332).  Fregean considerations certainly 
don’t warrant Peacocke’s claim that “to be a concept is simply to have a certain role in 
rational transitions in thought, in the mind of a rational thinker” (2005, p. 169).  For 
we’ve just seen that Fodor’s Cartesian account can claim to be constrained by Fregean 
considerations, despite the fact that it denies that there’s a constitutive connection 
between rationality and evidence, on the one hand, and concepts and content, on the 
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other.10 What such Fregean considerations show, according to Fodor, is that synonymous 
concepts have distinct MOPs, which are syntactically individuated.  Since it’s open for a 
Cartesian to deny the Fregean identification of MOPs with senses, it’s question-begging 
in this context for Peacocke to assume that issues about rationality and the like turn on 
the content of thoughts.  For they may just as well turn on their form, or syntax.  The 
question of whether Peacocke’s Pragmatism should be endorsed on grounds of 
explanatory power thus depends upon the antecedent question of whether issues about 
rationality turn on the content of thoughts.  And it should now be clear that this question, 
in turn, depends upon the question of whether MOPs should be identified with senses.  I 
argue that the cost of answering “no” to this latter question is quite high.   
The Mates cases, Kripke-esque examples, and Informational Atomism each 
independently suggest that MOPs are sensitive to the syntactically individuated vehicles 
of thought.  As we’ve seen, a purely informational semantics alone essentially forces this 
conclusion, since it requires that distinct coreferential concepts are synonyms.  And if 
‘content individuation can’t be all there is to concept individuation’, then the syntactic or 
formal properties of concepts would seem to be the only other candidates for 
individuation.  If this were the only consideration in favor of the claim that MOPs are 
syntactically individuated, then Fodor’s case would be very weak indeed.  For as we 
noted above, one may be inclined to take the fact that Informational Atomism implies 
that coreferential concepts are synonyms to be prima facie evidence against 
Informational Atomism.  A Fregean thus might rightly be suspicious of Fodor’s using this 
implication as support for the claim that MOPs are syntactically individuated.  The Mates 
                                                 
10
 We’ll see below that Peacocke’s claim is implausible for other reasons as well.  
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and Kripke-esque examples are thus an important dialectical tool, for they provide much 
needed independent support for Fodor’s claim that MOPs are not Fregean senses.  
This isn’t to say, of course, that Fregeans will accept Fodor’s claims about the 
implications of these examples.  For Fregeans will surely have something to say in 
response to Fodor’s claim that such examples show that substitution failures do not 
indicate that the relevant concepts differ in content.  For instance, Fregeans can attempt to 
account for Mates cases by providing a semantics of ‘that’-clauses in natural language.  
Of course, as Pietroski (2000a) points out, Fodor might deny that one can adequately 
reply to him by offering a particular Fregean theory of the semantics of attitude 
ascriptions (p. 344).  For Fodor claims that “English has no semantics” (1998a, p. 9, 
original emphasis), which implies that it doesn’t have a semantics of attitude ascriptions.  
In other words, if natural languages are not what have meaning “in the first instance” (as 
Fodor (2001b) puts it) and in fact have no compositional semantics at all, then one can’t 
reply to Fodor’s use of Mates cases by offering a semantics of attitude ascriptions.  But, 
as Pietroski also points out, to say that natural languages don’t have a compositional 
semantics is to make a very strong claim, which would require not only that semanticists 
are wrong about what their theories are theories of, but also that there be an alternative 
explanation for the successes that semanticists have had in providing detailed semantic 
theories: 
[O]ne does not account for the successes of actual semantic theories simply by 
positing unspecified mechanisms that map (translate, or compile) the sentences 
we know about into allegedly distinct sentences whose structure and meaning 
remains unknown.  One owes a case-by-case discussion of the facts apparently 
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explained by our best theories of adverbs, tense, etc.  In the absence of a 
semantics textbook for Mentalese, it is reasonable to assume that English has a 
semantics partly described by the (actual) semantics textbooks for English.  
(2000a, p. 345, original emphasis) 
In the eyes of Fregeans, then, it might seem rash to insist that Mates cases support the 
claim MOPs aren’t senses, if doing so requires that one deny that natural languages have 
a compositional semantics.     
In any case, there isn’t space here to consider in detail Fregean attempts to handle 
Mates cases, or to evaluate the basis of Fodor’s claims that there’s no compositional 
semantics for natural language.  Nor is there space to consider possible Fregean replies to 
Kripke.11 However, there are good reasons, which are independent of these technical 
issues in philosophy of language and linguistics, for thinking that Fodor’s claim that 
MOPs aren’t senses is implausible.  So, rather than replying to Fodor by attempting to 
undermine his use of the Mates and Kripke-esque cases, I will instead argue that his 
position is implausible when considered on its own (i.e., irrespective of his justification 
for it).   
There are three reasons to doubt the adequacy of Fodor’s account.  First, it’s not 
clear that Fodor’s account can handle cases in which the coreferential concepts in 
question are both distinct and primitive.  Second, there are reasons for thinking that 
concepts and their corresponding internal representations do not stand in the tight 
relationship that Fodor’s account seems to require.  Third, taking MOPs to be the 
                                                 
11
 Fodor makes use not only of the Kripke-esque Jackson/Pollock example above, but also Kripke’s (1979) 
puzzle about Pierre; see Fodor (1990, chapter 6).   
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representational vehicles of thought apparently requires that one give up on content-based 
explanations of people’s behavior in Frege cases.  Let’s consider each of these in turn.   
 
Coreferring, Primitive LOT expressions 
If coreferential terms are synonyms, then they can nevertheless express distinct concepts 
so long as MOPs are syntactically individuated.  I suspect that in many (perhaps most) 
cases there will be the needed structure at the level of internal representation to 
distinguish such concepts.  Thus, although informational semantics has it that HEAT and 
MEAN MOLECULAR KINETIC ENERGY are synonyms, it nevertheless counts them as 
distinct concepts since the latter, but not the former, has KINETIC and ENERGY as 
constituents.  Given the difference in the structure of the internal representations, Fodor’s 
story thus offers a nice account of why HEAT and MEAN MOLECULAR KINETIC ENERGY 
are distinct concepts. 
 But what about cases in which there is no structure that can distinguish the 
coreferential concepts?  Consider again SQUARE and DIAMOND.  On Fodor’s view, the 
propositional-attitude ascription “judges that’s a square” attributes to someone a 
judgment-relation to the very same proposition that the ascription “judges that’s a 
diamond” does.  But despite the identity of the content of the ascribed judgments, they 
are distinct judgment states.  On Fodor’s account, this is because the ascriptions are also 
used to specify the vehicle of the judgment states, which they do by “displaying a 
formula that is, to one or another degree, structurally isomorphic to the vehicle” (1990, p. 
169).  But in this case, “judges that’s a square” seems to be structurally isomorphic to 
“judges that’s a diamond,” in which case the corresponding vehicles will not be 
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structurally distinct.  In other words, SQUARE and DIAMOND seem to be primitives, and 
this apparently spells trouble for Fodor’s account.  For if SQUARE and DIAMOND are 
primitives, then one can’t appeal to differences in the form of the corresponding 
judgments to explain the differences in their rationality and epistemic status.  Primitive 
concepts are, after all, formally identical.  One would thus apparently have to appeal to 
the distinct contents of SQUARE and DIAMOND in order to explain the relevant facts about 
rationality and epistemic status.  But informational semantics can’t make any such 
appeal, since it implies that SQUARE and DIAMOND are synonyms.   
 One way for the informational semanticist to get out of this would be to claim that 
DIAMOND and SQUARE are not in fact coreferential.  The idea would be to grant that 
coreferential concepts pick out identical properties, but claim that being a diamond and 
being a square are in fact distinct.  For instance, one might claim that which of these 
properties is instantiated on a given occasion is tied to the way the object is positioned 
with respect to the perceiver.  Indeed, if one goes in for Fodor’s (1998a) view that most 
middle-level properties of objects are in fact mind-dependent, then it might fall out of 
one’s theory that being a diamond and being a square are distinct properties.  For being a 
diamond, on that view, just is the property that our minds lock to in consequence of 
having experiences of stereotypical diamonds.  And, one might claim, the set of 
stereotypical diamonds is not identical to the set of stereotypical squares, since 
stereotypical diamonds are positioned in a very particular way with respect to perceivers, 
i.e. they’re positioned in such a way that they look like diamonds and not squares.  Hence 
the properties that thinkers lock onto as a result will be distinct.  Perhaps a metaphysical 
response to the worry about primitive, coreferential concepts could be developed along 
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these lines.  But even if it could, to respond in this way would be to rest the plausibility of 
one’s theory on what I take to be a relatively tendentious metaphysics.12 
 Still another way out would be to deny that there could be genuinely primitive, 
coreferential predicates in the language of thought.  For perhaps in every case in which 
two coreferential natural language terms appear to be primitive, at least one of the 
corresponding internal representations is in fact complex. 13 The problem with this reply, 
however, is that I don’t see how an informational semanticist could defend it with any 
plausibility.  Perhaps some of the apparent cases of primitive coreferring terms will turn 
out to correspond to complex mental representations that can distinguish the relevant 
concepts.  But what’s the argument that all of them will?  That a particular theory of 
content needs there to be such internal structure in order to explain all the relevant data is 
no argument at all.  For surely the issue of which internal representations have structure is 
an empirical one, not to be decided by one’s philosophical theory of content.  
 But perhaps it wouldn’t bother Fodor if his theory of content determined his view 
about which representations are primitive and which are structured.  He might reason as 
follows: (i) informational semantics is a well motivated theory, since (as Fodor (1994, 
1998a) has claimed for some time now) it’s the only theory that has any hope of working 
                                                 
12
 Fodor might also reply that he’s only attempting to provide sufficient conditions for content, not 
necessary ones.  As he puts it in A Theory of Content: “Suppose we had naturalistically sufficient for 
content.  It wouldn’t, of course, follow that any of our neural states, or any of our public symbols have the 
content that they do because they satisfy the conditions on offer.  Indeed, it wouldn’t follow from the mere 
existence of sufficient conditions for content that anything in the universe has actually got any.  ‘P implies 
Q’ is neutral about Q.  God can accept the consequents of any true hypotheticals whose antecedents He 
doesn’t know to be false; but we can’t” (1990, p. 131).  But even if Fodor’s asymmetric dependency theory 
is intended to supply mere sufficient conditions, presumably this is not the case for informational semantics 
generally.  That is, I take it Fodor thinks that informational semantics is actually true of us, and will thus 
supply necessary and sufficient conditions for content.   
13
 Indeed, Fodor can object that this is true of the very case under consideration.  After all, being a diamond 
isn’t identical with being square, since some diamonds aren’t regular-diamonds.  The relevant concepts are 
thus SQUARE and REGULAR-DIAMOND, and the structure of the latter can serve to distinguish the concepts.  
This is surely a happy accident, however.  In any event, I take it the case could be made with CORIANDER 
and CILANTRO.   
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as a naturalistic account of content; (ii) informational semantics requires that 
coreferential concepts be distinguished syntactically, not semantically; so, (iii) in all 
cases in which two concepts are coreferential, the corresponding representations must be 
syntactically distinct; (iv) but saying this doesn’t require one to deny that the issue of 
which representations have structure and which don’t is an empirical one; for (v) 
although informational semantics places constraints on one’s view about the structure of 
mental representations, they aren’t a priori constraints (or at least not purely a priori), 
since informational semantics itself is (at least in part) empirically motivated.   
 Now, I’m not sure whether Fodor would offer such a reply.  He has made a 
similar kind of claim before, though.  For instance, when it comes to the possibility of 
primitive concepts for which the corresponding properties are uninstantiated (e.g. GHOST 
or PHLOGISTON) Fodor bites the bullet and says that there can be “no primitive concept 
without a corresponding property for it to lock to” (1998a, p. 165, original emphasis).  
Fodor thus allows informational semantics to determine his ontology in a way that one 
might rightly find a bit disconcerting.  Perhaps there are good metaphysical reasons for 
positing uninstantiated properties—e.g., some theorists argue that they’re needed in an 
account of the metaphysics of laws.14 But one might reasonably balk at positing such 
properties merely because one’s theory of content needs them.15 In any case, if Fodor is 
willing to believe that there’s a property for every primitive concept merely because 
informational semantics requires it, then perhaps he’s also willing to believe that, for 
every case of apparently primitive coreferential concepts, there will be structure to 
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 See Tooley (1977) and Rives (under revision) for discussion. 
15
 Rey (forthcoming b, c) makes this point in his discussion of empty concepts in the context of content 
externalism.   
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distinguish them, again where the belief is driven by a commitment to informational 
semantics.   
However, even if Fodor is willing to adopt a methodology of this kind, it bears 
emphasis that such a reply would not sit happily with his other commitments.  For as an 
Informational Atomist, he denies that lexical concepts have internal structure.  If lexical 
concepts are those concepts that correspond to lexical items in natural language, and two 
lexical items are apparently coreferential, then Fodor can’t save his informational 
semantics by claiming that the corresponding lexical concepts are in fact structurally 
complex, on pain of having to give up on Concept Atomism.  The possibility of primitive 
coreferential concepts thus poses a dilemma for the Informational Atomist.  Either the 
Atomist must insist that there will always be structure at the level of internal 
representation to distinguish apparently primitive, coreferential lexical concepts, in which 
case he must admit that some lexical concepts have internal structure, contra Atomism.16 
Or, the Informational Atomist can retain his Atomism in the face of primitive 
coreferential concepts, but must then give up on a non-semantic account of what 
distinguishes coreferential but distinct concepts.  Either way, it seems, the Informational 
Atomist loses.   
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 Now, it’s true that Fodor often hedges when it comes to characterizing Atomism.  In fact, to the best of 
my knowledge he nowhere claims that all lexical concepts are internally unstructured.  Rather, he usually 
says that most lexical concepts lack structure, or that it’s approximately true that all lexical concepts are 
atoms.  Presumably, the reason he hedges is that it’s an empirical issue as to whether a certain mental 
representation has internal structure.  Who knows, perhaps it will turn out that there’s even a small handful 
of definitions!  The point is that the distinction between structured and unstructured lexical concepts must 
be principled, and positing structured lexical concepts on the basis of whether they happen to corefer would 
surely not provide a principled distinction.   
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Concepts and Mental Representations 
A related worry has to do with the fact that Fodor’s account appears to require that 
concepts be identified with the corresponding mental representations.  For if MOPs are 
what distinguish coreferential but distinct concepts, and MOPs are internal mental 
representations, then presumably concepts themselves just are representations.  Indeed, 
the first of Fodor’s five ‘non-negotiable conditions on a theory of concepts’ is that 
“concepts are mental particulars; specifically, they satisfy whatever ontological 
conditions have to be met by things that function as mental causes and effects” (1998a, p. 
23).  And since MOPs, on Fodor’s account, are both in the head and proximal mental 
causes (1998a, p. 20), one might think that Fodor takes concepts themselves to be 
identical with their corresponding mental representations.17   
 Before we get to what I take to be a legitimate worry about the claim that 
concepts are identical with mental representations (/MOPs), let’s consider a recent 
argument Peacocke has put forward, which I think leaves that claim untouched: 
If we accept that a thinker’s possession of a concept must be realized by some 
subpersonal state involving a mental representation, why not say simply that the 
concept is the mental representation?  … [Because it can] be true that there are 
concepts human beings may never acquire, because of their intellectual 
limitations, or because the sun will expand to eradicate human life before humans 
reach a state at which they can acquire these concepts.  ‘There are concepts that 
will never be acquired’ cannot mean or imply ‘There are mental representations 
which are not mental representations in anyone’s mind’.  If concepts are 
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 Fodor often moves freely between talk of MOPs, concepts, and mental representations. See especially 
(1998a, pp. 15-22).   
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individuated by their possession conditions, on the other hand, there is no problem 
about the existence of concepts that will never be acquired.  They are simply 
concepts whose possession conditions will never be satisfied by thinkers.  (2005, 
p. 169, original emphasis) 
If concepts aren’t mental representations, this argument certainly doesn’t show it.  The 
fact that there are concepts that no human will ever acquire (or thoughts that no human 
will ever entertain) is perfectly consistent with the claim that concepts (or thoughts) are 
mental representations.  For the latter claim can be understood in terms of mental-
representation types, in which case ‘There are concepts that will never be acquired’ can 
mean ‘There are mental representations which are not mental representations in anyone’s 
mind’.  Of course, the sun may wipe us out before anyone entokens such a mental 
representation, but that surely doesn’t show that the concept couldn’t be the mental 
representation.  Indeed, given that Peacocke himself thinks that there are concepts that 
may never be entokened (and thus apparently doesn’t have a problem with abstract types 
in general), I don’t see why he thinks the same can’t be true for the corresponding mental 
representations.   
In any case, there’s another, more serious worry about the claim that concepts are 
mental representations, and that is that there are prima facie cases in which the two can 
come apart.18 There are really two worries here.  One is that the same concept can 
                                                 
18
 We touched on this issue in Chapter 1, when we discussed the different notions of ‘concept’ found in 
philosophy and psychology.  It bears emphasis that the ontological dispute between those who take 
concepts to be mental representations and those who take them to be what’s expressed by mental 
representations crosscuts the dispute between those who take concepts to be needed primarily for the 
purposes of psychological explanation and those who take it to be needed primarily for normative 
epistemology.  As we noted in Chapter 1, Peacocke (1992a) and Rey (1994, 1998b) think there are good 
reasons for distinguishing concepts and mental representations, whereas Laurence and Margolis (1999) and 
Fodor do not (although see below).   
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correspond to different mental representations in different people (and perhaps different 
time-slices of the same person), and the other is that the same mental representation can 
correspond to different concepts in different people (and perhaps different time-slices of 
the same person).  Rey provides the following examples to motivate each of these 
worries: 
One person might express the concept CITY by the word “city,” another by the 
word “ville”; still another perhaps by a mental image of bustling boulevards; but, 
for all that, they might have the same concept CITY; one could believe and another 
doubt that cities are healthy places to live.  Moreover, different people could 
employ the same representation to express different concepts: one person might 
use an image of Paris to express PARIS, another to express FRANCE.  (1994, p. 
186; quoted in Laurence and Margolis 1999, p. 76) 
If this is right, then possessing a particular mental representation is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for possessing a particular concept.   
 Let’s put the second case (where the same representation is used to express 
distinct concepts) to one side, and focus on the first kind of case.  Note that it’s 
essentially an application of the familiar claim that mental properties are multiply 
realized.  If type-type identity theory is false with respect to the propositional attitudes, as 
most philosophers of psychology believe, then it’s presumably also false with respect to 
concepts and their corresponding mental representations.  The empirical and 
philosophical arguments in favor of multiple realizability thus also provide prima facie 
support for the claim that the same concept can correspond to distinct mental 
representations in different people (or different time-slices of the same person).   
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A defender of the view that concepts are mental representations might be 
unconvinced, however.  For even if one grants that different mental-representation types 
can express the same concept, one might object, it doesn’t follow that concepts can’t be 
identified with mental representations.  For it all depends on how one types the mental 
representations.  If a token of mental-representation type M1, and a token of mental-
representation type M2, each express the same concept C, then obviously C can’t be 
identical with either M1 or M2.  But, the objection continues, the claim that concepts 
aren’t mental representations will follow from this only under the assumption that the 
token of M1 and the token of M2 aren’t each also tokens of some broader mental-
representation type, say, M3.  For if they are, then C may very well be identical with M3, 
in which case the claim that concepts are mental representations survives.19 
 There’s at least something right about this objection, for surely two tokens of 
distinct mental-representation types can nevertheless be tokens of the same mental-
representation type, if the latter is typed more broadly.  Indeed, this is true of two tokens 
of anything.  On my desk there is a copy of Concepts: Core Readings and a copy of The 
Elm and the Expert.  These are two tokens of distinct types, if we type according to which 
book the tokens are tokens of.  But if we type the things on my desk more broadly, in 
terms of books, mugs, clocks, and phones, then these two tokens will be of the same type, 
namely, book.  If we type more broadly still, then all of the tokens on my desk will be of 
the same type, say, object.  The point is that the objection above is absolutely right that 
we can evaluate claims about whether concepts are identical with mental representations 
only if we know the appropriate fineness-of-grain with which to type mental-
representations.  But what is the appropriate fineness-of-grain?  We know that, say, 
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 Laurence and Margolis raise an objection of this sort (1999, p. 76).   
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mental representation is too broad, since surely there are some type-distinct mental 
representations.  But what about a mental image of bustling boulevards and a predicate in 
the language of thought corresponding to “city”?  Given that mental representations are 
posited as part of an explanatory psychology, the latter is clearly what we should look to 
in order to answer this question.   
Now, given the Shareability Constraint, there are good explanatory reasons for 
thinking that two people can share the concept CITY, regardless of the character of the 
corresponding mental representations.  Moreover, I take it that the question of whether 
the internal representations are type-identical or type-distinct is an empirical one.  That 
said, there seem to be two relevant possibilities for typing the representations.  According 
to one, the internal representations ought to be typed according to their purely formal 
properties.  On this way of individuating representations, the token mental image and the 
token word-like representation will apparently be of distinct types.  For formal properties 
are simply non-semantic properties, and these two representations clearly have distinct 
non-semantic properties.  The image presumably has certain imagistic (/iconic) properties 
that are individuative, and the word-like representation presumably has certain 
orthographic (/discursive) properties that are individuative.  
For what it’s worth, I take it that this way of individuating representations accords 
with our intuitions.  Prima face, an image of a house is a different type of representation 
than the predicate “house,” even though they may be identical in content (i.e., they’re 
both about houses).  This way of individuating also sits well with some of the things that 
Fodor says when he’s summarizing the basic tenets of the Representational Theory of 
Mind.  For instance, he says: 
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[Propositional attitudes] … have their logical forms intrinsically.  Which is to say 
not only that if x and y are propositional attitudes of different logical forms they 
are ipso facto different mental particulars, but also that they are ipso facto mental 
particulars of different types.  (Fodor 2000a, p. 14, original emphasis)   
Note that Fodor puts the point here in terms of logical form.  But that’s because he’s only 
concerned with the propositional attitudes, whose relevant formal properties are their 
logical-form properties.  So the mere fact that mental images don’t have logical forms is 
beside the point.  The claim is that what matters for the type-individuation of mental 
representations is their formal properties.20 On this way of typing mental representations, 
the above example would constitute a case in which two tokens of distinct mental-
representation types each correspond to the same concept.  I take it, then, that on this way 
of individuating, such examples would show that concepts are not identical with mental 
representations.   
 However, there’s another way to individuate the internal mental-representations 
that correspond to concepts, namely, in terms of their functional/causal roles.  On this 
view, whether two token mental representations are of the same type is a matter of 
whether the representations have identical functional/causal roles.  If they do, then 
they’re of the same type, and if they don’t, then they aren’t.  Fodor also seems to endorse 
this way of individuating internal representations: 
If … MOPs are in the head, then they can be proximal mental causes and are, to 
that extent, apt for functional individuation.  If MOPs are both in the head and 
                                                 
20
 See also note 8 above.  
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functionally individuated, then a MOP’s identity can be constituted by what 
happens when you entertain it.  (1998a, p. 20, original emphasis).21   
On this way of individuating mental representations, are a token mental image of bustling 
boulevards and a token predicate in Mentalese corresponding to “city” tokens of identical 
mental-representation types?  Again, in the end it’s an empirical issue, of course.  But it’s 
at least not prima facie implausible that those who entoken an image of bustling 
boulevards when they entertain CITY, and those who entoken a predicate in that language 
of thought when they entertain CITY, are entokening representations that have distinct 
functional/causal roles.  It seems reasonable that a person who uses the image to express 
CITY will be entokening a representation that has a different causal profile than the 
representation entokened in someone who uses the predicate.  If this is correct, then the 
above example does pose a threat to the claim that concepts are identical with mental 
representations. 
 But suppose it were to turn out that although the image and the predicate in the 
language of thought are formally distinct, they’re identical in their functional/causal 
roles.  If this were the case, then individuating mental representations terms of their roles 
                                                 
21
 The following passage makes essentially the same point, but in terms of machine states: “The 
characterization of the type/token relation for Mentalese is functional, recursive, and (what else?) highly-
counterfactual.  Suppose we have a machine that computes in Mentalese.  For convenience, suppose it has 
an input tape and an output tape, and that Mentalese can be written on either.  I assume that we can 
recognize the numerical identity of the machine’s tape states, hence that the notion of numerically identical 
tape states is available to us to use for the characterization of type identity for Mentalese symbols.  Suppose 
that T1 and T2 are token inscriptions that do or can appear on the machine’s tapes.  Then: 1. T1 and T2 are 
tokens of the same type if, for any machine process (i.e., for any operation compatible with the machine’s 
table), the numerically same output state that was (or would have been) produced by the machine when it is 
given T1 as input would have been produced if the input had been T2; and vice versa.  2. If Ti and Tj 
belong to the same symbol type by criterion 1, then Tm and Tn belong to the same symbol type if any 
machine process that yielded (or would have yielded) Ti as output given Tm as input would have issued in 
Tj as output if the input had been Tn.  3. The type/token relation for primitive expression is closed under 1 
and 2.  The basic idea is that two tokens are of the very same type if they would both cause the machine to 
be in the very same states; i.e., in the numerically same states” (Fodor 1994, pp.105-109, original 
emphasis).   
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would provide a potential reply to the sorts of cases that motivate the claim that concepts 
are distinct from their corresponding internal representations.  For examples like the one 
above wouldn’t be cases in which there are two tokens of distinct mental-representation 
types corresponding to the same concept.  However, adopting this way of individuating 
representations would clearly create problems for Informational Atomism.  For if MOPs 
(i.e., the internal representations) are individuated in terms of their functional/causal 
roles, and MOPs = concepts, then concepts are individuated in terms of their 
functional/causal roles.  This implication will of course be anathema to Informational 
Atomists, who think that conceptual/inferential role semantics inevitably leads to 
semantic holism, which in turn violates the Shareability Constraint and has disastrous 
consequences for intentional psychology.22 Given that Informational Atomists deny that 
concepts can be functionally individuated such that they satisfy the Shareability 
Constraint, one wonders why the functional individuation of MOPs will be any less 
problematic, if MOPs = concepts.   
Once again, the problem can be posed as a dilemma.  The Informational Atomist 
can individuate the internal representations corresponding to concepts either in terms of 
their formal properties or in terms of their functional/causal roles.  The former strategy 
allows for the possibility of tokens of distinct mental-representation types to correspond 
to the same concept, which threatens the claim that concepts are identical with their 
corresponding mental representations.  But the latter strategy plausibly also allows for 
this possibility, in which case it too threatens the identification claim.  (Of course if it 
turns out that the tokens are of the same mental-representation types because they have 
                                                 
22
 This point is made in Aydede (1998).  See Fodor and Lepore (1992) for an extensive discussion of the 
disastrous consequences of holism.   
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identical functional/causal roles, then the claim that concepts are internal representations 
is no longer threatened.)  But it’s not clear that Informational Atomists can adopt this way 
of individuating mental representations, since it’s apparently at odds with their insistence 
that concepts cannot be individuated functionally.  If this is right, then Informational 
Atomists must either give up on the claim that concepts are identical with mental 
representations, or allow that at least some concepts are individuated in terms of their 
roles.   
 One possible way out for the Informational Atomist would be to claim that this is 
a false dilemma.  For perhaps one can maintain both that mental representations are 
individuated in terms of their formal properties and that they’re individuated in terms of 
their functional/causal roles.  The way to do so is to claim that the functional/causal role 
of a mental representation supervenes on its formal properties, or, to put it slightly 
differently, that a mental representation has its functional/causal role in virtue of (among 
other things) its formal properties.  In fact, this claim is part and parcel of the very 
computationalism that Fodor champions (at least for the modular components of the 
mind; Fodor 1983, 2000a).  Here are two of the three defining features of the 
computational theory of mind as laid out by Fodor:  
i. Thoughts have their casual roles in virtue of, inter alia, their logical form.  
ii. The logical form of a thought supervenes on the syntactic form of the 
corresponding mental representation.  (2000a, p. 18)23 
Given this, a belief whose logical form is conjunctive will correspond to a mental 
representation whose syntactic form is conjunctive, and the syntax of the mental 
                                                 
23
 The third is the following: “iii. Mental processes (including, paradigmatically, thinking) are 
computations, that is, they are operations defined on the syntax of mental representations, and they are 
reliably truth preserving in indefinitely many cases” (Fodor, 2000a, pp. 18-19).   
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representation is what determines its functional/causal role.  For instance, suppose I 
entertain the belief that John ran and Mary swam, and thereby entoken the corresponding 
conjunctive mental representation.  Suppose further that my entertaining this belief 
causes me to entertain the belief that John ran.  The former thought caused me to 
entertain the latter thought in virtue of its logical form, which, according to 
computationalism, supervenes on the syntax of the corresponding mental representation.  
In such a case, both the causal role of the representation and its formal properties are 
individuative, since they bear some sort of determination/dependency relation to one 
another.   
 While this is a promising move, note that it will only work for complex mental 
representations, i.e., representations that have internal structure upon which their causal 
role can supervene.  It will thus work for the propositional attitudes, since their 
corresponding mental representations are presumably structured.  However, the 
Informational Atomist can apparently make no such appeal in the case of lexical concepts 
that putatively correspond to distinct mental representations in different people.  For the 
Atomist is committed to the claim that lexical concepts lack internal structure, and thus 
have no structure upon which their causal roles can supervene.  In the case of lexical 
concepts, then, the Informational Atomist is apparently vulnerable to the above dilemma. 
 
Intentional Explanations  
 
In light of the these considerations, one may wonder why Fodor just doesn’t give up on 
the Shareability Constraint, at least as applied to the representational vehicles of thought.  
For perhaps what’s shared across people’s heads are not MOPs, but conceptual contents, 
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where the latter are understood broadly (as informational semantics requires).  Indeed, 
Fodor uses the fact that there can be interpersonal MOP variation to motivate the claim 
that psychological generalizations are stated in terms of broad content.  If this is right, 
then giving up on the Shareability Constraint for the representational vehicles of thought 
will pose no threat to the viability of intentional psychology.  Fodor explains his view as 
follows:  
One can, I think, imagine a world where everything is delicately balanced in the 
following way: Content is broad, the metaphysics of content is externalist (e.g., 
causal/informational), and modes of presentation are sentences of Mentalese.  
Modes of presentation with similar causal histories (or nomic affiliations; anyhow 
with similar broad contents) overlap enough in their syntax to sustain robust 
psychological generalizations.  But not enough to make the minds that these 
generalizations subsume homogenous under syntactic description.  …  In such a 
world, the laws that a computational psychology implements might be intractably 
and ineliminably intentional precisely because they are laws about broad content; 
viz., laws about a kind of content that computationally heterogeneous minds can 
share in virtue of similarities in their extrinsic relations.  (1994, p. 53, original 
emphasis)  
This argument is an ingenious attempt to turn an apparent weakness of Fodor’s treatment 
of Frege cases into a strength of Informational Atomism.   
Do concepts themselves satisfy the Shareability Constraint on this view?  Yes and 
No.  If concepts are identical with their corresponding MOPs, as Fodor sometimes 
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claims,24 then the answer is clearly “no”.  For MOPs, he allows, don’t satisfy the 
Constraint.  But if, as Fodor says elsewhere, “a concept is a MOP together with a 
content” (1998a, p. 20n.16, my emphasis), then concepts do satisfy the Constraint, at 
least along one of their dimensions.  That is, although MOPs aren’t shared, conceptual 
contents are.  And, again, if psychological explanations are broad, then the fact that 
concepts violate the Shareability Constraint along their MOP-dimension will not threaten 
the viability of intentional psychology.  Although this is elegant, Fodor’s treatment here 
apparently comes at a high price, namely, that one must give up on intentional 
explanations of people’s behavior in Frege cases. 
To see this, consider the hoary example of Oedipus, who didn’t want to marry his 
mother or kill his father, but ended up doing both all the same.  The common-sense/folk-
psychological explanation of Oedipus’ behavior, of course, is that Oedipus didn’t believe 
that Jocasta was his mother, or that the rude traveler was his father.  Let’s take the truth 
of this explanation as given.  The question is: how does Fodor’s account accommodate it?  
As we’ve seen, informational semantics forces Fodor to a non-semantic explanation of 
people’s behavior in Frege cases, for it has it that Oedipus’ desire to marry Jocasta is a 
mental state with the same content as the state Oedipus would have been in had he 
desired to marry his mother (which he didn’t).  Given this constraint, an explanation of 
Oedipus’ behavior cannot appeal to the contents of Oedipus’ thoughts.  Rather, the 
explanation must be pitched at the level of syntactically-individuated internal 
                                                 
24
 For instance: “I use ‘entertaining’ and ‘grasping’ a MOP (/concept) interchangeably” (Fodor, 1998a, p. 
17).  And: “For present purposes, it will do to think of thoughts as mental representations analogous to 
closed sentences, and concepts as mental representations analogous to the corresponding open ones” 
(Fodor, 1998a, p. 25).   
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representations—i.e., at the level of the mechanisms that implement intentional 
psychological laws.   
However, one may think that this is the wrong level at which to pitch the 
explanation, at least if the explanation is to respect the folk-psychological explanation.25 
For one might claim that the folk are not doing implementation-level psychology when 
they explain Oedipus’ behavior.  Rather, they’re simply appealing to what Oedipus 
believed and desired.  Oedipus was disgusted because he came to believe that he married 
his mother, and not just that some new terms in the language of thought came to be 
entokened in his nervous system.  Of course, if RTM is true, then Oedipus’ coming to 
have this belief just is his coming to stand in the belief-relation to a sentence in the 
language of thought.  And one might argue further that the folk-psychological 
explanation somehow makes implicit reference to non-semantic differences in the 
vehicles of Oedipus’ thoughts before and after he realizes what he’s done.  (Recall 
Fodor’s claim that attitude ascriptions specify the vehicle by displaying it.)  But even if 
Fodor’s account does not disrespect the explanatory practices of the folk, it does seem at 
odds with a content-based explanation of Oedipus’ behavior.   
 One may wonder, though, whether this is actually such a high price to pay.  After 
all, as we noted in Chapter 2, we shouldn’t expect a mature scientific psychology to 
respect folk psychology in its entirety.  Some bits of the latter may have to give way to 
the more sophisticated conception of ourselves that scientific psychology delivers.  
Indeed, some arguably already have.  Perhaps the folk-psychological explanation of 
peoples’ behavior in Frege cases is just one (more) example of this, in which case it’s no 
objection to Fodor’s account that it disrespects the folk-psychological explanation.   
                                                 
25
 I owe this objection to Peter Carruthers. 
 258 
But this reply ignores an important distinction.  It’s true, of course, that the 
categories of a mature scientific psychology might replace some folk-psychological 
categories while nevertheless remaining (in some sense) a vindication of it.  Exactly how 
many and which categories may be replaced is controversial.  But what isn’t 
controversial, I take it, is that if a developed scientific psychology fails to be intentional, 
then folk psychology will fail to be vindicated.  For folk psychology is, as Fodor likes to 
say, intentional through and through.  Thus, although folk psychology might survive the 
replacement of, say, the categories of belief and desire, it will not survive the replacement 
of intentional categories altogether.26 Fodor’s claim is not that an explanation of people’s 
behavior in Frege cases will not appeal to the folk-psychological categories of belief and 
desire.  But he does seem committed to the claim that such explanations will not appeal 
to the content of the relevant mental states, which does seem like a fairly high price.27 
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, the previous three sections constitute what I take to be a convincing case 
against Fodor’s treatment of Frege cases.  Let’s conclude, then, by supposing that Fodor 
                                                 
26
 Recall, in this regard, Fodor’s distinction between ‘conservative’ and ‘die-hard’ intentional realists: “A 
conservative intentional realist who is not a diehard can contemplate with equanimity the abandonment of 
belief/desire psychology strictly socalled, so long as the apparatus of intentional explanation is itself left 
intact” (1990, pp. 174-175, original emphasis).   
27
 Fodor (1994) seems to be aware of this consequence, since he claims not only that Frege cases are rare 
(contra Fodor 1980), but also that they are exceptions rather than counterexamples to psychological 
generalizations couched in terms of broad content.  Even if these claims are correct, however, that there 
should be an asymmetry between the kind of explanation required in Frege and non-Frege cases (i.e., that 
one invokes content and the other doesn’t) is itself a theoretically unattractive consequence of the view.  
For it seems odd to claim that a different kind of explanation is required merely because the person lacks 
some of the information upon which the success of his/her behavior depends.  If content is invoked in cases 
in which people happen to have all of the relevant information, then why shouldn’t it also be invoked in 
cases in which they don’t?  Because one’s theory of content requires it?  In any case, a full-fledged 
discussion of Fodor’s claims in The Elm and the Expert would take us too far afield.  As the literature on 
the book demonstrates, though, Fodor’s arguments there are not only far from clear, but also controversial.  
See, e.g., Arjo (1996), Brook and Stainton (1997), Segal (1997), and Aydede and Robbins (2001). 
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is wrong that MOPs should not be identified with senses, and asking ourselves the 
following two questions: (1) Does this also show that Fodor is wrong to deny that the 
rationality of a transition in thought, or a judgment, turns on its content?;  and (2) if so, 
does it follow that concepts are constitutively connected to reasons and rationality?   
Fodor apparently thinks that the answer to question (1) is “no”.  Consider the 
following passage: 
I would’ve thought there was considerable prima face evidence that chains of 
synonymous thoughts can differ in their rationality.  For example, it’s irrational to 
flout modes [sic] ponens in transparent cases, but it needn’t be when the premises 
are syntactically involute, in which case, it may be only a mistake.  If this is right 
some of the time, perhaps it is right all of the time.  And if it’s right all the time, 
then maybe any theory that can distinguish between the MOPs of equivalent 
thoughts whether or not it supposes that MOPs are senses can provide a 
reconstruction of rationality that’s, anyhow, as good as Frege’s.  What I like so 
much about the computational theory of mind is that, unlike Frege’s, it offers the 
prospect of a nonsemantic account of rationality; hence one that has a fighting 
chance of being mechanizable.  (2000b, p. 369, original emphasis) 
Note, first, that Fodor is helping himself to a distinction between what counts as an error 
of reasoning and what counts as a mere mistake.  For I take it that this is what the 
difference between irrationally flouting a transparent instance of modus ponens and 
accidentally flouting a non-transparent instance amounts to.  Now, I don’t know whether 
Fodor thinks there’s a principled distinction to be drawn here, and if so, how he thinks it 
should be drawn.  One way to do so would be to ground the distinction in an a priori/a 
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posteriori distinction.  But of course it’s not clear that, qua good Quinean, Fodor could 
do this.  In any case, even if there is a principled distinction between being irrational and 
merely making a mistake, I don’t see Fodor’s point here.  For if the reason that thoughts 
containing synonymous concepts can differ in their rationality is that the synonyms have 
distinct MOPs, then it’s unclear why the issue of whether MOPs are senses is irrelevant 
to providing a ‘reconstruction of rationality’.  If MOPs are senses, as Fregeans suppose, 
then it seems that whether or not a (transition in) thought is rational will depend upon its 
content; and if MOPs aren’t senses, then it won’t.  I simply don’t see how Fodor’s 
example affects this. 
 It’s prima facie plausible, then, that the answer to (1) is “yes”.  For if MOPs 
aren’t the representational vehicles of thoughts, then presumably they’re thought contents 
(i.e., senses).  And if MOPs are posited (as they traditionally have been) in order to 
explain such facts as, say, why John can rationally think the morning star is beautiful and 
that the evening star is ugly, then facts about rationality will turn on the content of 
thought.  Moreover, it seems to me that (contra Fodor’s claim in the last sentence of the 
above quote) such a Fregean position is perfectly compatible with the computational 
theory of mind.  Perhaps the latter is incompatible with Frege’s own anti-mentalistic 
theory.  But neo-Fregeans like Peacocke don’t accept Frege’s anti-mentalism, and are 
thus free to accept the fifth thesis of Fodor’s RTM: “whatever distinguishes coextensive 
concepts is ipso facto ‘in the head’” (1998a, p. 15).28 
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 Oddly enough, Fodor himself seems to recognize this point (1998a, p. 15n9).  It’s worth pointing out, 
moreover, that Frege himself was concerned with deduction, which is surely the best candidate when it 
comes to the plausibility of capturing rational relations in computational terms.  So I simply don’t see 
Fodor’s point about his nonsemantic account being better off than Frege’s in terms of having a “fighting 
chance of being mechanizable”.  Indeed, Fodor (1983, 2000a) himself has argued at length that the 
rationality involved in nondeductive forms of inference are problematic for the computational theory of 
mind.  Does he think we can give a nonsemantic account of that kind of rationality?   
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However, a positive answer to (1) needn’t imply a positive answer to (2).  We saw 
earlier that Peacocke assumes that what “all Fregean IRS theories, of whatever stripe, 
agree upon is the central place of reasons and rationality in the individuation of concepts” 
(2000a, p. 332).  However, it seems to me that one can adopt a version of Concept 
Pragmatism for (inter alia) the familiar Fregean reasons, while at the same time deny that 
concepts are constitutively connected to reasons and rationality.  For appealing to 
concepts in an explanation of facts about rationality does not require that one take the 
concepts themselves to be individuated in terms of rationality.   
To return to a previous example, suppose someone is perceiving an object as a 
square, and we want explain the difference in the rationality of the judgment that’s a 
square and the judgment that’s a diamond in those circumstances.  We may very well 
need to invoke content in the explanation.  But this doesn’t require that SQUARE and 
DIAMOND themselves be individuated in terms of what it’s rational to judge given an 
experience of a certain kind.  They may simply be individuated in terms of the 
corresponding judgments, in which case the question of their rationality and epistemic 
status would be a further question, whose answer is not, as it were, written into the 
identity of the concepts themselves.   
I argued earlier that Peacocke’s general argument for Knowledge Pragmatism 
fails because it presupposes a treatment of Frege cases that the Cartesian will deny.  We 
can now see that the argument fails even if the Cartesian treatment of Frege is false.  A 
defeat for Cartesianism here thus does not imply a victory for Knowledge Pragmatism.  I 
conclude, then, that Judgment Pragmatism is not threatened by anything either the 
Cartesian or the Knowledge Pragmatist has to say about Frege cases. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
 
 
 
We started with the meta-level question: What do we need a theory of concepts for?  I 
hope to have shown that taking an explanatory psychology to be the proper home of 
concepts can shed light on the recent debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept 
Pragmatists.  I’ve argued, in particular, that adopting the psychological perspective leads 
to a version of conceptual/inferential roles semantics—Judgment Pragmatism—according 
to which concepts are not constitutively tied to rationality and knowledge.   
The analytic/synthetic loomed large in our discussion, and I’d like to conclude 
with some remarks on its role in the dialectic.  As we’ve seen, the Quinean Challenge is 
the primary motivation for the Cartesian’s denial of constitutive connections among 
concepts.  My polemical strategy was to show the very meta-level approach adopted by 
Cartesians in fact provides powerful explanatory reasons for positing such a distinction.  
There’s irony here.  For while Cartesians claim that Pragmatists wrongly put 
epistemological and philosophical concerns in the driver’s seat when they construct their 
theories, my arguments show that Pragmatists can defend their position on the very 
explanatory grounds that Cartesians (rightly, in my view) take to be primary.  Once we 
see this, though, we can also see that Cartesians themselves ultimately adopt their 
position for primarily philosophical reasons (i.e., Quinean scruples), despite their own 
methodological moralizing. 
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Of course, Cartesians do argue against the analytic/synthetic distinction on 
empirical grounds.  But if my arguments are correct, Pragmatists needn’t worry about 
these arguments.  For I argued not only that these arguments don’t constitute a 
convincing case for Concept Atomism, but also that even if they are successful, they’re 
entirely compatible with a Pragmatism that does not take the constitutive roles of lexical 
concepts to be specified by their internal structure.  The upshot of this is that Fodor is 
wrong to claim that what “settles” the issue between informational semantics and 
conceptual/inferential role accounts is that only the former are compatible with Atomism 
(1998a, p. 15).  Contra Fodor, the empirical case for Atomism thus does not show that an 
informational semantics should be a defining thesis of the Representational Theory of 
Mind.  Rather, the latter can and should be built upon a version of conceptual/inferential 
role semantics.   
I can’t hope to have convinced the reader of all of the particular claims I defended 
above.   But, if nothing else, I hope my arguments illustrate that distinguishing the 
psychological and epistemological perspectives on concepts shows that Cartesians and 
Pragmatists alike have underestimated the number of positions available.   
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